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ABSTRACT 
 
The symptomatology of depression includes affective and cognitive features. As such, 
depression has been associated both with maladaptive concern over emotional material, and 
also with general impairments in attentional control. In the current thesis, I investigated the 
potential influence of such depression-related dysfunctional emotional processing on a range 
of cognitive control abilities, using experimental paradigms containing either neutral or 
affective stimuli. In contrast to the hypothesis that depressive symptoms are associated with 
generally compromised cognitive control, depression-related impairments were not found on 
a range of ‘classic’ measures of cognitive control, including error-processing (pre-error 
speeding, posterror slowing and error-related ERPs), overriding response conflict (colour-
word Stroop interference, conflict adaptation) or more sustained control processes (cued-RT 
performance, preparatory ERPs, and maintaining long-term speed-accuracy tradeoffs). 
Interestingly, however, differences between groups with low and elevated levels of depressive 
symptoms emerged during the performance of emotionally valenced tasks. First, an elevated 
depressive symptom group showed a reduced ability to resolve emotional conflict arising 
between competing affective representations. When compared with spared performance on 
the classic Stroop task, this result suggests that depressive symptoms are associated with a 
specific impairment in the ability to regulate emotional distraction. Secondly, an ERP related 
to advanced preparation in cued-RT tasks (the CNV), but not those associated with early 
perceptual processing (P1, N170), was selectively modulated by negative, but not positive, 
task-irrelevant emotional distractors presented during the cue-target interval. This pattern of 
ERP results supports a late processing locus of affective attentional bias in depression. 
Together, the current results propose that control processes which facilitate the regulation of 
emotional material (i.e., over emotional sources of distraction) might be selectively affected 
by increased depressive symptoms, suggesting that future work should consider affective 
variables when investigating executive control processes in depression.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Depression comprises both affective and cognitive symptoms. The emotional features of 
depressive symptomatology relate to a profound mood disturbance, which is associated with 
increased concern for negative material and sensitivity to personal failure (Beck, 1979; Beck 
2008; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV [DSM-IV], 1994; National 
Institute of Mental Health [NIMH], 2011). On the other hand, the cognitive symptoms of 
depression include subjective reports of diminished concentration and difficulty making 
decisions (DSM-IV, 1994; NIMH, 2011). As both cognitive and affective symptoms co-occur 
in depression, it seems imperative that experimental psychological research not only 
investigates depression-related changes in emotional and cognitive (non-emotional) processes 
in isolation, but also how these factors might interact. In the current thesis, through both 
processes of literature review and novel empirical research, a particular group of cognitive 
functions, collectively referred to as cognitive control, were studied during the presence of 
both emotional and non-emotional information in order to investigate the contribution of both 
emotional and cognitive factors on performance in participant groups with elevated levels of 
depressive symptoms.  
1.0.1 What is Cognitive Control? 
In our everyday lives we must often perform complex and effortful tasks in noisy and 
challenging environments.  In order to facilitate performance in such situations, the human 
cognitive system possesses a remarkable flexibility to regulate perception, attention, and 
action in the pursuit of performance goals. In experimental psychology, both the terms 
executive function and cognitive control are used to encompass the broad range of processes 
which serve to facilitate effortful performance in such demanding contexts (cf. Baddeley, 
1986; Banich, 2009; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 2001; Miyake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki & Howerter, 2000). Control processes benefit the maintenance of goal 
16 
 
directed behavior in many diverse ways, such as: reducing interference from sources of 
misleading distraction in the environment (Banich, 2009; Botvinick et al., 2001; Miyake et 
al., 2000), shifting performance to a more conservative style of responding after making a 
mistake (e.g., Laming, 1968; Rabbitt & Rogers, 1977), or by preparing mental processes in a 
future-oriented manner, in anticipation of an up-coming challenge (Banich, 2009; Braver, 
2012).  
1.0.2 Why Might Cognitive Control Interact with Emotion? 
While the human mind possesses a large information processing capability, the ability 
to focus on current task performance is susceptible to distraction from salient, but goal-
irrelevant material (Botivnick et al., 2001; Lavie, 2005; Marois & Ivanoff, 2005; Miyake et 
al., 2000). Importantly, it has been proposed that emotional material is particularly salient 
and, when present, affective signals might gain “privileged access” to information processing 
(c.f., Hodsoll, Viding & Lavie, 2011; Reeck & Egner, 2011). On the one hand, this honored 
status of affective signals potentially benefits the individual by bringing negative, but 
motivationally relevant events (e.g., cues indicating personal threat or the grief of another 
individual) to the focus of attention (Iordan et al., 2013; Pessoa, 2008). On the other hand, the 
enhanced attentional processing of spontaneously occurring, but processing otherwise goal-
irrelevant emotional information might incur a significant cost to non-emotional aspects of 
on-going performance (Hodsoll et al., 2011; Iordan et al., 2013; Pessoa, 2008; Reeck & 
Egner, 2011; Siegle, Ingram & Matt, 2002). Consequently, task-irrelevant emotional 
information may be particularly resilient to control efforts (Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006), 
providing a potent form of environmental distraction (cf. Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Iordan 
et al., 2013; Hodsoll et al., 2011; Pessoa, 2008; Reeck & Egner, 2011). In addition to 
environmental affective signals potentially interfering with on-going performance, affect that 
is integrally related to task performance, such as the aversive experience of committing an 
17 
 
error or negative feedback, has been proposed motivate improvements in performance in the 
avoidance of future negative events (c.f., Botvinick, 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Inzlicht & 
Legault, in press; Pessoa, 2008). Therefore, in such circumstances affect potentially aids 
performance by indicating the need to increase control efforts (Botvinick, 2007). In light of 
the diverse benefical and detrimental effects of emotion on performance, the relationship 
between affective and cognitive processes has recently been referred to as a “double-edged 
sword” (Iordan et al., 2013): On the one hand task-irrelevant emotion has the potential to 
interfere with and impair successful on-going performance, while on the other hand, affective 
processes can determine the motivational salience of events, potentially driving the up-
regulation of cognitive control. 
The particular interest of the current thesis was to investigate potential interactions 
between cognitive control and affect for participants reporting elevated levels of depressive 
symptoms. More specifically, as depressive symptomatology is fundamentally associated 
with disordered emotional processing, the general hypothesis pursued within the current 
thesis is that deleterious effects of affective processing on task performance will become 
more pronounced for participants with elevated as compared to low levels of depressive 
symptoms. The goal of the following general introduction section is to provide a theoretical 
background to the novel empirical work presented in this thesis. First, however, I will first 
provide a brief overview of the phenomenology and some theoretical accounts of depressive 
symptomatology. 
1.1 Depression 
1.1.1 The Nature of Depression 
Depression is a commonly occurring mental disorder, with prevalence estimates for clinical 
diagnoses of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) generally ranging between 5 to 20 % of the 
18 
 
adult population (Angst, 1995; Kessler et al., 2007; Wittchen & Jacobi, 2005). Further 
indicating the high frequency of mood disturbance in western society, milder forms of 
depression are potentially experienced by over 30% of the adult population (Angst, 1995). 
The most salient feature of depression is perhaps the sustained and profound mood 
disturbance which largely characterizes the disorder. Depressed individuals typically report 
increased negative emotions such as feelings of guilt, worthlessness, low self-esteem and 
irritability (DSM-IV, 1994; NIMH, 2011). In addition to such increased negative affect, 
depressed individuals also report reduced positive affect, such as taking less interest in 
previously enjoyable activities, general loss of pleasure or a lack of interest in sex (DSM-IV, 
1994; NIHM, 2011). Furthermore, depressive symptomatology also commonly co-occurs 
with anxiety disorders and anxious symptoms (c.f., Fountoulakis et al., 2007; Hirschfield, 
2001) to an extent that a unitary diagnosis of depression without elevated anxiety levels has 
been described as the ‘exception’ rather than the ‘rule’ (Hirschfield, 2001). In specific 
relation to affective features, both anxiety and depression are characterized by increased 
levels of negative affect, while reduced positive affect or anhedonia is generally considered a 
distinct feature of depression (c.f., Watson, Clark & Carey, 1988). In addition to emotional 
disturbance, depressed individuals also often report somatic-physical symptoms, such as sleep 
disturbance, decreased/increased appetite or general aches and pains (DSM-IV, 1994; NIHM, 
2011). Finally, and important for current concerns, cognitive symptoms of depression include 
complaints of generally diminished concentration, reduced memory for details and difficulty 
making decisions (DSM-IV, 1994; NIHM, 2011). Therefore, ‘depression’ encompasses a 
range of emotional, somatic and cognitive features, and, as a consequence of this 
heterogeneous symptom profile, depression is highly debilitating for the individual in daily 
life (Hirschfield, 2001; Wittchen & Jacobi, 2005). More specifically, in addition to the 
exacerbation of physical ailments and pain (Spiegel, Sands & Koopman, 1994), bouts of 
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depression are known to increase strain on the sufferer in household, social and work-place 
environments (Andrews, 2001; Judd, Paulus, Wells & Rapaport, 1996; Miller, 2010; 
Moussavi et al., 2007). Finally, both clinical and sub-clinical levels of depression have been 
linked to “excess mortality”, attributed both to increased suicide risk and other factors, such 
as unhealthy life-style choices (e.g., excessive tobacco smoking or alcohol consumption) 
(Cuijpers & Smit, 2002; Ebmeier et al., 2006). 
1.1.2 The Etiology of Depression 
While an exhaustive discussion of the putative causes of depression is outside the scope 
of the current thesis, it is nevertheless important to briefly review some of the most prominent 
theoretical concepts regarding the etiology of depression. Most theoretical discussions of 
depression propose that depressive episodes are both initiated and maintained by interactions 
between genetic, psychological (e.g., personality, negative cognitive biases), and 
environmental factors (e.g., major or minor life stress, bereavement, or the breakup of a 
personal relationship) (c.f., Beck, 2008; De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Ebmeier, Donahey & 
Steele, 2006; Keedwell, 2008; Nolen-hoeksema, 1991; Sullivan, Neale & Kendler, 2000). 
More specifically, latent vulnerability factors (e.g., genetics, personality) are proposed to 
increase susceptibility to depression by sensitizing the individual to concern-related stressors 
(Beck, 2008; De Raedt & Koster, 2010). For example, Beck’s influential cognitive theory of 
depression suggests that underlying ‘dysfunctional attitudes’ relating to negative views about 
“the self, the world and the future” bias cognitive processing (e.g., memories, interpretation 
of events, and attention) in depression-vulnerable individuals towards negative, concern-
related material, ultimately leading to increased and/or prolonged depressed mood (Beck, 
1979; for recent reviews see Beck, 2008; Disner, Beevers, Haigh & Beck, 2011). Importantly, 
individual differences in such biased processing has the potential to explain why some 
individuals respond to negative life events with resilience, whilst such stressors to others 
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appear to provoke depressive episodes (see Beck, 1979; Beck, 2008; De Raedt & Koster, 
2010).  
One suggestion from Beck’s cognitive theory of particular importance for current 
concerns is the proposal that attentional bias towards concern-related material in the 
environment might confer significant depression vulnerability. Increased attentional 
engagement with sad material, perceived as self-referent by the depressed individual, is 
proposed to reinforce the negative thought patterns or “dysfunctional attitudes” that putatively 
perpetuate depressive symptoms (Beck, 1979; Beck, 2008; De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). Early experimental attempts to provide empirical support for such valence-
specific attentional biases in depression often failed, leading to the suggestion that depression 
may not be associated with mood-congruent attentional bias (c.f., Mogg & Bradley, 2005; 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). More recently, however, it has been proposed 
that previous null findings are largely attributable to the short presentation duration of 
emotional material in many initial investigations. In contrast, studies presenting depression-
relevant material (i.e., sad stimuli) for longer stimulus durations (typically > 1000 ms) have 
more reliably reported mood-congruent attentional biases towards negative material in 
depressed participants (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue,  & 
Joormann, 2004; Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 2005; Leyman, De Raedt, 
Vaeyens, & Philippaerts, 2011; for a recent review see De Raedt & Koster, 2010). These 
findings suggest that depression is not associated with rapid and involuntary orienting 
towards negative material, as appears to be the case in anxious disorders (see Bradley et al., 
1997; Mogg & Bradley, 2005), but instead with the inability to disengage or inhibit deep or 
elaborative processing of mood-congruent, sad material once such content has become the 
focus of attention (c.f. Gotlib et al., 2004; Joormann, 2004; Koster et al., 2005; Koster, De 
Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011).  
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1.2 Cognitive Control Processes and Depressive symptoms.  
In remainder of this general introduction I will provide a theoretical background for the 
cognitive control functions to be investigated throughout the empirical work presented in this 
thesis. Additionally, this review will serve to provide motivation for the study of these 
specific processes in association with depressive symptoms. Looking ahead, the review 
proposes three core aspects of cognitive control which are relevant to the current project. 
First, control processes which serve goal-directed behaviour by: 1) overriding interference 
from pre-potent responses (Banich, 2009; Botvinick et al., 2001; Miyake et al., 2000), and, 2) 
preparing mental processes in a future-oriented or anticipatory manner before the onset of an 
imperative stimulus (Banich, 2009; Braver, 2012) will be discussed. Together, such cognitive 
control processes may be considered as functioning to help the individual minimize the risk 
of performance failure in challenging situations. Despite our best interests, however, mistakes 
do occur, and it is vital that the cognitive system has mechanisms in place to successful detect 
our mistakes, and subsequently initiate a more cautious style of responding in order to reduce 
the occurrence of future errors (Botvinick et al., 2001; Laming, 1979; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 
1977). Therefore, the final section of this general introduction will review research that aims 
to understand the mechanisms involved in the detection of errors and the subsequent remedial 
adaptation of performance. 
Throughout the following section I will cover each of these control processes in turn, 
first reviewing the basic theoretical framework for each function, and subsequently relating 
the process to depressive symptoms, proposing the specific hypotheses to be tested in the 
empirical work presented in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
1.3 Overcoming Processing Interference. 
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One central task for cognitive control processes is to facilitate attention to currently 
relevant aspects of the environment, whilst reducing the influence of irrelevant environmental 
stimulation which introduces noise to the information processing system (see Botvinick et al., 
2001; Eriksen & Schultz, 1979; Gratton, Coles & Donchin, 1992). The requirement for such 
attentional focus is particularly prevalent when irrelevant noise in the environment has the 
potential to prime a viable (i.e., within the potential response set), but currently incorrect 
response alternative (Botvinick et al., 2001; Kornblum, Hasbroucq & Osman, 1990). This 
ability to selectively attend to task-relevant representations despite conflicting information is 
generally considered to represent a fundamental characteristic of executive functioning (cf. 
Banich, 2009; Botvinick et al., 2001; Macleod, 1991; Miyake et al., 2000).  
In experimental psychology, a number of paradigms have been employed to study the 
effects of processing interference on behaviour. In the following sections I will first provide a 
brief overview of three particularly common interference protocols: The Eriksen Flanker task 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974); the Simon task (Simon & Rudell, 1967) and the Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935). Subsequently, I will focus on the putative mechanisms and neural substrates 
associated with the exertion of attentional control in these tasks. For the sake of brevity, this 
review was biased towards research using the Stroop task due to both its high prevalence in 
studies using depressed samples and direct bearing on the empirical work presented in the 
current thesis. In addition to these commonly used interference paradigms, I will review an 
affective variant of the Stroop protocol (the Emotional-face Stroop task, Etkin, Egner, Peraza, 
Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006) which will be used in later empirical work to study control over 
conflict arising from competing affective representations in participants with elevated levels 
of depressive symptoms.  
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1.3.1 Experimental Indices of Processing Interference. 
The Eriksen Flanker  task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974).  
In the classic Eriksen-Flanker paradigm participants are instructed to respond to the 
central letter (e.g., either H or S) of a horizontally aligned array of letters (e.g., HHHHH). 
Responses in this task are typically facilitated (i.e., faster and more accurate) if the noise, or 
flanker, letters surrounding the target are response compatible (e.g., SSSSS or HHHHH). 
Conversely, responses are impaired (i.e., slower and less accurate) when flanker letters are 
incompatible with the response target (e.g., HHSHH or SSHSS). Furthermore, if response 
irrelevant letters, (i.e., letters not available in the current response set, e.g., OOSOO) are 
presented as flankers, reaction time (RT) and accuracy levels tend to fall in-between those 
achieved in compatible and incompatible trials (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), suggesting that 
processes of response facilitation and interference occur on compatible and incompatible 
stimulus arrays, respectively. Thus, interference occurs in the Flanker paradigm when two 
stimulus dimensions, which symbolically relate to mutually exclusive response alternatives, 
are presented simultaneously creating conflict between response representations.  
 
The Simon task (Simon & Rudell, 1967). 
The Simon task provides a further example of an interference paradigm commonly used 
in experimental psychology. In an example Simon task participants respond to inherently 
non-spatial stimuli (e.g., colours, shapes or symbols) using opposing manual key-press 
responses with the left and right hands (e.g., ■ = left response, □ = right response). Response 
conflict is manipulated in this task by presenting target symbols in a spatial location that is 
either corresponding (e.g., ■ target on the left side of the screen, requiring a left hand 
response) or non-corresponding (e.g., ■ target on the right side of the screen, requiring a left 
hand response) with the task-relevant stimulus-response mapping. Importantly, unlike the 
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Flanker task, conflict arises in the Simon task when innately spatial information (physical 
target location) cues the opposing response to the task-relevant action conveyed by symbolic 
aspects of the stimulus (Kornblum et al., 1990). Consequently, targets presented in non-
corresponding stimulus locations are associated with performance interference whilst 
performance is facilitated for targets presented in corresponding stimulus locations (e.g., 
Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; St rmer,  euthold, Soetens, & Schr ter, 2002;   hr & Kunde, 
2008). Furthermore, because priming by spatial location does not require translation from 
symbolic representations to action selection (e.g., as is the case letters in the standard flanker 
paradigm that are innately unrelated to spatial location), it is commonly regarded that spatial 
information in the Simon task primes action selection through a route more automatic or 
direct than the more intentional or deliberate route that facilitates goal-relevant stimulus 
feature processing (c.f.,  Kornblum et al., 1990). Consequently, it has been suggested that 
attentional control in the Simon task may be exerted to suppress the influence of this direct 
priming route in order to reduce interference caused by spatial priming (St rmer,  euthold, 
Soetens, & Schr ter, 2002;  euthold, 2011). 
The Stroop task (Stroop, 1935).  
Once described as “the gold standard of attentional measures” (Macleod, 1992), the 
classic colour-word Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) is among the most frequently employed 
paradigms in experimental psychology (Macleod, 1991; Macleod, 1992). On a classic Stroop 
trial, participants are required to identify the physical colour of a written word (colour-
naming) while ignoring, or not attending to, the written form of the word (word reading). 
Take as an example a simple Stroop protocol in which two words (RED and BLUE) are 
printed in either red or blue ink. Depending on the nature of the stimulus the semantic 
meaning of the irrelevant word dimension may either be compatible (e.g., “B UE”, presented 
in blue ink) or incompatible (e.g., “B UE”, presented in red ink) with the colour-naming goal 
25 
 
of the task. Importantly, the relationship between task relevant and irrelevant stimulus 
dimensions has strong implications for behavioural performance: Responses are typically 
faster and more accurate on compatible compared to incompatible trials (Macleod, 1991; 
Stroop, 1935). Furthermore, colour-naming performance to ‘neutral’ words that are 
semantically unrelated to the colours included in the response-set (e.g., a string of coloured 
letters, e.g., “XXXX”; a non-colour word, e.g., “CHAIR”) are typically slower and less 
accurate than compatible probes, but faster and more accurate than incompatible trials, 
suggesting processes of both facilitation and interference are generated by word-reading on 
compatible and incompatible trials, respectively (see Macleod, 1991 for a review).  
The occurrence of this Stroop interference is commonly explained by a difference in the 
strength of processing in parallel information processing channels representing colour-naming 
and word-reading aspects of a Stroop stimulus. More specifically, it is suggested that that 
stronger or more automatic word-reading processes have the ability to interfere with colour-
naming (cf. Cohen, Dunbar & McClelland, 1990; Macleod, 1991). Furthermore, research 
suggests that conflict in the Stroop paradigm arises from competing information 
representations at both semantic (meaning) and response-related levels of processing (see De 
Houwer, 2003a; Macleod, 1991; Van Veen & Carter, 2005). Most important for current 
concerns, however, are suggestions that individual differences in levels of Stroop interference 
can inform the state of executive control processes associated with psychopathology (George 
et al., 1997; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Snyder, 2013). In this regard, the Stroop task appears 
to have been the most frequently studied interference protocol in relation to depressive 
symptoms, with the Stroop interference effect commonly cited as a prototypical measure of 
inhibitory control over prepotent responses in cross-sectional studies (Miyake et al., 2000; 
Snyder, 2013). It is important to note, however, that during Stroop performance it is 
ambiguous as to whether control is exerted over performance by a mechanism which 
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deliberately inhibits the processing of task-irrelevant stimulus dimensions (i.e., reduces 
automatic word-reading), or a mechanism that has an excitatory influence of task-relevant 
processes (i.e., amplifies colour-naming processes), or a combination of both (Aron, 2007; 
Cohen et al., 1990; Egner & Hirsch, 2005). Consequently, the adaptive biasing of attention 
assumed to reduce interference effects in the Stroop paradigm will be referred to as  an 
attentional control processes throughout the current thesis, as this terminology is deliberately 
neutral about the mechanism by which the prepotent response is avoided (Aron, 2007). 
1.3.2. Overcoming Interference: Sequential Adjustments in Control after Processing 
Conflict. 
 
In addition to the overall interference effects reported in paradigms such as the Eriksen 
flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), the Simon task (Simon & Rudell, 1967), and the 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), it is assumed that the effect of conflict on performance on a given 
trial is modulated in reaction to the conflict level experienced in the previous trial.  First 
observed by Gratton and colleagues (1992) in the flanker task, the classic behavioural 
manifestation of this sequential adjustment effect is depicted in Figure 1. As can be observed, 
the influence of conflict on the current trial (i.e., Trial N) is reduced when trial N-1 included 
response conflict (i.e., an incompatible array). Importantly, highlighting the ubiquity of this 
sequential effect across paradigms, analogous adaptations have been reported using a range of 
common interference tasks, including  the classic and modified versions of the Stroop task  
(Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, Stenger 
& Carter, 2004; Kerns et al., 2005; est, Choi & Travers, 2010), the Simon task (Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2007; Notebeart & Verguts, 2011; St rmer et al., 2002;   hr & Ansorge, 2005; 
Wühr & Kunde, 2008) and the Arrow flanker task (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter & 
Cohen, 1999; Ullsperger, Bylsma & Botvinick, 2005). Therefore, together, these results 
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suggest that this Congruency Sequence Effect (CSE, Egner, 2007) reflects a highly replicable 
and relatively fundamental (i.e., not task specific) aspect of online control adjustment after 
conflict.  
Theoretical accounts of the CSE propose that an adaptive mechanism exerts increased 
attentional control after the experience of conflict, reducing the influence of irrelevant 
stimulus dimensions on post-conflict trials (Botvinick et al., 2001; Egner, 2007;  ratton et al., 
1992; Kerns et al., 2004; St rmer et al., 2002; Ullsperger et al., 2005). Thus, in addition to 
classic interference effects, the CSE provides further evidence that cognitive control is up-
regulated in a reactive manner after processing interference (Botvinick et al., 2001; di 
Pellegrino, Ciaramelli &   dvas, 2007; Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012; Ullsperger et al., 2005)1. 
In an influential model of the cognitive control, Botvinick and colleagues (Botvinick, 2007; 
Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, Cohen & Carter, 2004) aimed to precisely specify the 
cognitive and neural architecture responsible for the initiation and implementation of 
increased levels of cognitive control during sequential performance. Specifically, Botvinick et 
al. (2001, 2004) suggested that an evaluative mechanism continually monitors performance 
for the occurrence of conflict between competing response alternatives. This evaluative, 
conflict monitoring mechanism provides continuous feedback signals to a further executive 
control process that is responsible for implementing increased control by biasing attention 
towards task-relevant aspects of the stimulus (e.g., colour-naming in the Stroop task) in order 
to reduce processing conflict (see Figure 2 for an network model of this mechanism during 
Stroop performance). 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Please see Section 1.3.4 section for a view contrary to this conflict adaptation account of the CSE. 
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Figure 1: Line graph depicting the classic ‘Gratton effect’ in a Flanker experiment (figure 
adapted from Gratton et al., 1992). A more detailed inspection of the behavioural data 
reveals that incompatible sequence repetitions (iI sequences, where lower- and upper-case 
letters denote the compatibility level of Trial N-1and Trial N, respectively), are faster than 
incompatible trials proceeded by non-conflict (cI). Conversely, compatible trials preceded by 
incompatible arrays (iC) are typically slower than compatible trials preceded by another 
compatible trial (cC). Importantly, these findings suggest that the influence of flanker letters 
on performance is reduced after the experience of conflict, leading to reduced interference if 
Trial N+1 is incompatible, but also reduced response facilitation effects when Trial N+1 is 
compatible.  
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Figure 2: Neural network model of conflict monitoring processes in the classic Stroop task. 
The model demonstrates the action of the conflict-monitoring-cognitive control loop in a 
classic Stroop task with two response options: Red (R) and Green (G). At the base, the model 
comprises two input modules representing the two dimensions of the compound Stroop 
stimulus: “Display color” (i.e., physical ‘ink’ colour, with units representing Red [R], Green 
[G] or Neutral [N] (During word-reading instructions), e.g., black ink) and “Word” (i.e., 
written word form, with neutral during colour-naming instruction being ‘XXXX’, for 
example). These input units can excite the ‘Response’ layer which represents possible 
actions. Importantly, while only a single response unit (red or green) is activated on 
compatible trials, incompatible trials activate both the correct and incorrect colour unit, 
creating conflict at the response level.  The ‘Task Demand’ module represents possible 
instructions to either “name colour!” [C] or “read word!” [W]. These task units have the 
ability to implement a top-down bias to facilitate, for example, colour naming (see also 
Cohen et al., 1990). Critically, the Conflict Monitoring Loop (in blue) evaluates the level of 
current conflict in the response layer, communicating the level of conflict to the ‘Task 
Demand’ module which subsequently increases control as necessary. Figure from Botvinick 
et al. (2004) 
 
 
Importantly, in addition to specifying the cognitive architecture responsible for both the 
detection and the resolution of response conflict, the conflict monitoring model proposed 
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distinct neural correlates responsible for implementing both the evaluative (monitoring) and 
executive (control) aspects of cognitive control. More specifically, Botvinick et al. (2001) 
cast the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in the role of the conflict monitor which signals to 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) the need to increase top-down, executive control 
over information processing to facilitate goal-directed behaviour (see also Ridderinkhoff, 
Ullsperger, Crone & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). In the following sections I will briefly outline some 
neuroimaging results which support these putative roles of the ACC and DLPFC in cognitive 
control. Importantly, however, at this point it should be noted that recent reviews and meta-
analyses propose that ACC functions are significantly broader than only the evaluation of 
response-conflict. For example, the ACC has been implicated in a range of other processes, 
such as pain, emotional expression, prediction of error-likelihood and decision uncertainty 
(cf. Botvinick, 2007; Brown & Braver, 2005; Bush, Luu & Posner, 2000; Etkin, Egner & 
Kalisch, 2011; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Shackman, Salomons, Slagter, Fox, Winter & 
Davidson, 2011). Thus, the ACC instead appears to monitor on-going events for the need to 
increase adaptive control across multiple domains (cf. Botvinick, 2007; Ridderinkhof et al., 
2004; Shackman et al., 2011). Consequently, in the context of the current review, the ACC is 
considered as a substrate facilitating evaluative components of cognitive control that may be 
regarded as conflict-sensitive as opposed to conflict-specific (cf. Botvinick, 2007; Shackman 
et al., 2011).  
 
 Increased ACC activation to response conflict has been observed in numerous 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) 
studies of various interference tasks (Barch, Braver, Akbudak, Conturo, Ollinger & Snyder, 
2001; Botvinick et al., 1999; George et al., 1997; Carter & van Veen, 2007; Kerns et al., 
2004; Kerns et al., 2005; Van Veen & Carter, 2005). Importantly, Botvinick and colleagues 
(c.f., Botvinick et al., 2001; 2004), proposed that the ACC fulfils evaluative, conflict 
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monitoring functions, which signals to other brain areas (e.g., DLPFC) the need for increased 
executive control as required (i.e., bias information processing in favour of current task 
demands). Therefore, in reference to Figure 2, the ACC is assumed to facilitate the conflict 
monitoring loop (in blue) while the “Task Demand” module maps onto the D PFC 
(Botvinick et al., 2004). In contrast, an alternative interpretation of ACC activity during 
cognitive control tasks suggests that the ACC itself actively enforces executive control 
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Desposito, Detre, Alsop, Shin, Atlas & Grossman, 1995). 
Importantly, strong evidence in favour of an evaluative conceptualisation of the ACC was 
provided by fMRI investigations of the CSE in both the Flanker task (Botvinick et al., 1999) 
and Stroop task (Kerns et al., 2004). More specifically, as cognitive control views of the CSE 
suggest that control demands are higher after incompatible than compatible trials, an active-
control conceptualisation of the ACC predicts greater activation of this neural structure for iC 
and iI sequences (‘c’ = compatible trial, ‘i’= incompatible trial, and lower- and upper-case 
letters denote the compatibility level of Trial N-1and Trial N, respectively) rather than cC and 
cI trial sequences (Botvinick et al., 1999). Importantly, however, the ACC was reported to be 
consistently less rather than more active in trials following conflict, contradicting the idea that 
the ACC actively implements executive control (Botvinick et al., 1999; Egner et al., 2008; 
Kerns et al., 2004; Kerns et al., 2005). Furthermore, the conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick 
et al., 2001) proposes that increased DLPFC response should follow ACC activity, and this 
DLPFC activity should further relate to the implementation of attentional control over on-
going information processing. In support of this suggestion, Kerns et al. (2004) reported that 
higher blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) response in the ACC on trial N predicted 
increased PFC response on trial N+1. Furthermore, Kerns et al. (2004) observed increased 
PFC activation on trials associated with the largest degree of conflict adaptation, supporting 
the proposed role of the PFC in the implementation of control (cf. Botvinick et al., 2001).  
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1.3.3 The Resolution of Conflict Arising from Affective Representations 
In addition to ‘classic’ interference tasks such as the Stroop, Simon and Flanker tasks, 
affective neuroscience research has provided a number of emotional-analogues to these 
cognitive control tasks, such as the colour-word emotional-Stroop task (Algom, Chajut & 
Lev, 2004; Williams, Mathews, MacLeod, 1996), the emotional-face Flanker paradigm 
(Ochsner, Hughes, Robertson, Cooper & Gabrieli, 2009) and emotional-variants of the Simon 
task (De Houwer, 2003b; Kanske & Kotz, 2012). In the following section, I will focus 
exclusively on one Stroop-type paradigm, specifically the Emotional-face Stroop task (Etkin 
et al., 2006) due to its direct relevance to the empirical work conducted in the current thesis.  
In order to assess the resolution of conflict arising from competing emotional 
representations, Etkin et al. (2006) developed an emotional-face Stroop task with interference 
properties similar to the classic Stroop paradigm, see Figure 3). In this paradigm, participants 
must selectively respond to a relevant emotional stimulus dimension (affective face) whilst 
avoiding the processing of an irrelevant emotional distractor (affective word), with sometimes 
conflicting emotional valence. Thus, akin to the classic Stroop task, conflict occurs in the 
emotional-face Stroop task when relevant and irrelevant emotional stimulus dimensions are in 
opposition (e.g., negative facial expression; word: “HAPPY”). Furthermore, in addition to 
slower RTs and increased error rates on incompatible rather than compatible trials, CSEs 
similar to those observed in non-emotional interference protocols occur in the emotional-face 
Stroop task, reflecting the ability to resolve emotional conflict on a trial-to-trial basis (Etkin et 
al., 2006; Egner, Etkin, Gale & Hirsch, 2008). Consequently, one initial benefit of the 
Emotional-face Stroop paradigm is that it provides behavioural correlates of interference 
processing in a affective task that are highly analogous to the conflict effects reported in 
‘classic’, non-emotional interference paradigms. Additionally, as emotional-conflict 
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resolution requires the exertion of attentional control over competing affective 
representations, it has been suggested that CSEs in the emotional face Stroop task reflects a 
form of implicit (i.e., uninstructed) emotion regulation (Gyurak, Gross & Etkin, 2011).   
 
 
Figure 3: Figure depicting compatible (left) and incompatible (right) conditions in an 
Emotional-Face Stroop task (Image from Etkin et al., 2006). 
 
Interestingly, while interference in both the classic and emotional-face Stroop tasks has 
been associated with activation of the dorsal ACC (presumably because both tasks elicit 
conflict between competing response alternatives, see Botvinick et al., 2001; Egner et al., 
2008; Haas, Omura, Constable & Canli, 2006; Van Veen & Carter, 2005), it has been 
proposed that the neural structures responsible for the resolution of emotional conflict differ 
from those implicated in control over non-emotional conflict. More specifically, in an fMRI 
investigation, Egner et al., (2008) contrasted high conflict resolution trials (i.e., iC and iI 
transitions) with low conflict resolution trials (i.e., cI and cC transitions) during performance 
of the emotional-face Stroop task and a non-emotional face Stroop task (Gender 
identification). Importantly, the authors noted that while increased DLPFC activity was 
observed on high-conflict resolution trials (vs. low conflict resolution trials) in the non-
emotional task, high-conflict resolution in the emotional-face Stroop task was associated with 
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increased activity in the rostral ACC (rACC) and co-occuring reduced amygdala activity (see 
also Etkin et al., 2006).  Consequently, Egner et al. (2006) proposed that emotional conflict is 
resolved by distinct processes through which the rACC exerts control over emotional conflict 
processing in the amygdala (see also Etkin et al., 2008). Further supporting this proposed role 
of the rACC in the resolution of emotional conflict, Maier and de Pellegrino (2012) recently 
reported that patients with rACC lesions showed impaired CSEs in the emotional face-Stroop 
task, but not in an affectively neutral (gender identification) face-Stroop paradigm.  
In addition to these neuro-scientific reports, two recent studies suggest that the 
mechanisms underlying emotional and non-emotional conflict resolution can be dissociated 
behaviourally. First, Soutschek and Schubert (2013) noted that the resolution of emotional 
conflict (CSEs during the emotional face-Stroop task), but not of non-emotional conflict 
(CSEs during neutral face-Stroop task), was impaired when an emotional Go/NoGo task was 
presented between Stroop trials. Soutschek and Schubert (2013) argued that this selective 
suppression of emotional conflict resolution by a secondary affective task strongly supports 
the proposed division between the mechanisms facilitating control over emotional versus non-
emotional material. Further suggesting that affective and cognitive control processes can be 
dissociated behaviourally, Monti, Weintraub and Egner (2010) reported that CSEs were 
reduced in older participants relative to younger adults on a non-emotional, but not an 
emotional face-Stroop task. In line with previous suggestions (cf. Samanez-Larkin, 
Robertson, Mikels, Carstensen & Gotlib, 2009), Monti et al. (2010) concluded that their 
results provided novel support for the idea that emotional processes are left relatively spared 
by healthy aging processes. Important for current concerns, these findings suggest that 
individual differences in emotional control processes can be identified behaviourally by 
performance measures in the emotional-face Stroop paradigm.  
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1.3.4 Challenges to the conflict adaptation account of CSEs 
While the conflict-monitoring theory has elegantly accounted for both the behavioural 
and neural correlates of the CSE, several alternative proposals have challenged the conflict 
adaptation account of this sequential effect (e.g., Hommel, Proctor & Vu, 2004; Hommel, 
2004; Mayr, Awh & Lawrey, 2003; Schalghecken & Martini, 2012). While an in-depth 
discussion and analysis of these alternative accounts is outside the scope of the current thesis 
(see Egner, 2007 for review), in the following section I will summarise and evaluate the 
repetition priming account (Mayr et al., 2003), which likely reflects the most salient 
challenge to the conflict adaptation theory in the literature.  
In contrast to cognitive control interpretations of the CSE, Mayr et al. (2003) proposed 
that the ‘conflict adaptation’ effects reported in many interference tasks can be explained by 
stimulus-specific priming effects, rather than an online adjustment in attentional control. 
More specifically, in typical interference paradigms, exact stimulus repetition trials occur 
more frequently on compatibility level repetitions (e.g., iI and cC transitions), than on 
compatibility level alternations (e.g., cI and iC transitions). Taking the classic Eriksen flanker 
protocol as an example, a given compatible stimulus array (e.g., ‘SSSSS’) can either be 
followed by a full stimulus alternation (e.g., ‘HHHHH’), or an exact stimulus repetition (e.g., 
‘SSSSS’) for a given cC transition. Similarly, for a given iI sequence the incompatible array 
‘SSHSS’ can only be followed by ‘HHSHH’ or ‘SSHSS’. Thus, exact stimulus repetitions 
occur with 50% likelihood on compatibility-level repetitions, potentially facilitating 
performance by the frequently occurring repetition of identical Stimulus-Response mappings 
for iI and cC transitions (Mayr et al., 2003). In contrast, in the same flanker task, 
compatibility-level alternations (iC and cI transitions) are always stimulus alternations, 
suggesting that stimulus-specific priming cannot benefit iC and cI transitions. Thus, Mayr et 
al. (2003) proposed that a bias towards stimulus-specific priming effects for compatibility-
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level repetitions rather than alternations can explain the CSE effect in many common 
interference paradigms. More specifically, performance facilitation on iI and cC trials might 
be explained by a bias towards exact stimulus repetitions (Mayr et al., 2003), without the 
need for an executive control adjustment (c.f., Botvinick et al., 2001; Gratton et al., 1992). In 
support of these claims, Mayr et al. (2003) reported that the CSE was no longer significant 
when exact stimulus repetitions were removed from analyses in the Flanker task (see also 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006).  
In response to the significant challenge posed by the repetition-priming account, several 
authors have excluded exact repetitions in analyses of the CSE in various conflict paradigms. 
Importantly, and consistent with the repetition priming account, few of these studies have 
reported significant CSEs during flanker performance when controlling for exact stimulus 
repetitions (c.f., Egner, 2007; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006; Mayr et al., 2003; however, see 
Ullsperger et al., 2005). In contrast, studies have reported significant CSEs when exact 
stimulus repetitions are removed from analyses in the Stroop task (Duthoo & Notebaert, 
2012; Kerns et al., 2004; Kerns et al., 2005; Notebaert, Verbruggen &  iefooghe, 200 ), the 
Simon task (e.g., Schlaghecken & Martini, 2012; St rmer et al., 2002), and the Emotional-
face Stroop task (e.g., Egner et al., 2008; Etkin et al., 2006). Consequently, it appears that the 
effects of repetition priming are at least stronger in the flanker task than in other interference 
paradigms (cf. Egner, 2007; Schalghecken & Martini, 2012). It should be noted, however, 
that despite a significant CSE remaining after controlling for exact stimulus repetitions, the 
size of the effect is typically reduced, suggesting the simultaneous influence of attentional 
control and priming mechanisms contribute to the overall (uncorrected) CSE (cf. Egner, 
2007; Notebaert et al., 2006).  
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1.3.5 Attentional Control over Conflict in Depression 
One focus of the current thesis was to compare conflict resolution processes for 
participants with elevated levels of depression during the performance of tasks in which 
conflict arises from both non-emotional (e.g., colour-word Stroop task) and emotional (e.g., 
Emotional-face Stroop) representations. Before addressing the hypotheses regarding 
emotional conflict resolution in depression (see section 1.2.6), I will first review proposals 
that depression might be associated with impairments in general (i.e., non-emotional) 
cognitive control processes. 
In addition to protracted mood disturbance, depression is associated with a number of 
cognitive symptoms, including impaired concentration and difficulty making decisions 
(DSM-IV, 1994), these core symptoms of depression provide initial suggestion that currently 
depressed individuals might be associated with the reduced ability to exert attentional control, 
as assumed to be required in the implementation of cognitive control over response conflict 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 1990; Gratton et al., 1992). Further suggesting that 
conflict adaptation processes in particular might be affected by depression, several 
neuroimaging investigations have reported the hypo-activity of both the dorsal (dACC) and 
DLPFC in depressed participants relative to controls (see Drevets, 1998; George et al., 1997; 
Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008a; Liotti & Mayberg, 2001; Mayberg, 1997; Pizzagalli, 2011). 
Additionally, structural investigations of the neuro-anatomy of depression have revealed 
reduced dACC gray matter volume depressed samples (Drevets, 1998; Van Tol et al., 2010). 
This clear overlap between the neural structures putatively disrupted by depression, and those 
assumed to facilitate cognitive control adjustments (c.f., Botvinick et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof 
et al., 2004), motivate the prediction that general conflict adaptation processes might be 
impaired in participants with elevated levels of depressive symptoms.   
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Both the cognitive symptoms and “hypofrontality” present in depression have 
motivated many experimental studies of executive functions in depressed samples (see 
Snyder, 2013 for a recent review), and it has been suggested that depression is associated with 
impairments on “effortful” rather than automatic task performance (Hartlage, Alloy,  
Vazquez, & Dykman, 1993).  In these regards, the term “executive function” has commonly 
been used to refer to a broad range of psychological processes facilitating effortful task 
performance, including task set shifting; the updating of information in working memory; 
and, the overriding of prepotent responses (Miyake et al., 2000; Roiser & Sahakian, 2013; 
Snyder, 2013). The focus of the current thesis is necessarily constrained to the overriding of 
prepotent responses, due to this processes centrality in models of cognitive control (Botvinick 
et al., 2001). The ability to bias the information processing system in avoidance of 
interference is commonly considered to be central to maintaining efficient goal-directed 
behaviour (Banich, 2009; Miyake et al., 2000; Snyder, 2013), and as such has been 
considered a fundamental component of cognitive control (Botvinick et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, as such attentional control functions have been suggested to facilitate the 
performance of everyday tasks (Banich, 2009), impairment in such fundamental processes 
potentially has a negative impact on quality of life (Snyder, 2013). In the particular context of 
depression, it has been proposed that impaired attentional control might underlie the inability 
of depressed individuals to successfully inhibit or disengage from prolonged attentional 
engagement towards concern-related emotional material (De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Joorman 
et al., 2007; Koster et al., 2011; Phillips, Drevets, Rauch & Lane, 2003), potentially 
conferring increased depression vulnerability due to the increased processing of negatively 
themed stimuli (De Raedt & Koster, 2010).  
Experimental studies of conflict processing in depression appear to have predominantly 
focussed on the classic colour-word Stroop task. In line with the predictions generated from 
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the cognitive symptoms and the “hypofrontality” associated with depression, several authors 
have reported increased Stroop effects in depressed samples (e.g., Constant et al., 2005; 
Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008a; Kertzman et al., 2010; Lampe, Sitskoorn & Heeren, 2004; 
Lemelin et al., 1997; Lyche et al., 2011; Moritz et al., 2002; Trichard et al., 1995). Further 
strengthening the conclusions from these investigations, a recent meta-analysis synthesising 
the results from Stroop investigations of depressed samples reported that depression was 
associated with increased Stroop effects (Snyder, 2013). Contrary to this evidence, however, 
it should also be noted that many do not report generally increased Stroop effects associated 
with increased depression (e.g., George et al., 1997; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007: Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2010; Krompinger & Simons, 2011; Markela-Lerenc et al., 2006; Meiran, 
Diamond, Toder & Nemets, 2011; Wagner et al., 2006), perhaps questioning the ubiquity of 
conflict processing impairments is such samples. Additionally, beyond the Stroop task, 
generally increased interference effects have not often been reported in depressed groups 
using alternative classic interference paradigms, such as the flanker task (e.g., Clawson et al., 
2013; Olvet et al., 2010; Pizzagalli et al., 2006; Ruchsow et al., 2004; Schroder et al., 2013) 
and the Simon task (e.g., Kanske & Kotz, 2012 (3 experiments); Halari et al., 2009; Holmes 
& Pizzagalli, 2007; however, see Ng, Chan & Schlaghecken, 2012). Therefore, while 
depression-related impairment appears to have been reported most frequently for the Stroop 
task, reliable group difference (i.e., depressed vs. non-depressed) do not appear to be 
observed on other interference paradigms commonly assumed to reflect similar cognitive 
control abilities (Botvinick et al., 2001; Miyake et al., 2000). 
In light of the mixed reports of Stroop interference effects in depression, it is potentially 
informative to identify common methodological factors shared by investigations reporting 
increased Stroop effects in depressed samples. One such factor which appears to discriminate 
well between results in this regard is the use of blocked vs. randomised presentation of Stroop 
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compatibility levels. More specifically, investigations that have presented Stroop 
compatibility levels (i.e., compatible, incompatible and neutral probes) in independent blocks 
have revealed depression related impairments most often (e.g., Constant et al., 2005; 
Kertzman et al., 2010; Lampe, Sitskoorn & Heeren, 2004; Lemelin et al., 1997; Lyche et al., 
2011; Moritz et al., 2002; Trichard et al., 1995). In such designs, Stroop interference is 
operationalized as the difference between the total time to read a list of incompatible stimuli 
(e.g., 48 colour words written in conflicting ink colours), minus the total time to read a list of 
either compatible or neutral probes. Studies employing such designs have frequently reported 
increased Stroop interference effects in depressed samples. Importantly, performance has 
been proposed to be influenced by more sustained or proactive control processes when 
conflict levels are entirely predictable (De Pisapia & Braver, 2006; Logan, Zbrodoff & 
Williamson, 1984; Macleod, 1991), therefore, impairments in such a task might be attributed 
to  a depression-related impairment in sustained control processes, rather than more reactive 
control over local fluctuations in levels of conflict (see also Markela-Lerenc, Kaiser, Fiedler, 
Weisbrod & Mundt, 2006). Highlighting the potential significance of such manipulations, 
studies measuring Stroop performance using the randomised presentation of compatibility 
levels have often reported no differences in overall Stroop interference between depressed 
and control groups (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007: Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2010; Krompinger & 
Simons, 2011; Markela-Lerenc et al., 2006; Meiran, Diamond, Toder & Nemets, 2011; 
Wagner et al., 2006; however, see Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008).  
Importantly, one additional benefit of the randomised presentation of compatibility 
levels is that the CSE can be operationalized as a further measure of online adjustments in 
cognitive control (Botvinick et al., 2001; Egner, 2007; Gratton et al., 1992; Kerns et al., 2004; 
St rmer et al., 2002). To my knowledge only two studies in the existing literature have 
reported impaired CSEs during classic Stroop task performance for participants with elevated 
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levels depressive symptoms (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007, Meiran et al., 2011). More 
specifically, Holmes and Pizzagalli (2007) reported that participants with relatively mild-
moderate, sub-clinical depressive symptoms were associated with reduced CSEs (i.e., larger 
Stroop effects on post-conflict trials) as compared to low symptom scorers. Secondly, Meiran 
et al. (2011) reported that clinically depressed participants (vs. matched controls) were 
associated with larger Stroop effects in post-conflict trials. Together, these results propose 
that depression might be associated with the reduced ability to reactively increase levels of 
cognitive control after experiencing response conflict. It should be noted, however, that one 
further investigation (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008a) reported no difference between MDD and 
control groups on the CSE effect during classic colour-word Stroop performance. Finally, a 
number of previous investigations have failed to find significant depression-related CSE 
impairments in a range of classic conflict paradigms (Counting Stroop: West et al., 2010, 
Simon task: Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Ng, Chan & Schlaghecken, 2012; Flanker task: 
Pizzagalli, Peccoralo, Davidson, & Cohen, 2006). In light of these various null results, it 
might be suggested that depressive symptoms are not reliably associated with impaired CSE 
adjustments across a range of interference tasks (see Ng et al., 2012 for a similar suggestion). 
As significant depression-related impairments have been revealed more frequently in the 
classic Stroop paradigm (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Meiran et al., 2011), and  slightly 
differing mechanisms have been implicated in attentional control over conflict in various 
compatibility paradigms (Cohen et al., 1990; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Gratton et al., 1992; 
Konblum et al., 1990; Liu, Banich, Jacobson & Tanabe, 2004; Stürmer et al., 2002), it 
remains possible that reliable impairments in depression occur more frequently during 
performance of the Stroop task. Consequently, Chapter 5 of the current thesis project tested 
the attentional control abilities of groups scoring a range of depressive symptoms in the 
classic Stroop paradigm. 
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1.3.6 Implicit Emotion Regulation during the Emotional-face Stroop task in Depression 
In addition to control over response conflict occurring in classic non-emotional 
interference paradigms, participants with low and elevated levels of depressive symptoms 
will additionally be compared on their ability to resolve conflict arising from emotional 
distractors in the emotional-face Stroop task (Chapter 5). Most importantly, as distinct control 
processes have been implicated in the resolution of emotional conflict (vs. non-emotional 
conflict) (see section 1.3.3 for review), it is of interest to understand the operation of this 
affect-specific attentional control process in participants with elevated levels of depressive 
symptoms.   
There are several reasons to predict that depression might be associated with the 
impaired resolution of emotional conflict. Initially, the significant mood disturbance which 
largely characterizes depressive symptomatology (DSM-IV, 1994), strongly suggests that 
abnormal emotional regulation reflects a significant feature of depression. Consequently, as 
emotional conflict resolution has been described as an implicit form of emotion regulation 
(Gyurak et al., 2011), the core affective symptoms of depression motivate the study of 
depression-related performance on this emotional task. In addition, even for euthymic 
individuals, it has been proposed that emotional material might gain “privileged access” to 
on-going information processing, and as such, affective signals provide highly salient sources 
of environmental distraction (c.f., Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Hodsoll et al., 2011; Reeck & 
Egner, 2011). This already prominent source of distraction may take on a particular 
significance (and be more resilient to control efforts), for individuals who are characterized 
by increased concern for emotional material, such as those with elevated depressive 
symptoms (Beck, 1979; Beck, 2008; Koster et al., 2005).  
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Furthermore, on a neuroanatomical level, in addition to the hypo-activation of the ACC 
and DLPFC often reported in neuroimaging studies of depression (c.f., Drevets, 1998; George 
et al., 1997; Mayberg, 1997; Liotti & Mayberg, 2001), both acutely depressed individuals and 
those induced into states of low-mood have been associated with increased activity in ventral 
structures classically associated with emotional processing, including the amygdala and sub-
genual cingulate (c.f., Beck, 2008; Disner et al., 2011; Drevets , 1998; Mayberg et al., 1997 
Siegle, Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002). Furthermore, increased amygdala 
responsiveness to both concern-related (i.e., sad) emotional faces (Siegle et al., 2002) and 
emotional words (Laeger et al., 2012) have been reported in depressed individuals. Important 
for current concerns, this hyperactive “ventral compartment” (Mayberg, 1997) in depression 
suggests that emotional conflict (which is putatively tracked by the amygdala, c.f., Etkin et 
al., 2006; Egner et al., 2008) might register particularly strongly in depression. Additionally, 
successful emotional conflict resolution has been suggested to depend upon the ‘top-down’ 
inhibitory influence of the rACC on the amygdala (Egner et al., 2008; Maier & di Pellegrino, 
2012). Reduced grey matter volume in the rACC has previously been reported in depression 
(c.f., Drevets, 1998; van Tol et al., 2010), further suggesting the potential malfunctioning of 
this emotional control mechanism. It should also be noted, however, that functional 
neuroimaging investigations have also reported increased rACC activity when depressed 
individuals (vs. non-depressed controls) perform tasks including emotional material (Eugene, 
Joormann, Cooney, Atlas & Gotlib, 2010; Mittershiffthaler et al., 2008).  
Therefore, in Chapter 5 participants with varying current levels of depressive symptoms 
were compared on their ability to resolve conflict arising from emotional (Emotional face 
Stroop task) and non-emotional (classic Stroop task) representations. Importantly, this 
comparison will test whether attentional control processes in depression are uniformly 
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impaired across both emotional and non-emotional processes, or if specific impairments 
occur when control must be exerted in an explicitly affective paradigm. 
 
1.4. Advanced Preparation, the Contingent Negative Variation and Sustained Control 
Processes in Depressed Samples 
Thus far, the current review has proposed adaptive cognitive control functions that are 
initiated transiently after internal performance monitoring processes detect competition 
between potential response alternatives, and signal for increased control to reduce the 
influence of such interference on performance (cf. Botvinick et al., 2001; Egner et al., 2008; 
Etkin et al., 2006; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). However, cognitive control processes can also 
occur in a sustained manner if reliable contextual information (e.g., external cues or long-
term task instructions) permit goal-directed processes to be prepared in advance (cf. Braver et 
al., 2007; Braver, 2012; Jentzsch & Leuthold, 2006; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). Such 
sustained control processes are thought to be particularly resource demanding, requiring the 
sustained biasing of perception, attention and action towards the performance of task goals 
(Braver, 2012; van Veen, Krug & Carter, 2008), and, therefore, as effortful control processes 
have been suggested to be impaired in depression (c.f., Hartlage et al., 1993), the detailed 
study of such proactive processes can potentially further inform the profile of cognitive 
impairment in depressed samples. As an initial measure of proactive control processes in 
participants with elevated depressive symptoms, the ability to maintain long-term speed and 
accuracy instructions was compared between participants with low and elevated depressive 
symptoms (see Chapter 5 for details). Secondly, in Chapter 6 of the current thesis a cued-RT 
paradigm will be used to investigate ability of participants with increased depressive 
symptoms to engage advanced preparatory processing despite the presence of concern-related 
emotional distractors. In addition to behavioural measures, Chapter 6 also includes the 
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measurement of an event-related potential (ERP) related to advanced preparation, the 
Contingent Negative Variation (CNV, Walter, Cooper, Aldrige, McCallum & Winter, 1964), 
to further investigate sustained control processes in participants reporting elevated levels of 
depressive symptoms. In the following section I will detail how the CNV will serve as a 
neurophysiological measure of advanced preparation in the current thesis. 
1.4.1 The CNV during cued RT performance 
One method commonly used to determine the influence of external task-related signals 
on future performance is the cued RT paradigm. In such tasks, a cue or warning stimulus is 
presented in advance of an imperative or target stimulus. Important for current concerns, ERP 
investigations of cueing paradigms reveal a low-frequency negative deflection in the stimulus 
locked ERP which commences shortly after cue onset and reaches maximum amplitude 
immediately before target onset, namely, the CNV (Walter et al., 1964). The CNV reflects a 
sustained ERP that typically develops over a number of seconds, depending upon the length 
of the cue-target interval. Additionally, amplitude of the CNV varies depending on the nature 
of the information presented by the cue. In some contexts, for example, cues forewarn aspects 
of the motor response required to a subsequent target (e.g., Jentzsch, Leuthold, Ridderinkhof, 
2004; Mackay & Bonnet, 1990; Ulrich, Leuthold & Sommer, 1998). In such circumstances, 
amplitude variations in the CNV can be attributed to the advanced preparation of motoric 
processes during the cue-target interval (c.f., Leuthold, Sommer & Ulrich, 2004). 
Alternatively, cues might indicate non-motoric factors relating to the upcoming stimulus, 
such as: instructions to increase effort (Falkenstein, Hoormann, Hohnsbein & Kleinsorge, 
2003); forewarning the imminent presentation of an interesting stimulus (e.g., an opposite sex 
nude, Howard, Longmore & Mason, 1992), or the compatibility level of an up-coming trial in 
an interference task (e.g.,  ratton et al., 1992; Alpay,  oerke & St rmer, 2009). In such 
circumstances, amplitude variation in the CNV can be attributed to anticipatory, non-motoric 
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processes which develop during the cue-target interval (c.f., Alpay et al., 2009; van Boxtel & 
Böcker, 2004). 
In the context of depression research, a recent ERP investigation (West et al., 2010) 
reported that increasing levels of sub-clinical depressive symptoms were associated with the 
attenuation of a pre-stimulus slow wave (~CNV), and interpreted this result to suggest that 
depression is associated with impaired proactive cognitive control processes. More 
specifically, West et al. (2010) measured the pre-stimulus low wave in the response-stimulus 
interval (i.e., the time between the response and the subsequent trial) during the performance 
of an un-cued counting Stroop task. While West et al. (2010) interpreted this reduced slow-
wave activity as reflecting a depression-related reduction in proactive cognitive control 
processes, it is important to note that depressive symptoms were not associated with impaired 
Stroop performance (including both the overall Stroop effect and the CSE). As proactive 
control processes refer to the sustained biasing of either perception, attention or action 
selection in the pursuit of long-term goal directed behaviour (c.f., Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 
2012), the lack of behavioural difference in elevated symptom scorers urges caution when 
suggesting that elevated depression is associated with generally reduced proactive cognitive 
control in the study reported by West et al. (2010).   
In the current thesis the CNV will be used as a measure of advanced preparation during 
a cued-RT task (Chapter 6) in which external cues indicate the difficulty level of an up-
coming task. Initially, the manipulation of task difficulty in this experiment was motivated as 
an additional measure of the effortful control processes predicted to be impaired in depression 
(c.f., Hartlage et al., 1993). In addition to these informative cues, however, task-irrelevant 
emotional distractors (emotionally expressive faces) were presented during the cue-target 
interval. As depression has previously been associated with increased attentional engagement 
with negative, concern-related material, particularly if such stimuli is presented for longer 
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stimulus presentation intervals (>1000 ms; e.g., Beck, 2008; Bradley et al., 1997; De Raedt & 
Koster, 2010; Gotlib et al., 2004; Koster et al., 2005), reflecting the deep or elaborative 
processing of such self-referent content (Koster et al., 2005; Leyman, De Raedt, Vaeyens, & 
Philippaerts, 2011), it is predicted that such attentional engagement with negative material 
will reduce attention devoted to normal preparatory processes which develop during the cue-
target interval, resulting in impaired behavioural performance (and attenuated CNV 
amplitudes) for individuals with elevated depressive symptoms. Importantly, in line with 
previous suggestions (Teece & Hamilton, 1973; Wagner, Rendtorff, Kathmann & Engel, 
1996), a strong effect of distraction on task-related preparatory CNV activity will only be 
inferred if attenuated CNV activity is associated with co-occurring impairment in behavioural 
performance. Finally, in addition to CNV amplitude, the processing of affective distractors on 
ERPs related to early attentional processing (P1 and N170, see Chapter 6 for details) will be 
compared between groups. As it has been proposed that depression is not associated with fast 
and involuntary orienting towards concern-related material (c.f., Bradley et al., 1997; Koster 
et al., 2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2005), it is predicted that the processing of distractors will not 
differentially affect the amplitude of these early attentional ERPs for low and elevated 
depressive symptom groups. 
1.5. The processing of errors. 
The cognitive control theory reviewed so far in the current thesis proposes the types of 
adaptive control mechanisms available to avoid the occurrence of performance errors, either 
by using attentional control to reduce the influence of processing interference, or by preparing 
control operations in advance to aid responding to a subsequent target. Despite our best 
efforts, however, errors do occur in performance, and it is important that the cognitive system 
has mechanisms in place to reliably detect errors and subsequently adjust performance to 
avoid the reoccurrence of such mistakes in future performance. Consequently, theories of 
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cognitive control have defined specific performance monitoring processes required to monitor 
performance for errors and subsequently adjust response criteria remedially in the avoidance 
of such errors (c.f., Botvinick et al., 2001; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Furthermore, in addition 
to being cognitive events that might stimulate changes in cognitive control levels, errors are 
aversive events (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Holroyd & Coles, 2002) relating to personal failure 
and perceived as threatening to the indivudal (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 
2007; Weinberg et al., 2012b). In line with these suggestions, the detection of errors has also 
been associated with affective and motivational processes (Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ & 
Hohnsbein, 2000; Gehring & Fencsik, 2001; Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Hajcak, 2012; Inzlicht & 
Al-Khindi, 2012; Pourtois, Vocat, N'Diaye, Spinelli, Seeck & Vuilleumier, 2010). Therefore, 
looking ahead, such negative, failure-related events (errors) have been suggested to be 
particularly concerning for individuals with increased depressive symptoms, leading to 
alterations in both evaluative and executive aspects of error processing (this idea with be 
detailed in subsequent section 1.5.7). First, however, in the following sections I will outline 
general theory relating to the behavioural (e.g., posterror-slowing; Laming, 1979; Rabbitt & 
Rodgers, 1977; pre-error speeding; Brewer & Smith, 1984) and neurophysiological markers 
associated with error processing, irrespective of depressive symptoms. 
 
1.5.1 Error-related Behavior: The modulation of RT before and after errors 
A wealth of evidence suggests that serial performance in choice RT tasks is continually 
modulated as a function of trial history. For example, performance can be observed to speed 
after longer sequences of correct responses (e.g., Brewer & Smith, 1984, Brewer & Smith, 
1989; Laming, 1979). Eventually, however, RTs speed to such an extent that performance 
becomes dangerously fast (typically < 250 ms; Brewer & Smith, 1984; Rabbitt, 1969; Rabbitt 
& Vyas, 1970), significantly increasing the chance of performance errors due to incomplete 
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stimulus processing (Botvinick et al., 2001; Rabbitt & Vyas, 1970). Consequently, error RTs 
in many tasks are considerably faster than correct trials (e.g., Brewer & Smith, 1984; 
Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009; Laming, 1979; Rabbitt, 1969; Rabbitt & Vyas, 1970). 
Importantly, this pre-error speeding, which typically precedes mistakes in choice-RT tasks, 
exhibits a graded time-course in which participants produce ever faster RT performance in 
small increments, from as many as 10 trials preceding the error response (Brewer & Smith, 
1984, Brewer & Smith, 1989).   
 Upon making a mistake in most choice RT tasks, participants appear to generate a 
strong, albeit not perfect, awareness that the error has occurred. Initial behavioural evidence 
supporting the efficacy of error detection processes comes from studies in which participants 
are required to signal (indicate) errors immediately after they occur; such studies typically 
find that participants signal errors with high accuracy (often between 80-95%) in typical 
choice RT tasks (e.g., Danielmeier, Wessel, Steinhauser & Ullsperger, 2009; Rabbitt, 2002; 
Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2006; for review see Yeung, Botvinick & Cohen, 2004). Further 
suggesting that participants are able to detect their errors reliably, RTs can be seen to slow 
dramatically on posterror (E+1 trials) as compared to post-correct trials. Unlike pre-error 
speeding, however, this posterror slowing (Laming, 1979; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977) tends to 
arise and decay rapidly in the trial sequence, peaking in the E+1 trial and becoming 
considerably smaller by E+2 trials (see Laming, 1979; Brewer & Smith, 1984). Additionally, 
E+1 trials are often followed by increases in accuracy (e.g., Laming, 1979; Brewer & Smith, 
1984; Jentzsch & Leuthold, 2006; Strozyk & Jentzsch, 2012), suggesting that this posterror 
slowing reflects an adaptive shift in response criteria, where participants trade speed for 
accuracy in an effort to avoid future mistakes (Botvinick et al., 2001; Dutilh, 
Vandekerckhove, Forstmann, Keuleer, Brysbert & Wagenmakers, 2012; Laming, 1979; 
Rabbit & Rogers, 1977). 
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Posterror behaviour is also modulated by the temporal distance between responses and 
subsequent events: The Response Stimulus Interval (RSI). More specifically, posterror 
slowing has been demonstrated to increase with decreasing RSI (e.g., Burns, 1971; 
Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011; Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009; Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; 
Rabbit, 1969; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). These findings initially appear somewhat counter 
intuitive: If posterror slowing is assumed to reflect a strategic shift in response threshold, then 
one would predict the effect to increase when more time is available to implement control 
adjustments (i.e. longer RSIs). Additionally, posterror trials are often followed by reduced 
rather than increased posterror accuracy at short RSIs (e.g., Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009; 
Jentzsch & Dudshig, 2009; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). In line with earlier suggestions 
(Gehring & Fencsik, 2001; Welford, 1979), Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009) recently proposed 
that a protracted bottleneck in central processing can explain these apparently counterintuitive 
posterror effects at short RSIs. Previous work suggests that response monitoring processes 
outlast response execution (cf. Welford, 1979; Jentzsch, Leuthold & Ulrich, 2007),  and 
Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009) recently proposed that error-monitoring processes are 
particularly time-consuming, causing a post-execution bottleneck after errors, that in turn 
interferes with on-going performance if subsequent events occur very soon after the mistake 
(i.e., at short RSIs). In contrast, when RSIs are longer, this bottleneck has time to clear 
between events, freeing central processes to implement adaptive shifts in response criteria 
(Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009). Crucially, while this bottleneck account of posterror slowing 
predicts deleterious consequences for posterror performance at short RSIs, error-monitoring is 
assumed to be a generally adaptive process that has maladaptive consequences for behaviour 
when events appear in close temporal proximity.   
In contrast to prior suggestions which describe posterror slowing as a consequence 
of adaptive control mechanisms, the orienting account (cf. Notebaert et al., 2009) attributes 
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posterror slowing to non-adaptive processes. More specifically, Notebaert et al. (2009) 
highlighted that while posterror slowing effects appear to occur very reliably in most studies 
of error-processing, co-occurring increases in posterror accuracy are not always observed 
(e.g., Hajcak & Simons, 2008; Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009). Given this apparent lack of 
support for control accounts of error adaptation, Notebaert et al. (2009) argued that other, 
non-adaptive explanations for posterror slowing, other than increased response caution, 
should be considered.  As an alternative to cognitive control accounts, Notebaert et al. (2009) 
proposed that posterror slowing is driven by an attention-orienting effect, initiated by the 
surprising nature of errors. According to this orienting account, all infrequent events, 
including errors, are particularly salient and, therefore, attract a strong attentional orienting 
response. Consequently, this orienting response leads to distraction from the on-going task, 
followed by a time-consuming process of task reorientation (Notebaert et al., 2009), which 
ultimately leads to slower and, importantly, less accurate performance after surprising events. 
As initial evidence for this mechanism, Notebaert et al. (2009) manipulated the 
discriminability (contrast) of colour stimuli using an adaptive programme designed to 
maintain performance accuracy rates at three approximate levels (35%, 55% or 75% 
accuracy). Critically, while typical posterror slowing occurred in this task when errors were 
infrequent (75% accuracy condition), significant postcorrect slowing was observed when 
errors out-numbered correct performance (35% accuracy condition; see also Núñez Castellar, 
Kuhn, Fias & Notebaert, 2010). While none of the slowing effects observed in these 
experiments were associated with systematically increased or decreased performance 
accuracy, a significant posterror accuracy decrease was observed in all conditions. In a 
second experiment, Notebaert et al., (2009) also reported RT slowing when a task-irrelevant 
auditory signal, presented between responses, was rare (25% of trials) rather than frequent 
(75%), providing further evidence for the relationship between surprise and subsequent RT 
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performance; however, posterror performance accuracy rates were not reported in this 
experiment. 
As the orienting account does not consider posterror slowing to reflect an adaptive 
control adjustment, this theory strongly questions the frequent use of posterror slowing as a 
dependent measure of cognitive control in clinical, developmental and other individual 
difference samples (c.f., Notebaert et al., 2009). In light of such concerns, however, it should 
be noted that some existing data cannot be easily explained by the orienting account. 
Specifically, a key motivating factor in the initial formulation of the orienting account was 
that most investigations of posterror slowing do not report accuracy improvements in the 
trials immediately following the error. Conversely, however, it might also be argued that 
reduced posterror accuracy, as predicted by the orienting account, also appears to be 
supported by relatively few investigations (using long RSIs; e.g., Fiehler, Ullsperger & Von 
Cramon, 2005; Notebaert & Verguts, 2011; Notebaert et al., 2009), while rather more studies 
have reported significant posterror accuracy increases (e.g., Brewer & Smith, 1984; Chiu & 
Deldin, 2007; Laming, 1968; Jentzsch & Leuthold, 2006; Schroder et al., 2013; Strozyk & 
Jentzsch, 2012). Importantly, these significant increases in posterror accuracy are particularly 
difficult to reconcile with the predictions of the orienting account of posterror slowing.  
Nevertheless, the orienting account remains a prominent challenge to control 
accounts of posterror slowing. Therefore, Chapter 3 of the current thesis used a false-
feedback manipulation in order to further differentiate between the predictions of adaptive 
and non-adaptive accounts of posterror slowing. It should be noted that, unlike the other 
empirical chapters contained in this work, Chapter 3 did not assess cognitive control 
processes relating to depressive symptoms. Instead, this Chapter was aimed to test competing 
control and orienting accounts of posterror slowing to validate this measure for use in the 
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subsequent empirical work which used a between groups design (i.e. low vs. elevated 
depressive symptom groups). 
1.5.2. Neurophysiological correlates of an error. 
In addition to the proposed behavioural correlates of error processing, cognitive 
neuroscientists have been interested in determining the neural mechanisms underlying error 
detection and posterror adjustment. In the following section I will overview the putative brain 
correlates of error-processing. In this review I will focus predominantly on event-related 
potentials (ERPs) that reveal highly stereotyped responses to performance errors. The focus 
on error-related ERPs was motivated both due to their direct bearing on the empirical work 
contained in this thesis, but also because these ERPs probably represent the most frequently 
used method to study the neural correlates of error-processing in human participants (Yeung 
et al., 2004).  
1.5.3. Error-related ERPs 
Studies of electrical brain activity have revealed two distinct ERPs relating to error 
commission: the error negativity/error-related negativity (Ne/ERN) and the error positivity 
(Pe) (c.f., Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann & Blanke, 1991; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer 
& Donchin, 1993). The Ne/ERN presents as a negative deflection in the response-locked ERP 
which peaks at around 50-100ms after the commission of an error at fronto-central electrode 
sites (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993). While the Ne/ERN is generally largest 
after error responses, a small negative deflection is also observed on correct trials, commonly 
referred to as the correct-related negativity (CRN) (cf. Coles, Scheffers & Holroyd, 2001; 
Vidal, Hasbroucq, Grapperon & Bonnet, 2000). The classic Pe component represents a 
sustained positive deflection in the response-locked ERP which typically peaks 200-500 ms 
following error commission at parietal electrode sites (Gehring et al., 1993; Falkenstein et al., 
1991). Additionally, it should also be noted that the Pe has recently been partitioned into two 
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sub-components by some authors. It has been suggested that the Pe comprises an early, fronto-
central (the early Pe) and a later, parietal (the late or classic Pe) sub-component (cf. Arbel & 
Donchin, 2009; van Veen & Carter, 2002). Furthermore, the Ne/ERN and Pe are present when 
participants make an error both in choice-RT tasks (e.g., Gehring et al., 1993; Hajcak & Foti, 
2008; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2006) and on errors of commission in Go/NoGo tasks (e.g, 
Georgiadi, Liotti, Nixon, & Liddle, 2011). Error-related ERPs are similar for stimuli that are 
presented in the visual or auditory modality (see Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ & 
Hohnsbein, 2000), and occur regardless of response modality: for errors committed by hand 
(e.g., Gehring et al., 1993; Falkenstein et al., 1991), foot (e.g., Holroyd, Dien & Coles, 1998), 
or eye movements (e.g., Endrass, Reuter & Kathmann, 2007; Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, 
Blow, Band & Kok, 2001).  
1.5.4 The Ne/ERN. 
 
Several theoretical frameworks have been proposed to account for the psychological 
processes which underlie the generation of the Ne/ERN. Before reviewing these competing 
proposals, I will first report some factors that are commonly agreed upon regarding the nature 
of the Ne/ERN. First, the early peak of the Ne/ERN makes it unlikely that the component 
reflects feedback information about the error gathered from sensory or proprioceptive 
sources. Instead, it is widely suggested that the component reflects a comparison between an 
internal representation of the issued erroneous motor command (i.e. efference copy), and 
concurrent stimulus evaluation processes which continue throughout error commission and 
indicate the task appropriate (correct) response alternative (cf. Bernstein, Scheffers & Coles, 
1995; Botvinick et al., 2001; Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993; Holroyd & Coles, 
2002; Yeung et al., 2004). Furthermore, the response-locked Ne/ERN does not occur in 
situations in which the correctness of a choice cannot be determined at response time (e.g., 
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gambling tasks or early phases of probabilistic learning; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002). If, however, external feedback is provided to indicate the accuracy 
of a response, a feedback-related Ne/ERN (sometimes also referred to as the Feedback-related 
Negativity [FRN], e.g., Stahl, 2010, or the Feedback Negativity [FN], e.g., Foti & Hajcak, 
2009) occurs 250-350 ms after such external signals provide the first indication of an error or 
negative outcome (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Stahl, 2010).  
Converging evidence from several imaging modalities, including ERP dipole 
localization (e.g., Dehaene, Posner & Tucker, 1994; Luu, Collins & Tucker, 2000; Miltner, 
Braun & Coles, 1997; van Veen & Carter, 2002, Taylor, Stern & Gehring, 2007); fMRI (e.g., 
Kerns et al., 2005; Mathalon, Whitfield & Ford, 2003); and, finally, intracranial EEG 
recording (e.g., Pourtois et al., 2010),  suggest that both the response-related and feedback-
related Ne/ERN largely reflect error-sensitive activity within the ACC. These suggestions are 
in line with the idea that the ACC plays a crucial role in the online monitoring of performance 
(cf. Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Botvinick et al., 2001; Shackman et al., 2011). Interestingly, 
error-related activity has also been reported in “affective” cortical structures such as the 
amygdala (e.g., Pourtois et al., 2010) and insula (Klein, Endrass, Kathmann, Neumann, von 
Cramon, & Ullsperger 2007; Ullsperger, Harsay, Wessel, & Ridderinkhof, 2010), potentially 
reflecting emotional aspects of error monitoring, such as the affective or motivational salience 
of the mistake (Pourtois et al., 2010).  
Competing Theoretical Accounts of the Ne/ERN 
Several accounts have aimed to determine the psychological processes that underlie the 
generation of the Ne/ERN. It should be noted that it is currently not possible to conclude that 
one theoretical view of the Ne/ERN (or ACC function in general) can explain the breadth of 
data generated by over two decades of Ne/ERN research (see Gehring, Liu, Orr & Carp, 2012, 
for an exhaustive review of this research). Furthermore, the empirical work presented in the 
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current thesis does not aim to directly compare competing accounts of the computational 
processes underlying Ne/ERN generation. Therefore, in the following section I will first 
review the most salient competing theories of the Ne/ERN, and subsequently discuss recent 
attempts to re-conceptualize the ACC in a manner which can potentially reconcile these 
competing accounts.  
The Conflict Monitoring Account of the Ne/ERN 
First, the Ne/ERN has been accounted for within the framework of the conflict 
monitoring theory of ACC function (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick et al., 2004; 
Danielmeier, Wessel, Steinhauser & Ullsperger, 2009; Gehring & Fencsik, 2001; Yeung et 
al., 2004). Importantly, proponents of the conflict-monitoring theory have suggested that the 
Ne/ERN reflects the high conflict which arises in the information processing system when 
response representations of both the correct and error response are active simultaneously 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004). More specifically, errors in many choice RT tasks 
tend to be associated with very fast RTs, reflecting premature actions that are omitted before 
sufficient stimulus processing has occurred (c.f., Botvinick et al., 2001; Brewer & Smith, 
1984; Rabbitt & Vyas, 1970). Consequently, the conflict monitoring account proposes that 
response conflict immediately following the error response occurs due to the simultaneous 
activation of response channels representing the response (i.e. the error) and a representation 
of the task-appropriate correct response (generated by on-going evaluation after the fast error 
response is initiated) (Botivinik et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004). Furthermore, in line with the 
general role of ACC function in the conflict monitoring account, this idea suggests that the 
Ne/ERN reflects evaluative performance monitoring functions which signal to other brain 
areas (e.g. the DLPFC) the need for remedial cognitive control adjustments (Botvinick et al., 
2001; Kerns et al., 2004; Yeung et al., 2004). Therefore, by accounting for the Ne/ERN within 
the framework of the conflict monitoring hypothesis, these authors have presented a ‘unified’ 
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account of ACC function in which the ACC is sensitive to response conflict occurring both on 
errors and correct performance on incompatible trials in interference paradigms (Botvinick et 
al., 1999; Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004). Importantly, this account also suggests 
that the Ne/ERN reflects the activity of an error-sensitive conflict monitoring process, rather 
than a specific error detection mechanism (Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004). 
Outcome Evaluation Accounts of the Ne/ERN 
An alternative account of the Ne/ERN proposes that the amplitude of the component 
reflects processes that determine the value of on-going events, determining whether outcomes 
are better or worse than expected (c.f., Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Yeung, Holroyd & Cohen, 
2004). Importantly, this idea relates the Ne/ERN to reinforcement learning processes, and, in 
particular, to reward prediction errors. The reinforcement learning Ne/ERN (RL-ERN) theory 
suggests that performance is continually monitored for the value of ongoing events (Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002). When errors occur, evaluative processes (putatively fulfilled by the 
mesencephalic dopamine system and the basal ganglia) register that events are worse than 
expected, and a reward prediction error signal is created (cf. Holroyd & Coles, 2002). 
Furthermore, the RL-ERN theory suggests that the Ne/ERN reflects the arrival of this 
reinforcement learning signal at the ACC (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Yeung et al., 2005). The 
original conceptualization of the RL-ERN theory, proposed that the Ne/ERN amplitude 
reflects the use of reinforcement learning signals by the ACC to select the appropriate motor 
controller (another brain area capable of imposing control over overt behaviour, e.g., 
DLPFC) to dominate performance in avoidance of future aversive outcomes (e.g. errors or 
monetary loss) (cf. Holroyd & Coles, 2002). However, subsequent studies have demonstrated 
that the feedback Ne/ERN occurs even when negative outcomes are not preceded by an overt 
motor response; for example, when feedback indicates loss in a task requiring no response 
output (Miltner, Brauer, Hecht, Trippe & Coles, 2004; Yeung et al., 2005). Importantly, such 
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results suggest that the Ne/ERN might reflect the introduction of outcome evaluation signals 
to the ACC, rather than the ACC directly selecting new motor controllers after undesirable 
behavioural responses or choices (see Yeung et al., 2005). 
Reconciling competing theories of ACC (and Ne/ERN) function. 
The apparently competing outcome evaluation and conflict monitoring accounts of the 
Ne/ERN appear difficult to reconcile within a single, parsimonious account of ACC function. 
Notably, Botvinick (2007) made a recent attempt to reconcile these competing accounts. First, 
Botvinick (2007) acknowledged that the range of findings reported in studies of outcome-
evaluation were difficult to explain by the idea of response conflict alone. Botvinick (2007) 
also argued, however, that a comprehensive theory of ACC function must also account for the 
substantial evidence relating the structure to response conflict during multiple interference 
paradigms (c.f., Botvinick et al., 2001; Kerns et al., 2004). Additionally, he noted that even in 
the original formulation, the conflict monitoring hypothesis (c.f., Botvinick et al., 2001) 
proposed that evaluating current levels of response conflict might reflect one, but not all of 
the evaluative processes sub-served by the ACC. In order to account for the diverse range of 
task that engage the ACC, Botvinick (2007) suggested that the ACC might serve performance 
by using reinforcement learning information to conduct a form of “cost-benefit” analysis.  
Under this framework, conflict is therefore among one of several types of events which 
register as a “cost”. Under this view, conflict is perceived as an aversive event, which leads to 
remedial or avoidant strategies such as conflict adaptation (cf. Botvinick et al., 2001), 
remedial posterror adjustments (e.g.,  aming, 19 8; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977), or “cost”-
avoidant decision making (cf. Botvinick, 2007; Kool, McGuire, Rosen & Botvinick, 2010). 
Similarly, negative feedback in gambling tasks (e.g., Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Yeung et al., 
2005) would then also register as a cost which would drive future cost-avoidant decision 
making. Therefore, important for current concerns, conflict arising during an error would also 
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constitute and be registered as a cost, with “cost” linking conflict monitoring theories of the 
Ne/ERN to reinforcement learning (see Shackman et al., 2011 for a similar suggestion). 
1.5.5 The Error Positivity (Pe) 
In contrast to the Ne/ERN, the Pe has played a less central role in many theories of 
performance monitoring (Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis & Ridderinkhof, 2005). Furthermore, the 
late or classic parietal Pe has additionally been studied with greater frequency than the early, 
fronto-central Pe (Arbel & Donchin, 2009). Regarding the classic Pe, it has been consistently 
suggested that this ERP reflects a P300 component (see Falkenstein et al., 1991; Leuthold & 
Sommer, 1999; Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis & Ridderinkhof, 2005; Ridderinkhof, Ramautar & 
Wijnen, 2009) and, as such, might be related to the contextual updating, awareness or the 
motivational significance of the error (Arbel & Donchin, 2009; Leuthold & Sommer, 1999; 
Overbeek et al., 2005; Ridderinkhof, Ramautar & Wijnen, 2009). Although an in-depth 
discussion of the relationship between error-related ERPs and error-awareness is outside the 
scope of the current review (for review see Wessel, 2012), it should be noted that, while the 
Ne/ERN has been related to conscious error-awareness with some controversy (see Charles, 
Van Opstal, Marti, & Dehaene, 2013; Endrass et al., 2007; Endrass, Klawohn, Preuss, & 
Kathmann, 2012; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; O’Connell et al., 2007), the late Pe has almost 
unanimously been related to conscious aspects of error monitoring (see Charles et al., 2013; 
Endrass et al., 2007; Endrass et al., 2012; Leuthold & Sommer, 1999; Niuwenhuis et al., 
2001; O’Connell et al., 2007; Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010, Steinhauser & Yeung, 2012; 
Wessel, 2012).  
In contrast to the classic Pe and Ne/ERN, considerably less is currently known about the 
functional significance of the early Pe. Importantly, however, the early and late sub-
components of the Pe have been shown to be differentially sensitive to experimental 
manipulation, suggesting that the psychological processes underlying the generation of these 
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components may differ. For example, in an antisaccade task, Endrass et al. (2007) noted that 
while the late Pe was markedly reduced for error-unaware trials, both the early Pe and Ne/ERN 
appeared with equal magnitude for both aware and unaware errors. In light of these results, 
the authors suggested that conscious error awareness emerges after the time-window of the 
early Pe. Furthermore, Ullsperger & von Crammon (2006) noted that both the Ne/ERN and 
early Pe were larger when participants were instructed to ‘signal’ rather than ‘correct’ their 
errors in a choice RT task, while the late Pe did not differ between conditions. Interestingly, 
together the findings of Endrass et al. (2007) and Ullsperger & von Crammon (2006) 
converge to suggest that the early Pe and Ne/ERN might reflect similar performance 
monitoring processes (see Van Veen & Carter, 2002 for a similar suggestion). Contradicting 
this view, however, Arbel and Donchin (2009) recently reported that while the Ne/ERN and 
late Pe were reduced when performance speed, rather than accuracy, was stressed the same 
speed-accuracy instruction had no effect on the amplitude of the early Pe. In the context of the 
current thesis, the early Pe will further serve as an extra source of error-related brain response 
in comparison between depressed and non-depressed groups, however, it will only be used as 
an additional measure of “error sensitivity” between groups, as the functional characteristic of 
this component await further elucidation.   
 Finally, when feedback provides the first indication of an unexpected negative event, 
the feedback Ne/ERN is followed by, or is sometimes superimposed upon, a P300-like 
component (e.g, Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2007; Yeung et al., 2005; Yeung & 
Sanfey, 2004). This feedback-P300 (f-P300) is typically observed at both fronto-central and 
parietal electrode sites (see Yeung, et al., 2005; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004; de Bruijn, Mars, & 
Hulstijn, 2004; Hajcak et al., 2007), and has been related to the extent to which feedback 
signals deviate from feedback expectancy (de Bruijn et al., 2004; Hajcak et al., 2007). This 
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effect has been suggested to occur independently from feedback valence (Yeung et al., 2005; 
Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). 
1.5.6 Error-related Brain Activity and Posterror Behaviour. 
The Ne/ERN and Posterror Slowing.  
Both the conflict monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2001) and RL-ERN (Holroyd & Coles, 
2002) theories of the Ne/ERN suggest that the amplitude of the component should predict the 
extent of subsequent posterror slowing (Botvinick et al., 2001; Holroyd & Coles, 2002, 
Yeung et al., 2004). While some studies have indeed reported a positive correlation between 
the amplitude of the Ne/ERN and posterror slowing (e.g., Debener, Ullsperger, Siegel, 
Fiehler, von Cramon & Engel, 2005; Gehring et al., 1993; Holroyd, Yeung, Coles, & Cohen, 
2005), several other authors did not find such a correlation (e.g., Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009; 
Gehring & Fencsik, 2001; Hajcak, McDonald & Simons, 2003a; Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, 2012), 
questioning a direct functional link between the amplitude of the Ne/ERN and the precise 
extent of remedial posterror adjustment. This apparent lack of reliable correlations between 
Ne/ERN and posterror slowing has stimulated several theoretical suggestions. Initially, 
Gehring and Fencsik (2001) suggested that the Ne/ERN (and early conflict-related ACC 
signals in general) might reflect a ‘warning signal’ that something has gone wrong, without 
specifying either the nature of the problem, nor the remedial adjustments (e.g. posterror 
slowing) required to fix it. Similarly, Hajcak and Simons (2008) suggested that the Ne/ERN 
might necessarily proceed, without being sufficient to precisely determine the extent of, 
posterror slowing.  
In addition to these cognitive control accounts, some authors have proposed a view of 
the Ne/ERN to suggest that it might represent an “affective” response, almost completely 
dissociable from behavioural adjustment. For example, increased Ne/ERN amplitudes without 
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co-occurring changes in post-error behaviour have been reported in numerous affect-related 
psychopathologies, such as obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Carrasco et al., 2013; Endrass, 
Klawohn, Schuster, & Kathmann, 2008; Gehring, Himle & Nisenson, 2000; Hajcak, Franklin, 
Foa, & Simons, 2008; Hajcak & Simons, 2002; Riesel, Endrass, Kaufmann & Kathmann, 
2011; Ruchsow et al., 2005; but see Nieuwenhuis, Nielen, Mol, Hajcak & Veltman, 2005), 
trait-worry (Hajcak, McDonald & Simons, 2003b) and General Anxiety Disorder (GAD, 
Weinberg, Olvet & Hajcak, 2010; Weinberg et al., 2012a; however, see Xiao et al., 2011). In 
light of these common findings, Weinberg, Reisel & Hajcak (2012b) recently suggested that 
variation between groups on the Ne/ERN may reflect trait defensive reactivity. More 
specifically, Weinberg et al. (2012b) reasoned that as errors are highly threatening and 
aversive events (cf. Hajcak & Foti, 2008), the Ne/ERN might reflect individual differences in 
defensive reactions to these threatening signals. Importantly, while this account allows for the 
dissociation between the Ne/ERN and the extent of posterror slowing, these suggestions need 
not be mutually exclusive from previous suggestions that the Ne/ERN (either as a “cognitive” 
or “affective” response) might precede posterror adjustment, with the precise extent of RT 
slowing being mediated by some other, as yet unknown factor (cf. Gehring & Fencsik, 2001; 
Hajcak & Simons, 2008). 
The Pe and Posterror Slowing. 
 Several authors have suggested that it is the Pe, and not the Ne/ERN, which might 
determine the extent of posterror slowing. For example, Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001) noted that 
both posterror slowing and the Pe were larger during error-aware (vs. unaware) trials, whilst 
the Ne/ERN was present for both aware and unaware trials, suggesting that the Pe and not the 
Ne/ERN might be more closely related to the extent of posterror slowing.  Additionally, 
Hajcak et al. (2003a) reported a significant correlation between the amplitude of the Pe and 
posterror slowing, further suggesting a link between this positive component and the extent of 
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RT slowing after errors (see also Boksem, Tops, Wester, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006; however, 
see Strozyk & Jentzsch, 2012).  
In addition to being associated with control accounts of posterror adaptation, the 
relationship between the Pe and posterror slowing has recently been interpreted in favour of 
the orienting account (Notebaert et al., 2009). More specifically, as the Pe has been linked to 
an ERP component classically associated with attentional processing, the P300 (cf. Leuthold 
& Sommer, 1999; Overbeek et al., 2005), proponents of the orienting account have suggested 
that relationships between posterror slowing and a P300-like ERP, rather than the amplitude 
of the Ne/ERN, particularly favours the orienting account (cf. Núñez Castellar et al., 2010). 
To provide additional support of this claim, Núñez Castellar et al. (2010) measured the 
relationship between response-locked (Ne/ERN) and feedback-locked (feedback Ne/ERN and 
f-P300) ERPs across conditions of the same adaptive colour identification task used by 
Notebeart et al. (2009) in the original formulation of the orienting account. Importantly, while 
neither the Ne/ERN nor the feedback Ne/ERN were correlated with the extent of posterror 
slowing or postcorrect slowing (when errors outnumbered correct response), the amplitude of 
the f-P300 was correlated with both posterror and post-correct slowing (Núñez Castellar et 
al., 2010). Consequently, Núñez Castellar et al. (2010) argued the observed relationship 
between the f-P300, often related to expectancy violation (cf. de Bruijn et al., 2004; Hajcak et 
al., 2007), and the extent of subsequent RT slowing provided clear support for the attention 
orienting account.  
In a recent joint-action experiment, however, we found evidence contrary to this 
relationship between f-P300 and posterror slowing (Picton, Saunders & Jentzsch, 2012). 
More specifically, in this study two participants performed independent choice-RT tasks to a 
single number presented on a shared computer monitor (e.g. Participant 1 responded with a 
parity judgement, whilst Participant 2 made a choice depending on whether the presented 
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number was higher or lower than 5). Responses were followed by feedback signals (visible to 
both participants) indicating the number of errors in a given trial (i.e. no errors, individual 
participant error, or both error). Importantly, this feedback did not indicate which participant 
actually committed the error. Behaviourally, participants only showed RT slowing after own, 
but not co-actors errors, suggesting that posterror slowing was deployed in an ego-centric 
manner. Interestingly, however, the ERP results revealed that while own errors were 
associated with clear response-locked error-related brain activity (Ne/ERN and Pe) and 
minimal feedback related activity, co-actor errors were associated with increased amplitudes 
of both the feedback Ne/ERN and the f-P300. Therefore, these ERP results suggest that co-
actor (error) feedbacks indeed violated feedback expectations (as evidenced by increased f-
P300 amplitude), but was not associated with increased posterror slowing. These findings 
contradict previous suggestions that expectancy violation is necessarily followed by RT 
slowing (c.f., Notebaert et al., 2009; Núñez Castellar et al., 2010). 
 
1.6 Error-processing, “perceived failure”, and Depression 
In the current thesis it is of interest to investigate the nature of error-processing (e.g., 
error-related ERPs and remedial posterror adjustments) in relation to increased levels of 
depressive symptoms. In addition to being events which motivate remedial adjustments in 
cognitive control, errors are inherently aversive and negatively-perceived actions (c.f., Hajcak 
& Foti, 2008; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Rabbitt & Vyas, 1970), and, more recently, it has been 
suggested that such errors convey signals of threat to the individual, mobilising defensive 
reactions (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Weinberg et al., 2012b). Important for current concerns, 
depression has been associated with an exaggerated sensitivity to “personal failure” (Beck, 
2008; Beats, Sahakian & Levy, 1996; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Wenzlaff & Grozier, 
1988), suggesting that failure-related events, such as mistakes and negative feedback, are 
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particularly salient to depressed individuals (Beats et al., 1996; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; 
Jones, Siegle, Muelly, Haggerty & Ghinassi, 2010; Roiser & Sahakian, 2013, Tucker, Luu, 
Frishkoff, Quiring & Poulsen, 2003). In the specific context of error adaptation, it has been 
proposed that performance errors (and negative performance feedback) provoke a 
‘catastrophic reaction to perceived failure’ (Beats et al., 199 ) or ‘negative automatic 
thoughts’ in depressed individuals (Jones et al., 2010), and such ‘off-task’ attention to these 
error-related affective cognitions is proposed to reduce processing of task-relevant 
information (Jones et al., 2010), often leading to less rather than more accurate posterror 
performance in depressed participants (e.g., Beats et al., 1996; Elliott, Sahakian, Herrod, 
Robbins & Paykel, 1997; Elliott, Sahakian, McKay, Herrod, Robbins & Paykel, 1996; 
Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2010; Jones et 
al., 2010; Pizzagalli, Peccoralo, Davidson & Cohen, 2006; Schroder,  Moran, Infantolino, & 
Moser, 2013).  
Initial empirical support for impaired posterror performance in depression came from 
researchers using neuropsychological test batteries to assess cognitive functioning. Such 
investigations often reported that depressed individuals did not make more mistakes than non-
depressed participants in general, however, after making an initial error, subsequent accuracy 
levels deteriorated for depressed groups (Beats et al., 1996; Elliott et al., 1997; Elliott et al., 
1996; but see Purcell, Maruff, Kyrios & Pantelis, 1997). Subsequent studies investigating 
error processing in depression using common cognitive control tasks (e.g., interference 
paradigms), however, have provided more mixed evidence for a deleterious relationship 
between depressive symptoms and error monitoring. The majority of these investigations 
have also reported error-related ERPs, providing additional information regarding the 
neurophysiological correlates of error monitoring in depressed samples. First, supporting the 
proposed “catastrophic” response to error commission in depression, larger Ne/ERN 
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amplitude and reduced posterror accuracy has been reported in un-medicated, moderately 
depressed samples during Stroop task performance (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008b; Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2010, see also Chiu & Deldin, 2007, for similar Ne/ERN potentiation in an MDD 
sample during Flanker performance). Importantly, as the Ne/ERN has been related to the 
affective saliency of the error (e.g., Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Hajcak et al., 2005; Holroyd & 
Coles, 2008; Pourtois et al., 2010), such increased Ne/ERN activity and reduced posterror 
accuracy in depressed samples supports previous suggestions that an exaggerated or 
“catastrophic” (Beats et al., 199 ) responsivity to errors occurs in depressed groups. 
However, as the Ne/ERN has been localised to the ACC (Dehaene et al., 1994; Yeung et al., 
2004), such increased Ne/ERN activity initially appears to contradict proposals that the ACC 
is hypoactive in depression (e.g., Drevets, 1998; Mayberg et al., 1997; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 
2008a). Interestingly, Holmes and Pizzagalli have reported increased error-related ACC 
response (i.e., increased Ne/ERN, Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008b) and reduced response-conflict 
related ACC activity (i.e., reduced N450-ERP amplitude, Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008a) in the 
same depressed sample, proposing that hyperactive evaluative control processes may occur in 
depressed samples specifically in the context of errors, perhaps because performance errors 
are inherently associated with the personal-failure assumed to be particularly concerning in 
depression (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Pizzagalli et al., 2006; Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988).  
In light of this observed hyperactive performance monitoring (i.e., increased Ne/ERN 
amplitude) in depressed groups, Olvet and Hajcak (2008) proposed that increased Ne/ERN 
amplitude reflects a trait-like neurophysiological marker of abnormal performance monitoring 
processes in all internalizing psychopathologies (including OCD, GAD and depression). 
Importantly, supporting such a claim, several investigations have reported increased Ne/ERN 
amplitudes reliably in GAD (Weinberg et al., 2010; Weinberg et al., 2012a) and OCD 
(Carrasco et al., 2013; Endrass et al., 2008; Gehring et al., 2000; Hajcak et al., 2008; Hajcak 
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& Simons, 2002; Riesel et al, 2011; Ruchsow et al., 2005). Consequently, these findings 
propose that increased error-monitoring might commonly occur in psychopathologies 
characterized by increased defensiveness toward personal mistakes (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008; 
see also Weinberg et al., 2012b). Challenging this proposal in regard to depression, however, 
it should be noted that several studies have not reported significantly increased Ne/ERN 
amplitude in depressed samples (e.g., Georgiadi, Liotti, Nixon, & Liddle, 2011; Ruchsow et 
al., 2004; Ruchsow et al., 2006; Olvet, Klein, & Hajcak, 2010; Schrijvers et al., 2008; 
Schrijvers et al., 2009). Furthermore, Ne/ERN amplitudes actually appear to be numerically 
reduced in particularly severe depression (Georgiadi et al., 2011; Schrijvers et al., 2008; 
Schrijvers et al., 2009), and the difference Ne/ERN amplitude (i.e., error-related ERP 
waveform minus correct-related waveform) was negatively correlated with increasing 
depressive symptoms severity in one further sample. In explanation of such results, it has 
been suggested that apathy in more severe levels of depressive symptoms might attenuate 
affective reactions to errors (c.f., Olvet et al., 2010; Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schrijvers et al., 
2009), while hyperactive error monitoring might remain in groups with more mild to 
moderate depressive symptoms (e.g., Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; 
Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2010; see Tucker et al., 2003 for a similar suggestion relating to the 
feedback Ne/ERN).  Finally, in studies which have not reported increased Ne/ERN activity in 
depressed participants, posterror accuracy levels also did not differ between elevated and low 
depressive symptom groups (e.g., Olvet et al., 2010; Ruchsow et al., 2004; Schrijvers et al., 
2008; Schrijvers et al., 2009). 
In contrast to the Ne/ERN, the Pe has typically played a less central role in reports of 
error-related ERPs in depression. As with the Ne/ERN, studies reporting the Pe in depressed 
participant groups have overall reported mixed results, and this observed variation in results 
appears to be at least partially attributable to depressive symptom severity. The most common 
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result appears to be generally reduced late Pe amplitude in depressed groups (e.g., Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2010; Olvet et al., 2010; Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schrijvers et al., 2009; Schroder et 
al., 2013; however, see Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008b; Ruchsow et al., 
2004, 2005; Georgiadi et al., 2011). More specifically, in two studies Schijvers et al. (2008, 
2009) reported reduced Pe amplitudes in particularly severely depressed samples, while both 
Olvet et al. (2010) and Schroder et al. (2013) reported negative correlations between 
increasing depressive symptom severity and late Pe amplitude. Together, these studies suggest 
that reduced Pe amplitude might be related to increasing depressive symptom severity.  In 
explanation of these results, both Schrijvers et al. (2008, 2009) and Olvet et al. (2010) 
suggested that apathy might reduce the motivational significance of errors for more severely 
depressed individuals. In contrast to these results, studies including participants with less 
severe symptoms have generally not reported reduced Pe amplitudes associated with 
depression (e.g., Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Compton et al., 2008; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008), 
while Holmes and Pizzagalli (2010) reported that the Pe was reduced only for a condition in 
which performance was rewarded but not in a further condition without performance 
incentives, further proposing that motivational factors might differentiate Pe response 
between depressed and control participants. 
In the context of the current thesis, error processing will be investigated in a sub-
clinical depressive symptom group identified by increased scores on a self-report measure of 
depressive symptoms. As it has previously been suggested that such groups are associated 
with increased Ne/ERN amplitudes (Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; 
Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2010; Tucker et al., 2003) and reduced posterror accuracy (e.g., Holmes 
& Pizzagalli, 2008; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2010; Pizzagalli et al., 2006; Schroder et al., 2013), 
it is predicted that such a group will be associated with hyperactive error-monitoring 
(increased Ne/ERN amplitude) and a “catastrophic” response to perceived failure (i.e., 
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reduced posterror accuracy). In addition to the quantification of the Ne/ERN and posterror-
behaviour, however, a more experiential or subjective account of error processing in 
depression was also attained in the current thesis. More specifically, studies have previously 
suggested that depression is associated with increased emotional-concern regarding errors, 
however, previous investigations have inferred this affective response either from posterror 
performance metrics or error-related ERPs amplitudes (e.g., Beats et al., 1996; Jones et al., 
2010; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008b). Importantly, while the Ne/ERN has been considered as a 
physiological correlate of affective error processing (Hajcak et al., 2005; Hajcak & Foti, 
2008; Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, 2012), the amplitude of the component alone is not the 
equivalent of a fully developed subjective emotional experience (see also Weinberg et al., 
2012b for similar suggestion). Therefore, in Chapter 4 of the current thesis (Chapter 4) 
subjective reports relating to the negative affective experience of errors were collected in 
order to determine if depression is associated with increasingly negative appraisals of error 
commission. Finally, posterror performance in depression has almost exclusively been 
investigated in paradigms using longer RSIs. Importantly, as error-adpatation impairment in 
depression is suggested to result from intrusive “automatic negative thoughts” (Jones et al., 
2010), and depression has recently been associated with impaired disengagement from the 
processing of concern-related material (c.f., Koster et al., 2011), participants with elevated 
low and elevated depressive symptoms are predicted to differ on posterror behaviour more 
prominently as RSIs increase due to the inability to disengage from affective processing of 
the error. In contrast, the time-conuming process of error monitoring is proposed to create 
performance interference at very short RSIs for all participant groups (c.f., Jentzsch & 
Dudshig, 2009) (see Chapter 4 for details). 
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1.7. Overview of the experimental work in the current thesis project  
 
The first goal of the current thesis project was to further investigate the nature of error 
processing abnormalities associated with elevated depressive symptoms levels. Importantly, 
the orienting account of error adaptation (cf. Notebaert et al., 2009) presents a significant 
challenge to studies which utilize error adaptation as a dependent measure of individual 
differences in cognitive control. Consequently, before investigating the nature of posterror 
adjustments in participants with elevated depressive symptoms, I aimed to design an 
experiment which could differentiate between adaptive and non-adaptive accounts of 
posterror slowing. Therefore, the first experiment of the current thesis used a false feedback 
manipulation in conjunction with ERP measures to differentiate between adaptive and non-
adaptive accounts of PES (see Chapter 3).  
The second experiment involved a systematic investigation of posterror slowing 
processes at 4 different RSIs ranging from short (100 ms) to long (1000 ms) for participant 
groups with low and elevated levels of depressive symptoms. In addition to these behavioural 
measures of posterror adjustment, error-related ERPs were compared between groups to 
investigate the sensitivity of evaluative aspects of error monitoring. Finally, error 
contextualized questionnaires were included in order to gain a subjective account of negative 
affect associated with errors to further investigate proposals that depression is associated with 
exagerated affective reactions to errors (see Chapter 4)  
The third experiment concerned the nature of sequential control over interference from 
emotional (Emotional-face Stroop task) and non-emotional (Classic Stroop task) conflict. 
Additionally, with the exception of one investigation (West et al., 2007), the nature of future 
oriented, proactive control has been relatively less studies as a function of increasing 
depressive symptomatology. Thus, participants were instructed to maintain either speed or 
accuracy instructions as a further measure of sustained control processes (see Chapter 5). 
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Finally, few studies have investigated executive processes in participants with elevated 
depressive symptoms when task-relevant information must be utilized across a delay period 
despite the presence of emotional distractors. Therefore, Chapter 6 presents a cueing study in 
which task-irrelevant emotional distractors (expressive faces) were presented with a cue, 
leading to potential mood-congruent distraction effects in participants with elevated 
depressive symptoms. Furthermore, ERP measures served as additional measures of distractor 
interference at early (P1, N170) and late (CNV) stages of processing.    
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2  
General Methods  
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In the following chapter I will outline the common aspects of the methodology used 
throughout the empirical work presented in the current thesis. The first section of the chapter 
will introduce a number of self-report inventories used to measure depressive symptoms, trait 
anxiety and general current affect. Secondly, I will provide a basic introduction to ERP 
research, covering the neural source of the EEG signal and common data processing and 
presentation standards in ERP research. Finally, specific technical information about the 
testing environment and behavioural and psychophysiological apparatus to be used in the 
empirical work presented within this thesis will be summarized. 
 
2.1 Measuring Depressive Symptoms 
Research strategies used to form groups depending on depressive symptoms can be 
classified into two categories. First, some investigations compare participants with a clinical 
diagnosis of a depressive disorder (e.g., Major Depressive Disorder, MDD) to a healthy 
control group who report no significant clinical symptoms (e.g., Olvet et al., 2010; Schrijvers 
et al., 2008; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008a). These clinical diagnoses are typically obtained by 
clinician administered interviews in health care settings. In experimental psychopathology, 
research using participant groups defined by clinical criteria have strong validity as it is clear 
that the identified participants’ symptoms are of sufficient magnitude to require treatment 
(c.f., Coyne, 1994). Alternatively, investigators can form groups by identifying abnormal 
psychological states using raw scores on well-validated self-report inventories (e.g., Holmes 
& Pizzagalli, 2007; Koster et al., 2005; Joormann, 2004). Some authors commonly refer to 
participants selected by self-report scores of depression severity using the term “Dysphoric” 
(e.g., Koster et al., 2005), however, as there is no clear definition or boundaries regarding the 
use of this term, I will simply refer to relative levels of “depressive symptoms” between 
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groups throughout this thesis. Crucially, the validity of a self-report inventory can be gauged 
by its comparison with clinical outcome measures. 
In the following sections I will introduce the specific self-report questionnaires used to 
measure depressive symptoms in the current thesis, and overview some validation research 
conducted on these inventories. Furthermore, a questionnaire to measure trait-anxiety will 
also be described because depression is commonly associated with trait-anxiety (e.g., Homes 
& Pizzagalli, 2007; Hirschfeld, 2001), therefore, it is important to measure co-morbid levels 
of trait-anxiety to provide a clear characterisation of the studied sample. Finally, a 
questionnaire commonly used to measure current (i.e., “in this moment”) positive and 
negative affect will also be described.   
 
2.1.2 Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II) 
The BDI-II (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) is among the most commonly used scales to 
measure the severity of depressive symptomatology in both clinical and experimental 
settings. Based upon the first edition of the BDI, the second edition was revised to closely 
match the criteria for the diagnosis of depressive disorders as itemized in the then recently 
published DSM-IV (APA, 1994; Beck et al., 1996). The BDI-II is a well validated measure of 
depressive symptomatology. For example, the scale correlates strongly with outcome 
measures from clinician administered interviews (e.g., Beck et al., 1996; Sprinkle et al., 2002) 
and other self-report measures of depressive symptoms (e.g., Fountoulakis et al., 2007). 
Additionally, the BDI-II demonstrates strong test-retest reliability in both clinical and sub-
clinical samples (Arnau, Meagher, Norris, & Bramson, 2001; Beck et al., 1996; Fountoulakis 
et al., 2007; Sprinkle et al., 2002), suggesting that the scale measures sustained levels of 
depressive symptoms, and is not overly sensitive to daily fluctuations in mood (Fountoulakis 
et al., 2007).  
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The structure of the BDI-II comprises 21 questions to which the individual is asked to 
endorse a value (ranging from 0-3) for each of the 21 questions which most closely reflects 
their feelings over the past two-week period, including the present day. The questions cover a 
variety of depressive symptoms (sadness, pessimism, past failure, loss of pleasure, guilty 
feelings, punishment feelings, self-dislike, self-criticalness, suicidal thoughts or wishes, 
crying, agitation, loss of interest, indecisiveness, worthlessness, loss of energy, changes in 
sleeping pattern, irritability, changes in appetite, concentration difficulty, tiredness or 
fatigue, loss of interest in sex) which are typically summed to give an overall score ranging 
from 0 to 63. This overall symptom level can be used in experimental psychopathology as a 
continuous variable (with higher scores relating to more severe symptoms), or can be used to 
form meaningful groups based on cut-off scores which relate to clinical symptom levels. 
Most studies consider a score greater than 13 to be indicative of mild mood disturbance (Beck 
et al., 1996), although higher cut-off scores have been recommended for studies wishing to 
obtain a higher detection rate. For example, Beck et al. (1996) suggested that a cut-off score 
of  > 17 would yield a “true positive” detection rate approximately > 93%. 
 
2.1.3 Major Depression Inventory (MDI) 
Developed by the World Health Organization (WHO), the MDI (Bech, Olsen, 
Noerholm & Abildgaard, 2001),  consists of 10 questions, see Table 1, specifically designed 
to closely match the multiple symptoms used to generate a diagnosis of Major Depressive 
Disorder (MDD) in both the DSM-IV and International Statistical Classification of Diseases 
and Related Health Problems - 10 (ICD-10, WHO, 2008). Participants are asked to consider 
each question in the context of the last two weeks while recording their answers. Symptoms 
are endorsed on a   point scale between “at no time” (0) and “all the time” (5). Thus, the MDI 
can provide a continuous measure of depressive symptom severity by adding the scores, with 
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a range from 0 to 50 (Bech et al., 2001; Cuijpers, Dekker, Noteboom, Smits & Peen, 2007). 
The MDI has demonstrated good validity in comparison with clinician derived diagnoses 
(Bech et al., 2001; Cuijpers et al., 2007; Fountoulaki et al., 2007; Olsen, Noerholm, Martiny 
& Bech, 2003), and correlates strongly with other self-report measures of depressive 
symptomatology, including the BDI-II (Fountoulaki et al., 2007).  
 
Table 1: MDI questions (note that questions 8 and 10 each contain two parts, the sub-
question with the lowest score is discarded). 
  
 
Major Depression Inventory 
 
1 Have you felt in low spirits or sad? 
2 Have you lost interest in your daily activities? 
3 Have you felt lacking in energy and strength? 
4 Have you felt less self-confident? 
5 Have you had a bad conscience and feelings of guilt? 
6 Have you felt that life wasn't worth living? 
7 Have you had difficulty concentrating, e.g., when reading the newspaper or watching 
television? 
8a Have you felt very restless? 
8b Have you felt subdued? 
9 Have you had trouble sleeping at night? 
10a Have you suffered from reduced appetite? 
10b Have you suffered from increased appetite? 
    
  
2.1.4 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait (STAI-T) 
In addition to levels of depressive symptoms, trait-anxious symptoms were measured in 
participant groups in the current thesis. The STAI-T (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & 
Jacobs, 1983) is probably one of the most commonly used self-report measures of trait 
anxiety, and, as such, has commonly been used as a measure of comorbid anxious symptoms 
in experimental psychological studies of depressed groups (e.g., Clasen, Wells, Ellis & 
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Beevers, 2013; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007). The trait version of the scale differs from its state 
companion measure as it measures stable feelings of anxiety as compared to state anxiety that 
occurrs in the present moment (Spielberger et al., 1983). The STAI-T comprises 20 self-
report items that are summed to estimate the overall levels of trait anxiety in an individual. 
Participants rate each item from “not at all” to “very much so” for how much this 
characteristic generally applies to themselves. Scores on this scale range from 20 to 80 with 
higher scores being indicative of increased levels of trait anxiety.  
 
2.1.5 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
The PANAS (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) provides a brief measure of two 
orthogonal dimensions of current affect: Positive Affect and Negative Affect. The PANAS 
lists 10 positive (interested, excited, strong, enthusiastic, proud, alert, inspired, determined, 
attentive, active) and 10 negative (distressed, upset, scared, hostile, irritable, ashamed, 
nervous, jittery, afraid) affective adjectives to which participants are asked to “indicate to 
what extent you feel this way right now, that is, in the present moment” on a 5-point scale 
between “very slightly/not at all” to “extremely”. Scores are summed separately for positive 
and negative adjectives. High scores on the positive affect (PA) dimension relates to feelings 
of high energy, alertness, enthusiasm, and conscientious engagement, while low PA reflects 
feelings of low mood and lethargy (Watson et al., 1998). Alternatively, the negative affect 
(NA) dimension of the scale increases as a function of emotional distress or unpleasant 
feelings including guilt, disgust and nervousness (Watson et al., 1988).  
In addition to its classic format, the PANAS can also be contextualized to provide a 
standardized assessment of affective appraisals in reaction to specific events such as social 
interactions (e.g., Rodebaugh, Jakatdar, Rosenberg, & Heimberg, 2009) or sport performance 
(Robazza, Bortoli, Nocini, Moser & Arslan, 2000). In the current thesis (Chapter 4) the 
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PANAS scales were contextualised to gain subjective affective measures of the feelings 
participants experienced in relation towards making an error after task performance. In this 
error-contextualised PANAS (ePANAS) the stem question was as follows: “Indicate to what 
extent you felt this way when you made an error during the reaction time task.” 
 
2.2 Event-related Potential Technique 
2.2.1 Creating an ERP Component from the Continuous EEG 
Electroencephalography (EEG) involves the measurement of electrical activity by the 
placement of electrodes on the scalp-surface of the head. Throughout the course of an EEG 
experiment the electrical activity at each electrode (sometimes referred to as a channel or 
lead) is measured continuously. An event-related potential (ERP) refers to the characteristic 
pattern of EEG signal evoked by the occurrence of a particular event of interest (e.g., 
response or stimulus onset). Several key processing steps are required to turn the continuous 
EEG into an ERP. First, throughout recording the EEG activity is marked with specific labels, 
commonly called triggers, that place markers on the continuous recording to allow the 
experimenter to later identify the specific time-points within the experiment at which the 
participant has either been presented with a specific stimuli (e.g., a sound or image) or has 
produced a certain response (e.g., correct, error, or miss). Subsequently, an ERP is created by 
measuring the electrophysiological signal in a discrete time-window, or epoch, surrounding 
the event of interest. Importantly, because the EEG signal is highly susceptible to interference 
from non-brain related sources of electrical activity (e.g., muscle movements, background 
environmental signal) and also to background brain activity not related to the signal of 
interest, the amount of signal (i.e., event-specific) will be highly contaminated within a single 
epoch by such multiple sources of noise. Importantly, however, because unwanted noise is 
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assumed to occur at random during an experiment, relative to the more temporally stable 
brain activity evoked by the event of interest, the averaging of multiple epochs substantially 
improves the signal-to-noise ratio, revealing the brain-evoked potential related to the 
psychological process of interest. Consequently, ERP investigations typically display Grand 
Average ERPs, which consist of the total number of usable epochs in the experiment summed 
both within and across individual participants.  
Given its reliance on electrical activity, a considerable strength of the ERP technique 
relative to other functional neuroimaging methodologies which rely on hemodynamic 
measurements, such as functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Positron 
Emission Tomography (PET), is the benefit of high temporal resolution. This property means 
that the ERP can provide useful information about the timing of mental events which occur 
between the stimulus onset and overt RT. More specifically, ERP methods can be used to 
detect processing stages which might be unobservable using classic RT methods (Luck, 2005; 
Luck, Woodruff & Vogel, 2000; Picton et al., 2000).  It is for this strength that the ERP has 
recently been championed as the “reaction time for the twenty-first century” ( uck, 2005). 
Additional benefits of the ERP method are that it is non-invasive, cost-effective and, once 
applied, causes minimal additional disruption to the participant (in contrast to the noise of an 
fMRI scanner, for example) during the course of a behavioural experiment (see Luck, 2005). 
Conversely, one salient limitation of the ERP technique is its relatively poor spatial resolution 
compared to fMRI of PET (Kalat, 1998; Luck, 2005), and as such, the neural generators of an 
ERP component are always estimated rather than known (Luck, 2005; see following section). 
One further limitation of the ERP method is that the low signal-to-noise ratio means that 
relatively long and repetitive testing sessions are required to generate reliable ERPs (Luck, 
2005; Picton et al., 2000).  
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2.2.2 The Source of the EEG Signal 
As mentioned previously, the biophysical events within the brain which generate an 
ERP cannot be explicitly known by recordings from scalp-located EEG electrodes (see Luck, 
2005). In the following section I will summarise the estimated or “most likely” neural source 
of the EEG signal.  
Electrophysiological techniques used in neuro-scientific research can detect two main 
sources of electrical activity generated within the brain: Action potentials and post-synaptic 
potentials (Luck, 2005). Action potentials refer to the propagation of voltage along an axon 
from the cell body to the axon terminal. Such action potentials occur in an all-or-none manner 
after a neuronal membrane reaches a given excitation threshold, creating small and brief 
shifts (~2 ms) in electrical potential within the brain. In contrast to the all-or-none firing of 
action potentials, postsynaptic potentials reflect the graded change in voltage over a cell 
membrane caused either by the repeated influence of a single presynaptic neuron (temporal 
summation) or the simultaneous input from two presynaptic neurones (spatial summation) 
(Kalat, 1998). Importantly, voltage fluctuations created by the activity of a single neuron are 
generally considered too weak to be detected by external EEG electrodes, therefore, the EEG 
signal is sensitive to voltages generated by brain potentials that have the ability to summate 
across neighbouring areas of cortex (Luck, 2005). Importantly, as action potentials involve 
very small voltages, arising in a temporally idiosyncratic manner to the action potentials of 
neighbouring neurones (often causing the cancelation of signal), it is expected that the action 
potential provides little meaningful signal to scalp-recorded EEG (Luck, 2005). In contrast, if 
the sustained voltages generated by postsynaptic potentials occur with temporal synchronicity 
in neighbouring, spatially aligned cells, they have the potential to summate, creating electrical 
dipoles that are detectable by EEG electrodes placed on the scalp (Luck, 2005). Importantly, 
because cortical pyramidal cells are spatially aligned in parallel to their neighbouring cells, 
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and at right angles to the cortical surface, it is expected that these neurones contribute most 
the scalp EEG signal (Luck, 2005).  
2.2.3 Naming and Identifying ERPs 
 The nomenclature used to identify and classify ERP components follows three main 
conventions which I will briefly outline in the following section. First, ERPs are commonly 
classified by the concatenation of the components polarity on the scalp (positive peak = ‘P’; 
negative = ‘N’) and its average peak-latency (ms between stimulus/response onset and peak 
amplitude). For example, under such a classification scheme, an ERP with a negative peak 
amplitude that occurs 170 ms after stimulus onset would be classified as an N170. Second, 
instead of peak latency, the ordinal position (after the event) of the ERP peak is sometimes 
used in the naming of a component (see Luck, 2005). Using this scheme, the first positive 
component is labelled “P1” (or P100), the second ‘P2’ (or P200), and the third ‘P3’ or P300, 
see Figure 4 for an idealised representation of this technique. Importantly, it should be noted 
that in many cases cases such as the P300 the ‘300’ usually also refers to an approximation of 
ERPs latency, however, in a typical experiment this component may peak earlier or 
substantially later than 300 ms after the stimulus. Finally, some ERPs are named neither by 
their time-course nor their ordinal position in the averaged waveform, but instead in relation 
to a specific event that is reliably associated with a characteristic brain-potential response, 
such and the Error-Related Negativity (Ne/ERN, Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 
1993) or the Contingent Negative Variation (CNV, Walters et al., 1964).  
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Figure 4: Idealised representation of the ordinal position of ERP components within the 
stimulus and response locked averaged waveform. 
 
Graphical representations of ERPs are commonly presented either as waveforms at 
individual electrodes, see Figure 4, or as topographical maps which display the distribution of 
electrical activity across the scalp, see Figure 5. Waveforms are presented graphically with 
voltage [V] and time [ms] as the y and x-axes, respectively. An important variable to be 
cautious about when observing graphical representations of ERP waveforms is that the 
polarity of voltage measures on the y-axis varies between authors. Please note that throughout 
the empirical work presented in the current thesis voltages will always be presented with 
positivity above and negativity below zero on the y-axis. For ERPs which have very well 
characterised and reliable topographies (e.g., ERN), it is often sufficient to display ERP 
waveforms from pre-determined electrode sites. For example, the Ne/ERN is often displayed 
at channel FCz where the ERP is maximal (e.g., Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009; Gehring et al., 
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2012; Olvet et al., 2010; Weinberg et al., 2012).  In contrast, when the ERP investigation is 
more exploratory in nature, or there is potential for topographical shifts in activation between 
conditions, it is most informative to present a range of electrodes (Picton et al., 2000). In 
many such circumstances, topographical maps provide a useful additional illustration of the 
scalp distribution of an ERP. Figure 5 provides example topographical maps for the ΔERN 
(error activity minus correct activity) and ΔPe using 3D topographical spline mapping 
functions in Brain Electromagnetic Source Analysis (BESA). These maps demonstrate clear 
maximal activity at fronto-central and parietal sites for the N/ERN and Pe, respectively. While 
colour-scales used in such maps commonly vary between investigators (Picton et al., 2000), 
topographical maps in the current empirical work will always display positive voltage in 
increasing red intensity, and negative voltages in blue. 
 
Figure 5: Spline maps depicting topographical representations of the Ne/ERN (top figure) 
and Pe (bottom figure) as produced in BESA software 
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2.3 Testing Environment, Apparatus and Data Processing Specific to the Current Work 
Participants were tested individually in an electrically shielded recording booth, with 
dimmed lighting and minimal background noise. The experimenter was always present during 
behavioural testing, and was seated outside the recording booth. All stimuli were presented on 
a 17 inch CRT monitor connected to an IBM-compatible personal computer at a viewing 
distance of approximately 80 cm. Experiments were presented using Experimental Run-Time 
Software (ERTS, BeriSoft Cooperation) and responses were recorded using ERTS keypads 
comprising 2 response keys located 15 cm apart on the horizontal plane of the participant.  
Electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings for each of the chapters containing ERP 
data (Chapters 3, 4 and 6) were conducted using a BIOSEMI Active-Two amplifier system 
with 72 Ag/AgCl electrodes. The majority of electrodes were secured to the scalp using a 
BIOSEMI elasticated cap, arranged according to the international 10/20 placement system 
(Jasper, 1958, see Figure 6). Four additional leads were placed at the outer canthi of each eye 
(two electrodes) and beneath each eye (two electrodes), to measure horizontal and vertical 
electrooculography (EOG), respectively. Two further electrodes (Common Mode Sense 
(CMS) active electrode and Driven Right Leg (DRL) passive electrode) served as reference 
and ground electrodes, respectively, during EEG recording. Two electrodes were placed on 
the left and right mastoids to serve as an additional potential references if required. 
Electrolyte gel (Sigma Gel, Parker laboratories, inc.) was used to improve conductivity 
between scalp and electrode. The EEG signal was digitized during recording at a sample rate 
of 256 Hz. 
 
85 
 
 
Figure 6: Map depicting electrode placements for the Biosemi 64 electrode system. The 
figure depicts a top-down projection, with the front of the head faceing the top of the image. 
In addition to the 64 measurement electrodes, the CMS and DRL electrodes are also 
depicted. Image adapted from www.biosemi.nl  
 
After recording all electrodes were re-referenced to average reference (V at active 
electrode minus average V of all electrodes). The EOG was used to identify and correct trials 
containing blinks and horizontal eye movements using the adaptive artifact correction method 
of BESA software (Ille, Berg & Scherg, 2002). Epochs (length defined in each chapter) were 
discarded if their amplitude exceeded 100 μV or if there was a low signal (.032 μV 
throughout the epoch). Epochs with gradients exceeding 75 μV were also excluded from the 
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analyses. A 0.10 Hz high-pass and a 20 Hz low-pass cut-off filters were employed in the 
current research. Finally, data were also visually inspected for bad channels or eye-blink 
related artefacts that were missed by the automatic procedure. Baseline measures and 
methods to determine the amplitude of a given ERP (e.g., “mean amplitude” [average V over 
x ms], or “peak amplitude” [maximum V occurring between time-point x and y]) varied 
between studies and is, therefore, reported independently in each chapter.   
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3 
False external feedback modulates posterror slowing and the f-P300: 
implications for theories of posterror adjustment
2
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The content of this empirical chapter is based on a publication in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. Reference: 
Saunders, B., & Jentzsch, I. (2012). False external feedback modulates posterror slowing and the f-P300: 
implications for theories of posterror adjustment. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19, 1210-1216. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Theories of cognitive control (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Holroyd & Coles, 2002) propose 
mechanisms capable of monitoring performance for errors and initiating subsequent remedial 
actions to avoid further mistakes in on-going behaviour. While considerable debate has 
occurred regarding the psychological process underlying error detection (see, Bernstein, 
Scheffers & Coles, 1995; Botvinick et al., 2001; Danielmeier et al., 2009; Holyroyd & Coles, 
2002), most cognitive control theories assume that error signals are used to initiate adaptive 
changes in performance to rectify these aversive outcomes. The posterror slowing effect (e.g., 
Rabbit & Rogers, 1977) is an example of such an adjustment. Cognitive control accounts 
have traditionally suggested that such posterrror slowing reflects an adaptive change in 
response strategy. More specifically, individuals are assumed to increase their response 
threshold to become more conservative after errors, particularly when sufficient time is 
available between subsequent events (e.g., Brewer & Smith, 1984; Laming, 1979; Hajcak, 
McDonald, & Simons, 2003). In contrast, posterror performance is consistently less accurate 
at shorter RSIs (i.e., RSIs<500 ms; e.g., Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009; Laming, 1979). In line 
with previous proposals (e.g., Gehring & Fenscik, 2001; Welford, 1980), Jentzsch & 
Dudschig (2009) recently suggested that error monitoring is a capacity-limited and time-
consuming, central process, which impairs performance if the subsequent event follows in too 
close temporal proximity to the error. 
 In contrast to control accounts of error adaptation, an alternative, non-adaptive 
theory of posterrror slowing, postulates that all infrequent events (including errors) elicit 
attentional orienting, followed by a time-consuming process reorientation attention to the on-
going task (Notebaert et al., 2009). Challenging traditionally cognitive control theories of 
error adaptation, this orienting account predicts slower and, importantly, less accurate 
performance after errors. Such decreases in posterror accuracy have been reported in some 
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contexts (e.g., Cheyne, Carriere, Solman, & Smilek, 2011; Houtman, Núñez Castellar, & 
Notebaert, 2012, Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009), and, in further support of the orienting 
account, posterror slowing is largest when errors are infrequent (Houtman et al., 2012; 
Notebaert et al., 2009), post-correct slowing is observed when correct responses are rare 
(Notebaert et al., 2009; Núñez Castellar, Kuhn, Fias & Notebaert, 2010), and responses slow 
after the unexpected presentation of task-irrelevant stimuli (Notebaert et al., 2009).  Most 
important for the concerns of the current thesis, the orienting account challenges the applied 
use of posterror behaviour as a valid metric of cognitive control processes in cross-sectional 
designs, such as those commonly employed in developmental and psychopathlogical 
investigations. Therefore, it seems imperative that on-going research aims to further assess 
the validity of posterror slowing measures as a measure of adaptive executive control. 
Therefore, the study presented in the current chapter aimed to differentiate between orienting 
and control accounts of posterror slowing in order to validate the use of error adaptation as a 
metric of cognitive control in the empirical research presented in a subsequent chapter of the 
current thesis (see Chapter 4).  
As discussed in greater detail in the General Introduction (see Chapter 1), distinct ERPs 
have been associated with errors and error-related feedback processing. The Ne/ERN 
(Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993) reflects a fronto-central negative deflection in 
the ERP which peaks 50-100 ms after response errors, or 200-350 ms after external feedback 
provides the first indication of an error (e.g., Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Stahl, 2010). A large 
positive component, the Pe, follows the Ne/ERN and is maximal 300-500 ms after errors at 
parietal electrode sites. The Pe has been associated with several functions: error awareness, 
affective error appraisal, error significance, error probability and behavioural adjustment 
(e.g., Overbeek et al., 2005) and several authors have noted similarities between the Pe and 
the P300 (e.g., Leuthold & Sommer, 1999; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). Similarly, the feedback 
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Ne/ERN is followed by, or sometimes superimposed upon, a positive P300-like component 
(e.g., Yeung et al., 2005). This feedback-P300 (f-P300) increases in amplitude when external 
signals violate feedback expectancy (e.g., de Bruijn, Mars, & Hulstijn, 2004; Hajcak, Moser, 
Holroyd, & Simons, 2007), irrespective of the valence (positive or negative) of the feedback 
signal (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004).  
Researchers investigating functional relationships between the magnitude of these error-
related brain potentials and posterror adjustments have reported mixed results. In specific 
relation to the Ne/ERN some studies report that posterror slowing increases with the 
amplitude of the Ne/ERN (e.g., Debener et al., 2005; Gehring et al., 1993; Holroyd, Yeung, 
Coles, & Cohen, 2005), whilst others have reported no correlation between the amplitude of 
the Ne/ERN and posterror adjustments (e.g., Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009; Gehring & Fencsik, 
2001; Strozyk & Jentzsch, 2012). Consequently, it has been proposed that the Ne/ERN might 
indicate the need, without being sufficient to trigger, remedial posterror adaptation (c.f. 
Hajcak & Simons, 2008). More recently, researchers have postulated that the later error- and 
feedback-related positive ERPs (the Pe and f-P300), and not the Ne/ERN, determine the extent 
of behavioural adjustments (e.g., Hajcak et al. 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Núñez 
Castellar et al., 2010; Simons, 2010; but see Picton et al., 2012), suggesting that attentional 
orienting rather than basic error evaluation predicts posterror slowing (Notebaert et al., 2009; 
Núñez Castellar et al., 2010, however, see Picton et al., 2012). 
The research presented in the current chapter compared the predictions of control (e.g., 
Botvinick et al., 2001; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Laming, 1979) and orienting (Notebaert et al., 
2009) accounts of posterror slowing. More specifically, the predictions of control and 
orienting accounts of posterror slowing were contrasted in the current chapter by providing 
participants with accurate (75%) or false feedback (25%) during the performance of a 
modified flanker task. While both accounts predict significant posterror slowing, the control 
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and orienting accounts suggest divergent effects of false feedback on RT performance. 
Specifically, when false “CORRECT” feedback, rather than accurate “ERROR” feedback, 
occurs following errors, control accounts predict reduced posterror slowing as this positive 
feedback might reduce the salience/aversiveness the mistake. Alternatively, the orienting 
account predicts the opposite effect. False “CORRECT” feedback signals after errors reflect 
unexpected/surprising and rare events, which should increase the extent of posterror slowing. 
Conversely, both adaptive and non-adaptive accounts of posterror behaviour propose slower 
performance after correct trials with false “ERROR” feedbacks as such events are both 
aversive and surprising. Finally, if participants regard external feedback as unimportant for 
performance evaluation during flanker task performance, no differential effect of feedback 
type should be observed on behaviour. 
In addition to behavioural performance measures, ERPs were analysed to assess internal 
performance monitoring processes (Ne/ERN, Pe) and attention orienting to external feedback 
signals (f-P300). Firstly, as participants typically generate strong performance awareness 
while completing flanker tasks, clear Ne/ERN and Pe components are predicted to occur on 
error trials. In contrast, as the external feedback signal is not the “first indicator” of an error, 
no specific hypotheses regarding feedback-related Ne/ERN activity are made in the current 
analyses. Importantly, if participants rapidly adjust feedback expectancy based on internal 
performance awareness, false feedback signals should elicit attention orienting regardless of 
feedback valence (e.g., positive or negative). Thus, infrequent false signals which violate 
feedback expectations should be associated with larger f-P300 amplitude than the expected 
(based on internal performance monitoring) accurate feedback signals. Finally, if participants 
ignore the unreliable external feedback signals, no differential modulation of the f-P300 
should occur.  
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3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
35 participants (M = 20.3 years, SD = 1.9, 20 women) contributed to the experiment. 
Five additional participants were excluded due to either insufficient trial numbers, too high 
error rates in any analysis cell or too slow overall performance (<6 error trials; error rate > 
40%; mean RT > 3 SDs).  
Electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings exist for only a subset (N = 26) of 
participants. Two participants were excluded (see above criteria) leaving 24 participants for 
EEG analyses. 
3.2.2 Apparatus and Stimuli 
Stimuli included four vowels (A,E,O,U) and four consonants (B,H,T,S) presented in 
black on a white background. Targets were surrounded by four letters resulting in compatible 
(e.g., EEAEE) or incompatible (e.g., SSUSS) arrangements
3
. Targets never perfectly matched 
the ‘flankers’ (e.g., AAAAA) and one stimuli arrangement was systematically removed per 
target set to ensure equal numbers of incompatible and compatible arrays. Each letter 
measured 7 x 5 mm, viewing distance: 85 cm.  Left and right responses were made with the 
left and right index fingers, respectively. EEG activity was recorded using identical apparatus 
as presented in Chapter 3: General Method. 
3.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were instructed to respond quickly to target letters (e.g., vowelleft key; 
consonant right key). Target assignment to response alternatives was balanced across 
participants. The experiment included 1152 trials (12 blocks x 96 trials), separated by short 
breaks. 
                                                 
3
 Flanker Effects: RTs and error rates for incompatible > compatible trials, Fs(1, 34) >100.80, ps < .001. 
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Stimuli were presented until response (max. 1500 ms), followed by a 500 ms blank 
interval. Subsequently, feedback (“CORRECT”, “ERROR”, “TOO FAST”, or “TOO 
S O ”) was presented in black for 150 ms, followed by another blank interval for 1150 ms 
before the next trial. Only “CORRECT” and “ERROR” feedback contradicted actual 
performance on 25% of the trials (correct trials: M = 25.0%: range 23.5-25.6%; error trials: M 
= 24.9, range 17.7-38.8%). Thus, our four conditions ranged from the most (correct response, 
accurate feedback) to the least probable (error response, false feedback; mean trial-count 
=15.9, range 6-33). Participants were informed prior to testing that feedback would 
occasionally be inaccurate
4
. 
3.2.4 Data Analysis 
Posterror Adjustments. 
All trials with missing, too slow (>1500 ms) or too fast responses (<150 ms) in trials N-
1 and/or trial N were discarded from analyses (<1%). 
Two trial-types were defined: (1) correct response in trial N and N-1 (postcorrect, CC), 
and (2) error response in trial N-1 preceding a correct response in trial N (posterror, EC)
5
. 
Only trials where N-1 was incompatible were included
6
. Error rates were calculated for 
postcorrect (E(postcorrect) = CE/(CC+CE)*100) and posterror trials (E(posterror) = 
EE/(EC+EE)*100). RTs and arcsine-transformed error rates were subjected to repeated 
                                                 
4
 In a pilot study without feedback, significant PES (21 ms), F(1, 13) = 7.34, p = .018. and numerically increased 
posterror accuracy (0.9%), F(1, 13) = 2.66, p = .127, was found, confirming that participants have internal 
accuracy awareness in our paradigm. 
5
 Dutilh et al. (2012) proposed that global fluctuations in performance can confound PES. Importantly, 
participants in our study showed pre-error speeding (27 ms) and PES, ruling out such confound (Dudschig & 
Jentzsch, 2009). 
6
 Far fewer errors occurred on compatible than incompatible trials, this analysis ensures that different trial 
sequences appear equally in posterror and postcorrect trials.  However, the ANOVA results were replicated 
when analyses included all trials. 
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measures ANOVAs with within-subject variables trial-type (postcorrect, posterror), and trial 
N-1 feedback (accurate, false).  
ERP Data. 
Trials with missing, too slow/fast responses, or EEG artefacts were excluded and data 
were re-referenced to average-reference (for details, seeChapter 3: General Methods). Epochs 
lasted 1500 ms, starting 200 ms before response onset. The mean number of epochs 
contributing to the least frequent condition was 13.5 (range = 6-28).  
Response-locked ERPs used a 100-ms baseline commencing 150 ms before the 
response. The Ne/ERN was measured using the peak amplitude at FCz in a 100-ms search 
window starting at response onset. The Pe was operationalized as the mean amplitude 300-
500 ms after response at Pz. f-P300 amplitude was measured using mean amplitude (400-600 
ms after feedback onset) at midline electrode sites (FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz) using a 100-ms 
baseline commencing 100 ms before feedback onset.  
 
3.3 Results 
 
Reaction times. Mean RTs were slower in posterror (477 ms) than postcorrect trials 
(458 ms); F(1, 34) = 18.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. Importantly, trial-type interacted with trial N-
1 feedback, F(1, 34) = 9.45, p = .004, ηp2 = .22; Post-hoc tests (Bonferroni-corrected α = 
.025) revealed that RTs for postcorrect trials were longer after false (461 ms) than accurate 
feedback (454 ms), F(1, 34) = 8.08, p = .008, ηp2 = .19. Conversely, posterror RTs were 
shorter after false (470 ms) than accurate feedback (483 ms), F(1, 34) = 6.07, p = .019, ηp2 = 
.15 (see Figure 6). No other effects reached significance (p > .10). 
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Figure 7: Mean RT as a function of trial-type (postcorrect, posterror) and trial N-1feedback 
(accurate, false). Error bars represent the within-subject 95% confidence intervals (e.g., 
Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
 
Choice error rates. Error rates were lower in posterror (8.3%) than postcorrect trials 
(9.3%), F(1, 34) = 10.30, p = .003, ηp
2
 = .23, and lower after false (8.2%) than accurate 
feedback (9.4%), F(1, 34) = 5.31, p = .027, ηp
2
 = .14. No significant interaction was found, p 
> .10. 
3.3.2 ERP data. 
Response-locked ERP Data (see Figure 7). The Ne/ERN was more negative on error 
(-5.66 V) than correct trials (-0.54 V), F(1, 23) = 57.23, p < .0001, ηp
2
 = .71. The Pe was 
larger on error (4.29 V) than correct trials (-3.15 V), F(1, 23) = 155.29 , p < .0001, ηp
2
 = 
.87. No other effects reached significance in the Ne/ERN and Pe (ps > .10). 
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Figure 8: Left panel: Response-locked ERP waveforms are shown at electrodes FCz (top) and 
Pz (bottom). Correct trial and error-related ERPs are depicted as a function of feedback-type 
(false vs. accurate). Right panel: Spline maps depicting the topographical distribution of the 
difference activity (error minus correct) in the analysis time-window for the Ne/ERN (top) and 
Pe (bottom). Analysis electrodes are circled in black. 
 
Feedback-locked ERP data (see Figure 8). Amplitudes were more negative on error 
than correct trials, F(1, 23) = 32.55, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .59. There was a main effect of electrode, 
F(3, 23) = 20.17, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .47, which  interacted with trial-type, F(3, 23) = 14.07, p < 
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.001, ηp
2
 = .38,  explained by residual activity from response-related error processing, 
particularly at parietal electrodes (see “Response-locked ERP Data”, Figure 7).  
Most importantly, there was an effect of feedback, F(3, 23) = 5.70, p = .026, ηp
2
 = .20, 
which interacted with electrode site, F(3, 23) = 2.88, p = .042, ηp
2
 = .11. Post-hoc tests 
(Bonferroni-corrected α = .0125) confirmed that amplitudes were larger for false (1.04 V) 
than accurate feedback (-0.31 V) only at electrode FCz, F(1, 23) = 9.62, p = .005, ηp
2
 = .30
7
, 
(remaining electrodes, p > .10).  No other effects were significant (ps > .10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 This effect became stronger when only participants with ≥10 epochs in the least frequent condition were 
included, F(1, 15) = 18.68, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .56. 
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Figure 9: Top Panel: Feedback-locked ERP waveforms are shown electrodes FCz. Correct 
trial and error-related ERPs are depicted in the left and right graphs respectively, each as a 
function of feedback-type (false, accurate). Bottom Panel: Spline map depicting the 
topographical distribution of the difference activity for the false feedback effect on the f-P300 
(false feedback minus accurate feedback) in the analysis time-window for the f-P300. 
Electrode FCz is circled in black. 
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3.4 Discussion 
The study presented in the current chapter investigated the influence of both accurate and 
false performance feedback on posterror behavioural adjustment. Replicating several existing 
results, and in line with cognitive control theories of posterror slowing (e.g., Brewer & Smith, 
1984; Laming, 1979; Strozyk & Jentzsch, 2012), individuals responded more slowly and 
accurately in posterror than postcorrect trials. Furthermore, infrequent false external feedback 
signals differentially affected participants’ post-feedback behaviour. More specifically, 
reaction times were slower on post-correct trials when feedback was false rather than 
accurate, whereas posterror slowing was reduced when error trials were followed by false 
rather than accurate external feedback signals. Most important for current concerns, these 
findings suggest that participants altered their response thresholds in relation to the content of 
external feedback signals.  
One interpretation of the current results could be that internal error detection is 
insufficient to determine performance accuracy, and, consequently, individuals instead used 
external feedback to guide on-going performance. Disagreeing with this proposal, however, 
both the behavioural main effect of trial-type (RTs and error rates), and the existence of clear 
electrophysiological correlates of error detection (Ne/ERN and Pe), suggest that participants 
generated a strong internal awareness of their accuracy during flanker performance. While 
these results do not allow one to conclude that internal error-monitoring processes were 100% 
efficient, recent single-trial and distributional analyses (Strozyk & Jentzsch, 2012) suggest 
that lapses in error detection are rare and, therefore, unlikely occur with sufficient frequency 
to create the behavioural effects observed in the current study. Consequently, despite being 
aware of their performance accuracy, participants in the current study altered their behaviour 
in relation to the content of external feedback.  
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In relation to theories of posterror slowing, the current results appear inconsistent with 
the orienting account (e.g., Notebaert et al., 2009). First, this non-adaptive account of 
posterror slowing is unable to explain the posterror accuracy improvement observed in the 
current study. Second, the orienting account hypothesises that slower performance should 
occur after expectancy violations (surprising events), rather than expectancy confirmations. In 
clear contrast to this core prediction of the orienting account; false and surprising, rather than 
expected and accurate, feedback was associated with reduced posterror slowing. Additionally, 
f-P300 amplitude was larger for false rather than accurate external feedback, suggesting 
participants detected these expectancy-violating, misleading feedback signals. Interestingly, 
the f-P300 modulation observed in the current experiment occurred at more fronto-central 
electrode sites than reported in previous investigations (see de Bruijn et al., 2004; Hajcak et 
al., 2007), proposing a novelty P300 effect. Importantly, this fronto-central scalp-distribution 
is consistent with the interpretation that the f-P300 reflects attention orienting (c.f., Friedman, 
Cycowicz &  aeta, 2001) to ‘surprising’ feedback signals in the context of the current study. 
Furthermore, this surprise response was associated with divergent post-feedback behavioural 
adjustments, proposing that expectancy violations per se does not account for the extent of 
subsequent slowing in the context of error processing (see also Picton et al., 2012).   
In support of the orienting account, it may be argued that internal and external response 
monitoring signals modulated each other to produce the data pattern observed in the current 
study. Specifically, independent of the accuracy of external feedback, “CORRECT” feedback 
signals were presented more frequently than “ERROR” feedback during task performance. 
Therefore, infrequent and false “ERROR” feedback signals presented after a small quantity of 
correct trials may have triggered an orienting response, resulting in slower subsequent 
performance relative to postcorrect trials preceded by frequent, accurate feedback. In contrast, 
frequent false “CORRECT” feedback after errors might predict faster responses than 
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infrequent accurate “ERROR” feedback. Importantly, this interpretation of the present data 
assumes that the overall frequency of a given stimulus drives attention orienting. Crucially, 
recent evidence proposes that orienting responses are not driven by the base-rate probability 
of stimulus occurrence, but instead by expectation (Parmentier et al., 2011; Vachon, et al., 
2012). In the current experiment, accurate “ERROR” feedback occurred less frequently than 
accurate “CORRECT” feedback, but was not associated with increased orienting (f-P300 
activity), additionally suggesting that expectancy violation (surprising feedback signals) and 
not low stimulus probability (error feedback in general) determines the magnitude of attention 
orienting to external stimuli (see also De Bruijn et al., 2004).  
While the orienting account cannot provide a comprehensive explanation of the 
currently observed results, it is clearly important to evaluate the ability of cognitive control 
theories to account for the observed data pattern. Initially, if posterror slowing at long RSIs 
indeed reflects an adaptive process, the currently observed effects of false feedback on 
behavioural performance appear to be quite maladaptive. More specifically, as participants 
were strongly aware of their performance accuracy, and were capable of detecting the 
accuracy of external feedback signals, neither postcorrect slowing nor reduced posterror 
slowing reflects truly adaptive behaviour after false feedback. Perhaps, as feedback signals in 
the current task were most frequently accurate, participants used feedback as an additional 
performance guide, failing to rapidly suppress the utilization of the external signal when false 
feedback occurred. Consequently, the current results may be explained by a “malfunctioning” 
adaptive system. Additionally, control theories have recently been extended to suggest that 
the up-regulation of cognitive control is motivated by the occurrence of aversive events 
(Botvinick, 2007; van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009). Therefore, in the current study, 
affectively positive “CORRECT” feedback perhaps reduced the averseness of error 
evaluations, in turn reducing the extent of posterror slowing. In contrast, aversive “ERROR” 
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feedback signals presented after correct responses may have provoked increases in cognitive 
control.  
 In a similar false-feedback study, de Bruijn et al., (2004) reported larger f-P300 
amplitude and postcorrect slowing after false “ERROR” feedback signals. Alone, however, 
this finding cannot differentiate between cognitive control and orienting accounts of posterror 
slowing. More specifically, as false “ERROR” feedback after correctly executed responses 
would be unexpected, both orienting and control accounts predict increased slowing after this 
feedback type. Importantly, in the current study participants were provided with false 
feedback after error trials, providing crucial evidence for decreased posterror slowing after 
false “CORRECT” feedback. Conversely, the current results appear to contradict those 
previously presented by Logan and Crump (2010). In their experiment, skilled typists entered 
words presented on-screen, with the time between finishing typing each letter, the 
interkeystroke interval (IKSI), serving as as a measure of posterror behaviour. The typists did 
not show significantly increased slowing after inserted errors, nor reduced slowing after 
externally corrected errors. Importantly, while we provided false feedback 1150 ms before the 
onset of the subsequent stimuli, Logan and Crump (2010) presented false feedback almost 
simultaneously as the participants typed the word. Given that the average IKSI was less than 
200 ms in their study, feedback might not have been presented for sufficient duration to 
influence the immediately following keystroke.  
In conclusion, the current results support cognitive control theories which propose that 
posterror slowing is the result of an adaptive modulation of response thresholds (e.g., 
Botvinick et al., 2001; Holyroyd & Coles, 2002, Laming, 1979). In addition to providing 
insight into theories of posterror slowing, these findings additionally ratify the applied use of 
posterror slowing, particularly when measured at longer RSIs in choice-RT tasks, as a valid 
behavioural measure of cognitive control in cross-correlational designs. Important for the 
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goals of the current thesis project, these results validate the use of posterror adaptation as a 
metric of cognitive control processes associated with increased levels of sub-clinical 
depressive symptoms (see Chapter 4).   
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4 
Depressive symptoms, error monitoring and the mechanisms of posterror 
slowing 
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 4.1 Introduction 
Depression has been associated with an exaggerated sensitivity towards personal failure 
(Rosier & Sahakian, 2013; Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). In the particular context of error 
processing, such increased sensitivity has been suggested to trigger a “catastrophic response 
to perceived failure” (Beats et al., 199 ), often resulting in less, rather than more, accurate 
performance on posterror trials in depressed samples (Beats et al., 1996; Elliott et al., 1996; 
Elliott et al., 1997; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007, Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008b; Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2010; Pizzagalli et al., 2006; Schroder et al., 2013; but see Olvet et al., 2010; 
Schrijvers et al., 2008, 2009; Ruchsow et al., 2004). In a similar explanation for such results, 
‘negative automatic thoughts’ (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Jones et al., 2010) have been 
proposed to accompany error commission in depressed individuals, and increased attention to 
these affective cognitions has been proposed to occupy information processing resources at 
the expense of on-going task performance (see also Siegle, Ingram & Matt, 2002). 
Consequently, this form of affective interference (c.f., Siegle et al., 2002) is proposed to 
account for impaired performance on posterror trials in depressed samples (Jones et al., 
2010). The current study aimed to extend these previous suggestions by systematically 
investigating the behavioural and electrophysiological correlates of the mechanisms of 
posterror slowing. In addition, while exaggerated affective reactions to mistakes have been 
proposed to account for impaired error adaptation in depression (c.f., Beats et al., 1996; Jones 
et al., 2010; Pizzagalli et al., 1996), to my knowledge no investigation has used self-report 
measures of negative affect to study experiential or subjective aspects of error monitoring in 
an elevated depressive symptom sample. Therefore, one further goal of the current study was 
to gain a more phenomenological account of error processing in an elevated BDI-II sample. 
4.1.2 Depressive-symptoms and the mechanisms of posterror slowing. 
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Studies of error processing in depression have typically measured posterror adjustments 
in classic cognitive control tasks (e.g., the Stroop protocol) using longer RSIs (> 1000 ms) 
(e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2010; 
Pizzagalli et al., 2006 Schrijvers et al., 2008, 2009). In the current study an RSI manipulation 
was used to assess posterror adjustment in an elevated depressed sample at multiple RSIs, 
ranging from short to long (100, 250, 500 and 1000 ms). The motivation for this manipulation 
was two-fold. First, it has been suggested that error-processing mechanisms have a 
differential influence on posterror adjustment when measured at short and long RSIs 
(Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009). More specifically, as discussed in more detail in Chapters 1 and 
3, Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009) proposed that a time consuming and capacity-limited error-
monitoring process interferes with posterror responding if the next event appears soon after 
the initial mistake (i.e., short RSIs), while controlled adjustments in response criteria are 
assumed to be most effective if sufficient time has elapsed between events for error-
monitoring to complete before subsequent trial onset (i.e., long RSIs). Therefore, initially, the 
RSI manipulation included in the current chapter provides a novel test of these mechanisms 
of error adaptation in an elevated depression sample. Additionally, however, there is reason to 
predict that impaired error adaptation processes in depression might become more 
pronounced as RSIs increase. Specifically, at very short RSIs (e.g., 100 ms), time-consuming 
error monitoring processes are predicted to lead to interference on posterror trials for all 
participant groups (c.f., Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009). At longer 
RSIs, however, impaired disengagement (Koster et al., 2011) from from ‘negative automatic 
thoughts’ (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Jones et al., 2010) or ‘catastrophic reactions’ (Beats et 
al., 1996) pertaining to the mistake are predicted to prolong the extent of initial error-
processing for depressed participants, reducing the time available to engage control 
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adjustment processes between events. Such affective processing is therefore predicted to 
result in group-differences in posterror performance as RSIs increase.  
Additionally, previous investigations of posterror performance in depressed samples 
have analysed performance in the trial immediately following the error (E+1 trials) (e.g., 
Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007, Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008b; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2010; 
Pizzagalli et al., 2006; Schroder et al., 2013). Importantly, however, if overly affective 
reactions to errors disrupt on-going behaviour in depressed samples, such deleterious error 
processing might affect performance beyond E+1 trials. Thus, posterror analyses in the 
current study were extended to additionally investigate Error +2 (E+2) trials to gauge the 
longer-term consequences of errors on performance in a depressive symptom group. 
Furthermore, independent of the hypotheses regarding depressive symptoms, it is currently 
not specified if the post-execution bottle-neck proposed by Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009) 
abolishes the possibility of improved posterror performance completely at short RSIs, or if 
performance adjustments are instead delayed until later in the trial sequence (e.g., E+2), once 
sufficient time has elapsed for central processes to clear. Therefore, one further aim of the 
current investigation was to investigate the longer-term consequences of error monitoring at 
short RSIs.  Finally, in addition to posterror slowing analyses, pre-error speeding effects (e.g., 
Brewer & Smith, 1984; Brewer & Smith, 1989; Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009) were contrasted 
with posterror effects between groups. Specifically, it was reasoned that if impairments in 
depression result from damaging emotional reactions specifically to errors, elevated and low 
depression groups should differ only on posterror, but not pre-error performance measures. 
4.1.3 Depression and error-related ERPs 
 
In addition to the planned behavioural analyses, the current investigation compared 
several ERP correlates of error monitoring (Ne/ERN and the early and late Pe) between low 
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and elevated depressive symptom groups. Theories which suggest that depression is 
associated with hyperactive error monitoring (e.g., Olvet & Hajcak, 2008; Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2008b; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2010), predict larger Ne/ERN amplitudes in 
depressed participants. In line with this proposal, several studies have reported larger (Chiu & 
Deldin, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008b; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2010), or numerically 
increased (Compton et al., 2008; Schroder et al., 2013), Ne/ERN amplitudes in depressed 
samples. In contrast, however, other investigations have reported no significant differences 
between low and elevated depression groups (Georgiadi et al., 2011; Olvet et al., 2010; 
Ruchsow et al., 2004; Ruchsow et al., 2006; Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schrijvers et al., 2009). In 
fact, several of these investigations have reported numerically decreased Ne/ERN amplitudes 
in acutely depressed samples (e.g., Georgiadi et al., 2011; Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schrijvers et 
al., 2009), or significant negative correlations between depressive symptom severity and 
Ne/ERN amplitude (Olvet et al., 2010; Georgiadi et al., 2011). Olvet et al. (2010), recently 
proposed that overall differences in symptom severity between samples potentially explains 
the variation in results observed across investigations. More specifically, investigations 
reporting reduced or undifferentiated Ne/ERN amplitude associated with depression have 
often included more severely symptomatic individuals (e.g., Georgiadi et al., 2011; Olvet et 
al., 2010; Ruchsow et al., 2004; Ruchsow et al., 2006; Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schrijvers et al., 
2009). Thus, it has been suggested that apathy or anhedonia present in more severely 
depressed samples might attenuate the motivational or affective significance of errors (c.f., 
Olvet et al., 2010; Tucker et al., 2003). In contrast, studies in which depressive symptoms are 
associated with larger Ne/ERN amplitudes have investigated more moderately depressed 
cohorts (Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008b; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2010), 
suggesting that less severely depressed participant groups are associated with hyperactive 
performance monitoring. As a sub-clinical depressed sample was included in the current 
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experiment, it is predicted that the Ne/ERN amplitude will be larger for the elevated than the 
low symptom group (c.f., Olvet et al., 2010).  
Although less dominant in many discussions of disordered action monitoring, the Pe has 
been reported in several depressed samples. First, it should be noted that the Pe can be divided 
into two sub-components:  early, fronto-central (the early Pe) and a later, parietal (the late Pe), 
peaks (cf. Arbel & Donchin, 2009; van Veen & Carter, 2002). The late Pe has been reported 
most often in depressed samples. Interestingly, the most consistent suggestion is that 
depression is associated with the  reduced amplitude of the late Pe (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 
2010; Olvet et al., 2010; Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schrijvers et al., 2009; Schroder et al., 2013; 
but see Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Compton et al., 2008; Georgiadi et al., 2011; Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2008b). This Pe attenuation appears to occur consistently in particularly severe 
depression (Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schrijvers et al., 2009), and has been correlated with 
increasing depressive symptom severity (Olvet et al., 2010; Schroder et al., 2013). As the Pe 
has been related to several psychological processes, such as error awareness (Endrass et al., 
2007; Leuthold & Sommer, 1999; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010), 
posterror behavioural adjustment (Hajcak et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001) and the 
motivational significance of the error (Overbeek et al., 2005; Ridderinkhof et al., 2009), it has 
been suggested that attenuated Pe amplitudes in depressed samples might reflect reduced 
motivational processes within more severely depressed participant groups (Olvet et al., 2010; 
Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schrijvers et al., 2009). Finally, to my knowledge only one study has 
previously differentiated between the early and late Pe in a depressed sample. Georgiadi et al. 
(2011) reported that neither the early nor the late Pe were significantly reduced in their 
moderate-severely depressed sample. The early Pe was operationalized in the current sample 
as a further measure of the sensitivity of error-monitoring processes between the current low 
and elevated depressive symptom groups.   
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4.1.4 Error processing and affective error appraisals 
 
Prior investigations have proposed that impaired error-processing in depression is 
related to exaggerated affective reactions to mistakes (e.g., Beats et al., 1996; Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2008, 2010; Jones et al., 2010). Importantly, such exaggerated affective responses 
has either been inferred from posterror behaviour (e.g., Beats et al., 1996; Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2008, 2010; Jones et al., 2010) or error-related brain activity (e.g., Chiu & Deldin, 
2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008, 2010). In contrast, I am aware of no investigation which 
has attempted to assess subjective levels of negative affect related to error commission in a 
depressed sample. In order to gain such a subjective account of error appraisal, an error-
contextualized version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, Clark 
& Tellegen, 1988; see Chapter 2: General Methods for an overview of this scale) was 
employed in the current study. It is predicted that increased depressive symptoms will be 
associated with more negative appraisals of the experience of an error than participants with 
low depressive symptoms. Additionally, this scale will be related to the behavioural and ERP 
correlates of error processing to assess the extent to which error-related negative affect is 
associated with these correlates of evaluative and executive cognitive control.  
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
56 participants, recruited from the University of St Andrews subject pool (~50% 
answering an advertisement seeking ‘low mood’ participants), participated for course credit 
or cash reimbursement (£5/hour). 8 participants were excluded either due to currently taking 
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an antidepressant medication
8
 (6 participants) or because their age was > 50 (2 participants) 
as older participants have previously been associated with reduced electrophysiological 
responses to errors (Hoffmann & Falkenstein, 2011; Strozyk & Jentzsch, 2012). 
Consequently, a total of 48 participants (mean age = 21.4, S.D. = 3.2, 17 males) contributed 
to the final analyses. 
Two groups were subsequently formed depending on Beck Depression Inventory-II 
symptom level (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). In line with previous studies investigating error 
processing in elevated BDI-II samples (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Pizzagalli et al., 2006), 
all participants scoring 13 or above contributed to the elevated symptom group (23 
participants, mean BDI-II = 21.7, range = 13-37), while those with scores less than 13 were 
included in the low symptom group (25 participants, mean BDI-II = 6.4, range = 0-12). 
4.2.2 Self-report measures 
The BDI-II and the STAI–T served as self-report measures of depressive symptoms and 
trait anxiety, respectively. Additionally, the standard PANAS was administered as a measure 
of current levels of positive and negative affect, and the ePANAS (sample Cronbach’s α = 
.803) as a subjective measure of error experience (see Chapter 2: General Method, for further 
details on each of these self-report measures). 
4.2.3 Apparatus and stimuli 
Recording environment, stimulus presentation software, and all apparatus were identical 
to those reported in the General method (Chapter 2). The stimuli consisted of four letters (D, 
T, M and X) presented centrally in black on a white background. Each letter stimuli measured 
                                                 
8
 Several prior investigations (e.g., Georgiadi et al., 2011; Schijvers et al., 2009) cite the inability to control for 
current medication usage as a limiting factor in their samples.  For this reason the few participants who were 
currently taking anti-depressant medication were excluded from the current cohort.  
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approximately 10 mm x 7 mm. Electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings were referenced 
and corrected for eye artefacts in an identical manner to that which is described in Chapter 2. 
4.2.4 Procedure 
Before application of the EEG apparatus, participants first completed the standard 
PANAS scale to gain a baseline measure of positive and negative affect. Participants were 
then prepared for EEG recording and were seated in an electrically shielded recording booth. 
The participants performed a choice RT task almost identical to that used in a previous study 
by Dudschig and Jentzsch (2009) in which four stimuli were mapped to two response 
alternatives (e.g., D and M  left response key; T and X  right response key). The 
assignment of targets to response alternatives was balanced across participants. Four RSI 
conditions were used in the experiment (100, 250, 500 and 1000 ms). RSI conditions were 
manipulated in a block-wise manner. Each RSI condition contained one block of 40 practice 
trials, followed by five consecutive blocks of 160 experimental trials. The order of RSI 
condition was balanced across participants using a Latin-square procedure.   
Target stimuli were presented randomly within a given block and were displayed until 
response or a maximum of 1500 ms. A fixation cross appeared subsequently for the duration 
of the RSI. No performance feedback was provided in the current experiment, thus 
participants had to rely on internal error detection processes to monitor performance. Each 
block ended with a break in which feedback pertaining to the average performance in 
previous block was provided.     
Immediately after completing the RT task participants answered the ePANAS 
questionnaire whilst still in the recording booth. All other self-report scales were completed 
later, once the recording apparatus has been removed from the participant.  
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4.2.5 Data analysis 
 Behavioural data 
All trials with missing, too slow (> 1500 ms) or too fast (< 100 ms) responses in trials 
N-1 and/or trial N were discarded from the analyses (< 1%). Five different trial-types were 
defined based on sequences of 4 consecutive trials as follows (note that ‘C’ and ‘E’ denote 
correct and error responses, respectively, with the current trial underlined). Trial-type: [1] all-
correct trials, (C-C-C-C); [2] pre-error trials (C-C-C-E); [3] error trials (C-C-E-C); [4] Error 
+1 (E+1) trials (C-E-C-C) and, finally, [5] E+2 trials (E-C-C-C). The mean and range number 
of trials contributing to each mean RT per trial-type is presented in Table 2 as a function of 
RSI and BDI-II group.  
 
Table 2: Table presenting mean and range trial-counts contributing to each conditional mean 
RTs as a function of trial-type, RSI and Group. Minimum number of trials per condition is 
presented in parenthesis.  
    Trial-type 
Group RSI All-correct Pre-error Error Error +1 Error +2 
       Low BDI-II 100 576 (467) 45 (19) 42 (18) 42 (19) 44 (20) 
 
250 541 (423) 51 ( 29) 49 (28)  49 (28) 51 (28) 
 
500 502 (310) 59 (41)  58 (39)  58 (40) 58 (42) 
 
1000 545 (306) 51 (29) 51 (28)  51 (26 ) 50 (26) 
       Elevated BDI-II 100 589 (496) 40 (17) 38 (17) 38 (16) 39 (17) 
 
250 552 (398) 47 (21) 45 (20) 44 (19) 45 (19) 
 
500 534 (292) 52 (24) 51 (23) 51 (22) 51 (22) 
 
1000 563 (339) 47 (11) 47 (11) 47 (12) 46 (12) 
             
 
Error rates were calculated using the following formula for post-correct trials 
(E(postcorrect) = C-C-E-C/( C-C-C-C + C-C-E-C) x 100); E+1 trials (E(E+1) = C-E-E-C/( C-
E-C-C + C-E-E-C) x 100) and E+2 trials (E(E+2) = E-C-E-C/(E-C-C-C + E-C-E-C) x 100).  
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RTs were subjected to repeated measures ANOVAs including the within-subjects 
factors of RSI (100, 250, 500 and 1000 ms) and trial-type (postcorrect, pre-errror, error, E+1 
and E+2) and the between subjects factor Group (low BDI-II vs. elevated BDI-II). Error rates 
were subjected to similar repeated measures ANOVAs with fewer levels of trial-type 
(postcorrect, E+1, E+2).    
ERP data 
The EEG data processing (trial-inclusion criteria, referencing, and filtering) were 
identical to those reported in Chapter 2.  Epochs commenced 200 ms before response onset 
and lasted for 1000 ms. The mean number of epochs contributing to the error waveforms are 
presented in Table 3. Most importantly, every participant in the analysis contributed sufficient 
error trials (≥ 12) to each analysis cell to conduct reliable Ne/ERN analyses (based upon 
previous estimates, see Larson, Baldwin, Good & Fair, 2010; Olvet & Hajcak, 2009).  
 
Table 3: Table presenting the mean (and range) number of error epochs contributing to the 
ERP analyses as a function of RSI and BDI-II Group. 
    Error Trials 
Group RSI Mean epoch count (range) 
   Low BDI-II 100 49 (17 - 94) 
 
250 63 (23 - 112) 
 
500 74 (40 - 152) 
 
1000 55 (13 - 133) 
   Elevated BDI-II 100 46 (15 - 65) 
 
250 55 (15 - 91) 
 
500 63 (22 - 130) 
 
1000 49 (12 - 139) 
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Each of the ERPs reported in the current study used a 100 ms baseline which started 
150 ms before the response. The Ne/ERN was measured using the most negative peak 
amplitude in a 100 ms search window following response onset at electrode FCz. The early Pe 
was defined as the mean amplitude 150-300 ms following the response at electrode FCz (see 
also Georgiadi et al., 2011; Van Veen & Carter, 2002). The late Pe was operationalized using 
a mean amplitude measure 250-450 ms following response at electrode Pz.  
Difference waveforms were calculated (grand mean error trial amplitude minus grand 
mean correct trial amplitude) independently for each participant. Difference waves were used 
as the current hypotheses concern the overall sensitivity of the error monitoring system (error 
activity relative to correct activity) and not the specific amplitudes of error or correct trials 
independently. These response-locked ERPs were subjected to repeated measures ANOVAs 
with the within-subjects factor of RSI (100, 250, 500 & 1000) and the between subjects factor 
of Group (Low BDI-II vs. High BDI-II).   
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Participant characteristics 
In addition to increased BDI-II scores, the elevated symptom group also reported 
increased scores on the STAI-T, see Table 4, suggesting the elevated BDI-II group was also 
characterised by higher levels of trait anxiety. As these two self-report scales (BDI-II and 
STAI-T) were highly correlated, r (46) =.671, p < .001, scores on these scales were not 
pursued as independent predictors of behavioural or ERP outcomes, and analyses instead 
focused on the BDI-II. Additionally, elevated BDI-II participants demonstrated increased 
negative affect and reduced positive affect (PANAS subscales) as compared to the low BDI-II 
participants see Table 4. Together, this self-report data confirms that the elevated BDI-II 
group had a significant mood disturbance as compared to low BDI-II scorers.  
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Table 4: Participant characteristics as a function of BDI-II group, paired-samples t-tests are 
presented to indicate significant differences between group means. 
 
Group     
Characteristic Low BDI-II High BDI-II t p 
Age 20.7 22.1 -1.36 > .10 
BDI-II 6.4 21.7 -9.66 < .001 
STAIT-T 37.7 52.1 -5.05 < .001 
     
PANAS-PA 30.5 23.9 4.50 < .001 
PANAS-NA 13.9 18.9 -3.51 .001 
     ePANAS-PA 23.4 24.0 < 1 > .10 
ePANAS-NA 22.6 26.3 -1.73 .092 
     
4.3.2 ePANAS scores.  
Contrary to the experimental hypotheses, groups did not differ in their affective ratings 
on the ePANAS negative affect scale, p = .092, see Table 4 and also Figure 9. Thus, the 
current results do not provide evidence for increasingly negative evaluations of errors in the 
elevated BDI-II group. Furthermore, BDI-II groups did not differ from each other on their 
scores in the positive affect sub-scale of the ePANAS, see Figure 9 
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Figure 10: Bar graphs depicting the mean endorsement for each adjective on the positive 
affect (top panel) and negative affect (bottom panel) subscales of the ePANAS as a function of 
BDI-II group. 
 
4.3.3 Behavioural Results 
Reaction Times. There was a significant main effect of RSI, F(3, 138) = 85.84, p < 
.0001, ηp
2
 = .651; mean RTs generally decreased with increasing RSI: RSI 100 (497 ms) > 
RSI 250 (458 ms) > RSI 500 (422 ms), Fs (1, 46) > 62.65, ps < .001, ηp
2
 > .576, however, 
there was no significant difference on mean RT between RSI 500 and 1000 (426 ms), F < 1, p 
> .10. Additionally, RTs were modulated by trial-type, F(4, 184) = 229.63, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
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.833. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that mean RTs on E+1 (534 ms) and E+2 (454 ms) trials 
were slower than all-correct trials (444 ms), Fs(1, 46) > 11.231, ps < .009, ηp
2
s > .195, 
confirming that significant posterror slowing occurred in trials following mistakes. 
Additionally, mean error RTs (401 ms) and pre-error trials (421 ms) were faster than all-
correct trials, Fs(1, 46) > 117.25, ps < .001, ηp
2
s > .717, confirming the presence of 
significant error and pre-error speeding, see also Figure 10 
Important for current concerns, RSI further interacted with trial-type, F(12, 552) = 
43.38, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .485. First, there was larger RSI-dependent modulation of RT on E+1 
trials than any other trial-type, all Fs(3, 138) > 52.94, ps < .001, ηp
2
s > .534. Replicating 
previous results (Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009), this effect was due to E+1 slowing effects 
(mean E+1 RT minus mean  all-correct RTs) increasing with decreasing RSI: RSI 100 (Δ1 3 
ms) > RSI 250 (Δ108 ms) > RSI 500 (Δ58 ms) > RSI 1000 (Δ31 ms), all Fs(1, 46) > 12.11, ps 
< .004, ηp
2
s > .207, see also Figure 10. Extending these previous results, E+2 slowing (mean 
E+2 RT minus mean all-correct RT) was also modulated by RSI, F(3, 138) = 9.49, p < .001, 
ηp
2
 = .171, and was larger at RSI 100 (Δ25 ms) than RSI 500 (Δ2 ms) and RSI 1000 (Δ1 ms), 
Fs(1, 46) > 17.02, ps < .001, ηp
2s > .270, however, RSI 250 (Δ11 ms) did not differ 
significantly from other RSIs, all ps < .10.  
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Figure 11: Mean RTs presented separately as a function of BDI-II group, trial-type and RSI. 
Error bars depict S.E.M. 
 
Furthermore, when posterror trials (E+1, E+2) were excluded from analyses, there was 
a significant trial-type by RSI interaction between all-correct, pre-error and error trials, F(3, 
138) = 5.028, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .099. Importantly, follow-up tests revealed that there was no 
effect of RSI on pre-error speeding (mean all-correct RT minus mean pre-error RTs), F(3, 
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138) = 1.80, p > .10. In contrast, the error speeding did interact with RSI (pre-error mean RT 
minus error mean RT), F(3, 138) = 5.02, p = .00 , ηp
2
 = .10.  This effect was due to a larger 
error speeding (pre-error mean RT minus error mean RT) at RSI 250 (Δ29 ms) than RSI 500 
(Δ17 ms), F(3, 138) = 5.964, p = .018, ηp
2
 = .113. However, there was no significant 
difference on this error speeding effect in any comparisons between any other RSIs, all ps > 
.10, see also Figure 10.  
Contrary to the experimental hypotheses, the factor Group did not interact with any RT 
variable, all Fs < 1.88, ps > .135. No other main effects or interactions were statistically 
significant in the RT analyses.  
 
Choice error rates. Choice error rates were modulated by trial-type, F(2, 92) = 16.95, 
p < .001, ηp
2
s = .269, due to error rates being lower on E+2 trials (6.3%) than post-correct 
(8.3%) and E+1 (8.3%) trials, Fs(1, 46) > 22.07, ps < .001, ηp
2
s > .324. Furthermore, there 
was a significant main effect of RSI, F(3, 138) = 11.21, p < .001, ηp
2
s = .196, due to lower 
error rates in RSI 100 (6.2%) than RSIs 250 (8.1%) and 500 (8.9%), Fs(1, 46) > 23.45, ps < 
.001, ηp
2
s > .336.  
Important for the current hypotheses, trial-type further interacted with RSI, F(6, 276) = 
3.414, p < .003, ηp
2
s = .069. While error rates did not differ between post-correct and E+1 
trials for RSIs 100, 250 and 500, (all ps > .10), error rates were significantly lower for E+1 
(6.7%) than post-correct (8.6%) trials at RSI 1000, F(1, 46) = 9.27, p = .01 , ηp
2
 = .168. 
Conversely, while error rates did not differ for RSI 1000 between E+1 and E+2 (6.8%) trials, 
F < 1, p > .10, there was a significant decrease in error rates from E+1 to E+2 trials for RSIs 
100 and 250, Fs(1, 46) > 8.83, ps < .021, ηp
2
s > .160, and a trend towards such at RSI 500, 
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F(1, 46) = 5.97, p = .072, ηp
2
 = .115, see Figure  11
9
. No effects involving BDI-II group were 
significant, all ps > .10. 
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Figure 12: Choice error rates [%] as a function of BDI-II group, Trial-Type and RSI. Error 
bars deptict S.E.M.  
                                                 
9 No significant correlations were found between BDI-II or ePANAS scores and the extent of posterror 
behaviour or posterror slowing.  
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4.3.4 ERP data 
Ne/ERN. Mean Ne/ERN amplitudes were numerically more negative for the low (-5.29 
V) than the high (-4.44 V) BDI-II group, however, this effect was not statistically 
significant, F(1, 46) = 1.626, p = .209, ηp
2
 = .034, see Figure 12. There was a significant main 
effect of RSI, F(1, 46) = 7.108, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .134. Post-hoc ANOVAs revealed that the 
Ne/ERN was smaller for RSI 100 (-4.23 V) than RSIs 500 (-5.08 V) and 1000 (-5.39 V), 
Fs(1, 46) > 11.675, ps > .002, ηps
2
 >.202; however, there was no significant difference 
between any other comparisons of Ne/ERN amplitude at other RSI levels (all ps > .10)
10
. No 
other main effects or interactions reached significance. 
In line with prior research (Olvet et al., 2010) correlations were conducted between 
depressive symptom severity (BDI-II score) and the difference Ne/ERN (collapsed across 
RSIs), at electrode FCz. This analysis returned a significant correlation between BDI-II 
symptom severity and the amplitude of the ∆Ne/ERN, r = .349, p = .015
11
. There was no 
significant correlation between ∆Ne/ERN and self-reported negative affect on the ePANAS or 
standard PANAS, ps > .10. 
 
 
                                                 
10
 ERP activity using an identical peak-search window to the difference Ne/ERN was also analysed using the 
non-difference waves, including the additional factor of Trial-type (correct, error). Importantly, this additional 
analysis revealed no further interaction with group, all ps > .10. Amplitudes were, however, more negative on 
error than correct trials, F(1, 46) = 152.97, p < .001. The main effect of RSI was also significant, F(3, 138) = 
6.18, p = .001, which was further qualified by an interaction between Trial-type and RSI,  F(3, 138) =8.24, p < 
.001, due to a significant effect of RSI occurring for error-related, F(3, 44) =8.24, p < .004, but not correct-
related, p > .10, activity.  
11
 Correlations conducted between BDI-II score and the Ne/ERN and correct-related negativity (CRN) 
independently revealed a significant correlation between the BDI-II score and the CRN, r = -.290, p = .045, but 
not for the Ne/ERN, p > .10. 
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Figure 13: Response-locked ERP at FCz. Left panel: ERPs are presented as a function of 
RSI, Trial-type and BDI-II group. Right panel: ERP difference waves (error – correct) 
presented as a function of Group and RSI. 
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Early Pe. While the elevated BDI-II group demonstrated numerically reduced early Pe 
amplitudes as compared to the low BDI-II group, see Figure 12, this difference was not 
statistically significant, F(1, 46) = 1.397, p = .243, ηp
2
 = .029. Additionally, there was a main 
effect of RSI, F(3, 138) = 9.10, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .165. Post-hoc ANOVAs revealed that early Pe 
amplitudes were lower at RSI 100 (3.16 V) than RSI 500 (4.12 V) and RSI 1000 (4.69 
V), Fs(1, 46) > 9.996, ps > .018, ηps
2
 >.178 . Additionally, early Pe amplitude at RSI 250 
(3.45 V) was smaller than RSI 1000, F(1, 46) =10.326, p = .012, ηp
2
 = .183. No further main 
effects or interactions were significant, all ps > .10.  
Pearson’s correlations revealed a trend towards a negative correlation between the 
amplitude of the early Pe (collapsed across RSIs) and BDI-II score, r = -.252, p = .085, and 
the negative affect sub-scale of the standard PANAS, r = -.263, p = .071.There was no 
significant correlation between negative affect ratings on the ePANAS or the standard 
PANAS and the difference early Pe amplitudes, p > .10.    
 
Late Pe. Mean late Pe amplitudes were associated with a main effect of RSI, F(1, 46) = 
27.077, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .371, as the late Pe amplitude tended to increase with RSI (RSI 100: 
3.52 V; RSI 250: 4.81 V; RSI 500: 5.67 V; RSI 1000: 6.27 V), see Figure 13 .  Post-hoc 
ANOVAs revealed that the amplitude of the late Pe at RSI 100 was significantly smaller than 
all other RSIs, all Fs(1, 46) > 30.38, ps > .001, ηps
2
 >.398. Amplitudes at RSI 250 were also 
smaller than RSI 500 and 1000, Fs(1, 46) > 15.406, ps > .001, ηps
2
 >.251, however, the 
difference between RSI 500 and RSI 1000 was not significant,  p > .10. No other effects, 
including correlations with BDI-II score, the standard PANAS or the negative affect subscale 
of the ePANAS reached significance, all ps > .10.  
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Figure 14: Response-locked ERP at Pz. Left panel: ERPs are presented as a function of RSI, 
Trial-type and BDI-II group. Right panel: ERP difference waves (error – correct) presented 
as a function of Group and RSI. 
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4.4 Discussion 
The current study investigated the nature of both error monitoring and posterror 
adjustments at a range of RSIs in relation to elevated levels of current depressive symptoms. 
Contrary to the experimental hypotheses, groups divided according to depressive symptom 
severity did not differ on measures of posterror slowing or posterror accuracy at any RSI. 
These findings are in contrast to previous suggestions that elevated depressive symptoms are 
associated with a “catastrophic” response to errors (Beats et al., 199 ; Jones et al., 2010), 
which ultimately leads to less, rather that more accurate posterror performance (e.g., Holmes 
& Pizzagalli, 2008b; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2010; Jones et al., 2010; Pizzagalli et al., 2006; 
Schroder et al., 2013). More specifically, while participants in general showed improved 
accuracy at E+1 trials for the longest RSI, and by E+2 trials for all RSIs, the efficacy of these 
control adjustments did not differ significantly between low and elevated BDI-II groups. 
Furthermore, subjective error appraisals gained after task performance (ePANAS) did not 
differ between groups. This finding does not support the idea that depressive symptoms are 
associated with increasingly negative error appraisals. Finally, the main group-split analyses 
did not reveal any significant differences between groups for any error-related brain potential 
(Ne/ERN, early Pe, late Pe). Interestingly, however, supporting one previous suggestion (Olvet 
et al., 2010), the reduction of the difference Ne/ERN was associated increasing BDI-II scores, 
suggesting that performance monitoring processes might differentiate less between correct 
and error trials as depressive symptom severity increases.  
First, as several prior studies have reported reduced posterror accuracy in depressed 
samples (e.g., Beats et al., 1996; Elliott et al., 1997; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008b; Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2010; Jones et al., 2010; Pizzagalli et al., 2006; Schroder et al., 2013), it is 
important to consider why the current results might differ from these previous investigations. 
Initially, it should be noted that a finding of decreased posterror accuracy in elevated 
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depressive symptom groups is not ubiquitous in the existing literature (e.g., Chui & Deldin, 
2007; Olvet et al., 2010; Ruchsow et al., 2006; Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schrijvers et al., 2009). 
Recently, it has been suggested that variation in task difficulty between studies might explain 
such discrepant results (Olvet et al., 2010; Schroder et al., 2013). More specifically, Olvet et 
al., (2010) highlighted that while they did not find posterror behavioural differences between 
groups using an arrow flanker task, previous investigations found impairments using the 
apparently more difficult tasks, including the classic Stroop, Simon and the standard Eriksen 
flanker paradigms (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008b; Pizzagalli 
et al., 2006; Schroder et al., 2013), suggesting that overall task difficulty might modulate the 
relationship between posterror impairment and depression. In a recent explicit test of this 
hypothesis, participants with elevated depressive symptoms showed reduced posterror 
accuracy for blocks of flanker performance in which S-R mappings were reversed from the 
previous block (increasing task difficulty), while elevated symptoms were not associated with 
posterror impairment when S-R mappings were maintained across experimental blocks 
(Schorder et al., 2013). In light of these results, Schroder et al. (2013) recently suggested that 
participants with elevated depressive symptoms might lack the ability to “bounce back” from 
errors specifically during more effortful tasks. Therefore, the choice RT task employed in the 
current investigation was perhaps too easy to uncover depressive-symptom related posterror 
impairment. Importantly, however, while task-difficulty might account for some variation 
between the existing results, it is important to note this idea suggests that depression is not 
associated with catastrophic reactions to errors per se, but instead to posterror performance 
impairments specifically within the context of increased task difficulty, perhaps because 
errors become more salient in tasks perceived as more difficult. 
In relation to error-related brain activity, the Ne/ERN, which has been related to 
adaptive performance monitoring processes (c.f., Botvinick et al., 2001; Holroyd & Coles, 
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2002; Yeung et al., 2004) and also affective or defensive reactions to errors (Hajcak & Foti, 
2008; Weinberg et al., 2012b), did not differ between groups in the current investigation. 
While this result is in line with some previous investigations that have reported no significant 
depression-related changes in Ne/ERN amplitude (Compton et al., 2008; Georgiadi et al., 
2011; Olvet et al., 2010; Ruchsow et al., 2004; Ruchsow et al., 2006; Schrijvers et al., 2008; 
Schrijvers et al., 2009; Schroder et al., 2013), this result is also inconsistent with previous 
suggestions that the Ne/ERN is increased in mild to moderately depressed samples (Chiu & 
Deldin, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008b; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2010; Tucker et al., 2003). 
Importantly, such mixed results are challenging for the proposal that increased Ne/ERN 
amplitudes represent a reliable feature of internalising psychopathology in general (including 
both anxious, e.g., GAD, OCD and depressive disorders, see Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). 
Interestingly, in contrast to depression, reliable increases in Ne/ERN amplitude appear to be 
observed in anxious psychopathologies, such as OCD (e.g., Gehring et al., 2000; Endrass et 
al., 2008; Riesel et al., 2011; Ruchsow et al., 2005) and GAD (Weinberg et al., 2010; 
Weinberg et al. 2012a), suggesting that hyperactive performance monitoring might be more 
closely related to anxiety than depression. Importantly, as the elevated depressive symptom 
group in the current study was characterised by increased levels of trait anxiety as well as 
depressive symptoms, the question arises as to why this highly anxious group was not also 
associated with increased Ne/ERN amplitude. In a recent study, Weinberg et al. (2012a) 
reported that while participants with a unitary diagnosis of GAD (without comorbid Major 
Depressive Disorder, MDD) were associated with increased Ne/ERN amplitudes, the 
magnitude of the component did not differ between individuals with a comorbid GAD/MDD 
diagnosis and healthy controls. In light of these results, Weinberg et al. (2012a) suggested 
that the presence of comorbid depressive symptoms might have a moderating influence on the 
otherwise increased Ne/ERN reactivity to errors in anxiety. Interestingly, this emerging 
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distinction between the Ne/ERN in depression and anxiety appears to parallel existing 
suggestions that it is anxiety, and not depression, which associated with increased defensive 
attentional orienting to sources of threatening information (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Mogg, Millar & Bradley, 2000). Finally, previous studies reporting increased Ne/ERN 
amplitude in moderately depressed samples did not include a measure of co-morbid anxious 
symptoms (Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008, 2010), limiting the ability to 
assess whether or not increased Ne/ERN amplitudes in these samples are mainly driven by a 
sub-section of these cohorts containing particularly high anxious symptoms.  
As a final point regarding the Ne/ERN, correlation analyses in the current study 
suggested that increasing BDI-II score was associated with reduced difference Ne/ERN 
activity. Additional follow-up correlations (see footnote 10) revealed that this effect was 
mostly due to increasingly negative amplitudes on correct, rather than error trials. 
Interestingly, Olvet et al. (2010) also reported reduced difference Ne/ERN amplitudes with 
increasing depressive symptom severity, primarily driven by a positive relationship between 
CRN amplitude and depressive symptoms.  While such correlations should be interpreted 
with caution, particularly as neither the current nor the prior investigation (Olvet et al., 2010) 
reported differences in the group-split analyses, these results converge to suggest that 
increasing depressive symptoms are potentially associated with the reduced differentiation 
between correct and error trial amplitudes. Furthermore, the fact that these correlations were 
driven mainly by increased CRN amplitude proposes that depression may be associated with 
increased error-like processing on correct trials, perhaps due to performance on correct trials 
being evaluated more negatively (Coles et al., 2001; Vidal et al., 2000). Such a proposal is in 
line with the self-deprecating nature of depressive cognitions (Beck, 2008). In contrast to this 
suggestion, however, Olvet et al. (2010) proposed that the reduced distinction between correct 
and error trials in the time-window of the Ne/ERN might relate to the “debilitating apathy and 
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anhedonia”, more prevalent with increasing depressive symptom severity. The overall pattern 
of results observed in the current study, however, urge caution when suggesting that 
depression-related error processing in the current sample is characterised by increasing 
apathy. More specifically, elevated and low BDI-II groups could not be differentiated from 
each other on the extent of pre-error speeding, posterror slowing or posterror accuracy 
improvement, strongly suggesting that both groups were equally motivated to regulate speed 
and accuracy during task performance. Furthermore, subjective feelings of apathy towards 
error commission would predict the reduced endorsement of both positive and negative affect 
on the ePANAS, however, groups also did not differ on this measure in the current 
investigation. Finally, in general, an enlarged CRN suggest increased rather that decreased 
monitoring, further disagreeing with the idea that apathy towards performance outcomes 
influenced the correlation results in both the previous (Olvet et al., 2010) and the current 
study.  
The magnitude of the early and the late Pe sub-components did not differ significantly 
between groups in the current experiment. While the early Pe was numerically reduced for the 
elevated BDI-II group under all RSIs in the current study, this effect was not statistically 
significant. This result is consistent with one previous investigation which also reported 
numerically reduced early Pe amplitude in a clinically depressed group (Georgiadi et al., 
2011). Furthermore, the late Pe was also not associated with depressive symptoms in the 
current investigation. In contrast to the current findings, reduced amplitudes of the more 
posterior, late Pe have been observed in a number of depressed samples (e.g., Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2010; Olvet et al., 2010; Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schijvers et al., 2009; Schroder et 
al., 2013; however, see Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Compton et al., 2008; Georgiadi et al., 2011; 
Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008). Previously, it has been suggested that the Pe might relate to the 
level of depressive symptom severity, with reduced Pe amplitudes being more reliably found 
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in severely depressed samples (Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schijvers et al., 2009). Therefore, the 
lack of relationship between the Pe and depressive symptoms might be accounted for by the 
sub-clinical, and less severe depressive symptoms in the currently studied sample.  
Finally, independent of BDI-II group, the current results provide important insights into 
recent debates regarding the adaptive consequences of error-processing. More specifically, 
while both cognitive control (e.g., Botvinick et al, 2001; Laming, 1979; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 
1977; Chapter 3) and orienting accounts of posterror slowing predict significant RT slowing 
on E+1 trials, the orienting account hypothesises that this slowing should be associated with 
reduced posterror accuracy in general, whereas control accounts predict increased posterror 
accuracy (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Laming, 1968), particularly at longer RSIs (Dudschig 
& Jentzsch, 2009; Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009). Contradicting the predictions of the orienting 
account, accuracy rates were significantly higher in the current study at RSI 1000 on E+ 1 
trials. These findings are clearly consistent with control accounts of posterror slowing 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Laming, 1968).  Furthermore, while the extent of posterror slowing 
increased with decreasing RSI (see also Burns, 1971; Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011; 
Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009; Rabbitt, 1969), E+1 trials at shorter RSIs were associated with 
numerically reduced accuracy compared to postcorrect trials. This pattern of posterror 
accuracy results (i.e., accuracy improvements occurring selectively at RSI 1000) can be fully 
accommodated by the bottleneck hypothesis as proposed by Jentzsch & Dudschig (2009). 
More specifically, Jentzsch & Dudschig (2009) suggested that that on-going error-monitoring 
from Trial N-1 can interfere with subsequent trial processes if insufficient time is provided 
between events for error-monitoring processes to fully complete (e.g., at short RSIs), whereas 
adaptive adjustments in response criteria can be implemented when sufficient time is 
available for central processes to clear between events. Therefore, the selective increase in 
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posterror accuracy (on E+1) at the longest, but none of the shorter RSIs, is in line with this 
bottleneck account of posterror adjustment. 
Further suggesting that errors motivate the up-regulation of adaptive cognitive control 
processes, E+2 trials were also associated with increased accuracy relative to post-correct 
trials at all RSIs. Additionally, RSI 100 was associated with significant posterror slowing on 
E+2 trials. Importantly, these findings suggest that interference caused by error-monitoring 
processes at short RSIs does not permanently abolish the processes which create adaptive 
shifts in posterror behaviour, but instead that such processes appear to be delayed by one trial 
at the shortest RSIs. Furthermore, while the slowing observed at E+2 is consistent with 
previous empirical observations (Burns, 1971; Rabbitt, 1969), these prior reports did not 
disclose E+2 accuracy rates. Thus, while Rabbitt (1969) concluded that E+2 slowing likely 
reflected a delayed shift in response threshold, Burns (1971) argued that E+2 slowing (and 
E+1 slowing at short RSIs) might result from an involuntary “orienting reflex” which 
distracts performance after the error but decays rapidly, and, as such does not interfere with 
E+2 trials at longer RSIs.  Critically, the accuracy improvements observed on trial E+2 in the 
current study favour the suggestion that E+2 slowing at short RSIs indeed reflects an adaptive 
shift in response threshold.  
Finally, the current results are also in line with many recent suggestions that the extent 
of posterror slowing does not appear to be directly determined by the size of the Ne/ERN 
(e.g., Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009; Hajcak & Simons, 2008; Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, 2012; 
Strozyk & Jentzsch, 2012). More specifically, and replicating previous results (Dudschig & 
Jentzsch, 2009), Ne/ERN amplitudes were smallest, whilst posterror slowing effects were 
largest, at RSI 100. Importantly, while RSI 100 was associated with significantly lower 
Ne/ERN amplitudes than RSI 500 and 1000, the Ne/ERN did not differ on any other RSI 
comparison, strongly suggesting that these effects cannot be explained by a simple 
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component overlap account (for a similar suggestion see also Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009). In 
contrast, the late Pe was reduced significantly as a function of decreasing RSI for RSI 100 
compared to all other RSIs, and also for RSI 250 compared to RSIs 500 and 1000, suggesting 
that this later ERP might be modulated by component overlap. Finally, the Ne/ERN has been 
demonstrated to be larger when accuracy rather than speed is stressed (Arbel & Donchin, 
2009; Falkenstein et al., 2000; Gehring et al., 1993). However, and again consistent with the 
suggestions of Dudschig and Jentzsch (2009), participants were slowest and most accurate in 
RSI 100, consequently, if an RSI-dependent shift on the SAT function confounded the current 
data, this confound should have resulted in enhanced Ne/ERN amplitudes at the shortest RSI; 
the opposite result was found in the current investigation. In line with previous suggestions 
(Dudshig & Jentzsch, 2009), it seems possible that the reduced Ne/ERN at RSI 100 observed 
in the current investigation reflects unfinished error monitoring.  
In conclusion, the results of the current study do not support the idea that depression is 
associated with a ‘catastrophic’ emotional response to mistakes. More specifically, participant 
groups with elevated and low levels of depressive symptoms did not differ either on 
behavioural, electrophysiological or subjective report measures of error processing. 
Independent of BDI-II group, however, the current results support control accounts of 
posterror slowing in general (Botvinick et al., 2001; Laming, 1979; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 
1977), and the bottleneck account of posterror slowing at short RSIs as proposed by Jentzsch 
and Dudschig (2009). Additionally, the finding that E+2 trials are associated with improved 
posterror accuracy suggests that the interference of on-going monitoring processes on 
posterror trials at short RSIs does not eliminate the motivational impact of the error, but 
instead delays accuracy improvements until a later stage in on-going task performance.  
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5 
Reactive and proactive control adjustments under increased depressive 
symptoms: Insights from the classic and emotional-face Stroop tasks
12
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The contents of this chapter are based upon an article currently in press at The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Saunders, B., & Jentzsch, I. (in press). Reactive and proactive control adjustments 
under increased depressive symptoms: Insights from the classic and emotional-face Stroop tasks. The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology 
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5.1 Introduction 
The human cognitive system is capable of exerting control over information processing, 
facilitating effortful goal-directed behaviour in complex and challenging environments.  
Importantly, this regulation of cognition is a dynamic process, which may be initiated either 
proactively by pre-determined, externally provided goals or reactively after spontaneous and 
unexpected challenges to on-going performance (Botvinick et al.,, 2001; Braver et al., 2007; 
Braver, 2012; Wühr & Kunde, 2008). Such proactive control processes assist the sustained 
maintenance of future-oriented goal-states, optimizing performance through the prolonged 
adjustment of information processing systems. Conversely, reactive control reflects the past-
oriented and transient up-regulation of control after spontaneous challenges to performance, 
such as response conflict or errors. Importantly, such reactive control adjustments rely upon 
internal action monitoring processes (assumed to be facilitated by the ACC; see Botvinick et 
al., 2001; Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012, see also Chapter 1:General Introduction for an 
extended discussion), that signal the need for increased control after the detection of response 
conflict (this executive control is putatively implemented by other neural structures, e.g., the 
DLPFC; Botvinick et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). 
Further to this intra-individual variation in the nature of cognitive control processes, 
executive impairments have been associated with various psychopathologies including 
schizophrenia (Barch & Ceasar, 2012; Kerns et al., 2005), attention deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (e.g., King, Colla, Brass, Heuser, & Cramon, 2007) and, important for current 
purposes, depression (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; West et al., 2010). Further to the protracted 
mood disturbance that often characterises the disorder, depressive symptomatology is 
associated with subjective reports of poor concentration and general loss of interest (DSM-IV, 
2000), proposing that attentional control and goal-motivated cognitive processes are 
potentially impaired in groups with increased depressive symptoms. Additionally, 
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neuroimaging research frequently implicates the dysfunction of the fronto-cingulate structures 
which putatively underlie cognitive control in the neuropsycholgy of depression (Liotti & 
Mayberg, 2001; Mayberg, 1997; Pizzagalli, 2011). Consequently, many authors have 
suggested that impairments in both proactive and reactive control processes might be 
apparent in participants with increased depressive symptoms (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; 
West et al., 2010).  
Reactive cognitive control processes are often studied using interference paradigms, 
such as the Stroop task. Previously identified as “the gold standard of attentional measures” 
(Macleod, 1992), the classic colour-word Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) has featured widely in 
experimental psychological research, informing both the development of contemporary 
theories of cognitive control (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Braver et al., 2007) and  
investigations of abnormal cognition in various psychopathologies (e.g., Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2008; Kerns et al., 2005; King et al., 2007; Moritz et al., 2002). In the classic 
Stroop paradigm task responses slow and become more error-prone for incompatible trials in 
which a task-irrelevant stimulus dimension primes a pre-potent but incorrect response (e.g., 
the word “B UE” presented in red ink during colour-naming instructions) as compared to 
compatible trials on which task-relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimensions are associated 
with the same response option (e.g., the word “B UE” presented in blue ink during a colour-
naming task). Additionally, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1, interference effects are 
modulated dynamically as a function of the conflict level experienced in the previous trial. 
Specifically, the Stroop effect can be observed to reduce following high conflict trials (vs. low 
conflict trials). This congruency sequence effect (CSE) is frequently assumed to reflect a 
conflict adaptation mechanism where the recruitment of increased attentional control reduces 
the influence of the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension on post-conflict trials (Botvinick et al., 
2001; Egner, 2007; Kerns et al., 2004; Ullsperger et al., 2005). Consequently, further to the 
137 
 
classic Stroop interference effect, CSEs provide additional suggestion that cognitive control is 
reactively up-regulated after response conflict is detected (see Botvinick et al., 2001; di 
Pellegrino, Ciaramelli &   dvas, 2007; Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012; Ullsperger et al., 
2005;Wühr & Kunde, 2008). Importantly, the CSE has diminishes as both inter-stimulus- and 
response-stimulus-intervals increase (Egner, Ely & Grinband, 2010; see also West et al., 
2010; Wühr & Ansorge, 2005), suggesting that CSEs reflect the operation of a  past-oriented 
interference resolution mechanism, and not to control processes that develop proactively over 
time in expectation of the upcoming need for control (cf. Egner et al., 2010; for similar a 
suggestion see Alpay, Goerke & Stürmer, 2009). However, it should be noted that under one 
computational framework (De Pisapia & Braver, 2006), the CSE might be considered a 
reactively triggered, transient increase in proactive control processes (see De Pisapia & 
Braver, 2006; Braver et al., 2007; but see Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012; Scherbaum, 
Dshemuchadse, Fischer & Goschke, 2010).  
Most important for the concerns of the current thesis, studies of Stroop interference in 
depressed samples have often used blocked designs in which Stroop interference is calculated 
as the difference between the total time to read a list of incompatible stimuli, minus the 
reading time for compatible or neutral word lists. While such investigatoins often found 
increased Stroop interference in depressed groups (e.g., Moritz et al., 2002; Trichard et al., 
1995; but see Egeland et al., 2003), it is important to note that proactive control processes can 
dominate performance when upcoming conflict trials are entirely expected (De Pisapia & 
Braver, 2006). In contrast, studies using the randomised presentation of compatibility levels 
within blocks of Stroop trials have often not reported depression-related differences in 
interference effects (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Meiran et al., 2011; Wagner et al., 2006, 
but see Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008).  Furthermore, such randomised designs permit the 
investigation of the CSE. Importantly, as conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001) 
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proposes that both post-conflict and posterror adaptation relies upon the integrity of similar 
evaluative control processes, analysis of the CSE and posterror slowing in the current and 
previous chapter (Chapter 4), respectively, provide complementary measures of reactive 
control processes in groups with sub-clinical depressive symptoms.  While two prior 
investigations have reported impaired CSEs in depressed groups during classic Stroop task 
performance (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007, Meiran et al., 2011), several other studies have not 
found such depression-related impairments in a variety of common interference tasks 
(Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Ng et al., 2012; Pizzagalli et al., 2006; West et al., 2010). It is 
also noteworthy that many such studies further biased the ratio of compatible to incompatible 
probes, manipulating both task difficulty and conflict-expectancy (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 
2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Meiran et al., 2011; West et al., 2010). Therefore, the study 
presented in the current chapter investigated the operation of reactive control processes 
(Stroop interference, CSEs) as a function of increasing depressive symptomatology when 
Stroop compatibility levels are equiprobable and presented in a randomised order. For these 
purposes the classic colour-word Stroop task was employed due to its prevalence in the 
existing literature, allowing comparison with existing results.  
Despite providing a reliable laboratory paradigm to study individual differences in 
attentional control, the classic Stroop task does not inform on the capacity to detect and 
resolve conflict which arises from competing affective environmental distractors. Depressive 
symptomatology has previously been associated with an impaired ability to regulate, inhibit 
or manipulate affective content (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Joormann, 2004; Koster et al., 
2005), therefore, it is predicted that depression will be associated the impaired ability to 
resolve interference from affective distractors. The emotional-face Stroop task (Etkin et al., 
2006) is an experimental paradigm designed to study such emotional conflict. In this protocol 
individuals must respond selectively to a task-relevant emotional stimulus dimension 
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(affective face), while avoiding priming by task-irrelevant, often conflicting, emotional 
distractors (affective word). Therefore, as in the classic Stroop task, conflict arises when 
relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimensions are in opposition (e.g., negative facial expression; 
word: “HAPPY”). Importantly, CSEs analogous to those observed in the colour-word Stroop 
task can be measured in the emotional-face Stroop protocol, demonstrating an ability to 
increase control levels after task-irrelevant emotional distraction. Most important for current 
concerns, recent research has proposed that a distinct mechanism underlies trial-to-trial 
executive control over emotional conflict (Egner et al., 2008; Etkin et al., 2006; Etkin et al., 
2011; Maier & di Pellegrino, 2012; Monti et al., 2010; Soutschek & Schubert, 2013, see 
Chapter 1 for an extended discussion of this proposal). As depression has been related to 
particular control impairments when tasks or events require the regulation, inhibition and 
manipulation of affective information processing (e.g., Elliott et al., 1997; Elliott et al., 1996; 
Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Joormann, Levens & Gotlib, 2011), 
increased depressive symptoms were hypothesised to be associated with an impairment in the 
trial-to-trial resolution of emotional conflict.  
Finally, unlike reactive cognitive control, considerably less is known about the 
manifestation of sustained, proactive control processes in participants with elevated levels of 
depression. In a recent psychophysiological study, West et al. (2010)  investigated proactive 
control processes as a function of incresed negative affect (~sub-clinical depressive 
symptoms). West et al. reported that during a counting Stroop paradigm, their ERP measure of 
proactive control (the pre-stimulus slow wave) was attenuated in participants with increasing 
depressive symptoms. In light of these ERP results, West et al. (2010) proposed that 
increasing depressive symptoms are associated with impaired proactive control processes. It 
should be noted, however, that behavioural effects (i.e., the Stroop effect and CSE) were 
related to the level of depressive symptoms in their study. To provide a behavioural measure 
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of future-oriented, sustained cognitive control processes, participants in the current study 
were instructed to prioritise speed or accuracy over the longer term during task performance. 
Many authors have proposed that the ability to adjust response-thresholds in order to generate 
and maintain trade-offs between speed for accuracy (and vice versa) reflect a fundamental 
operation of cognitive control processes (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Jentzsch & Leuthold, 
2006; Jones, Cho, Nystrom, Cohen, & Braver, 2002; Laming, 1979; Verbruggen & Logan, 
2009, see also Chapter 3 of the current thesis). Importantly, unlike the short-term adaptation 
of control settings observed under reactive control, compliance with an externally provided 
Speed-Accuracy Trade-off (SAT) instruction necessitates the proactive modulation of 
response strategy over the longer-term. Additionally, while various models of SAT have been 
proposed, most theories posit that these trade-offs involve the adaptation of the response 
threshold of decision-related mechanisms to create more (or less) conservative responding 
(see Bogacz, Wagenmakers, Forstmann & Nieuwenhuis, 2009; van Veen, Krug & Carter, 
2008; Wenzlaff, Bauer, Maess, & Heekeren, 2011). Therefore, in line with previous 
suggestions (West et al., 2010), it was hypothesised that increased depressive symptoms 
would be related to the impaired implementation of these explicit, proactive adjustments. 
 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
72 individuals (mean age = 21.4, S.D. = 3.1, 53 females), recruited from the University of St 
Andrews subject pool (~50% answering advertisement seeking “low mood” participants), 
participated for course credits or cash reimbursement (£5/hour). Nine participants were 
excluded due to either non-compliance with experimental procedure (3 participants); 
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withdrawal before study completion (1 participant) or currently taking psychoactive 
medication (5 participants). 
 Three groups were formed depending on Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, 
Steer & Brown, 1996) score. The low BDI-II group included all participants scoring below 7 
(25 participants; mean BDI-II = 2.7, range = 0- ). Participants scoring ≥ 17 were included in 
the high BDI-II group (19 participants; mean BDI-II = 25.7, range = 18-38) as this score 
yields a high true-positive rate (see Beck et al., 1996). Importantly, this method ensured that 
the highest symptom group had similar mean BDI-II scores as Major Depressive Disorder 
groups selected by clinical interview in similar experiments (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 
2008).  While previous research has often discarded medium scorers (e.g., Compton et al., 
2008; Watson, Dritschel, Jentzsch, & Obonsawin, 2008) a sufficient number were collected to 
permit their inclusion in the analyses (19 participants, mean BDI-II = 10.6, range = 7-16). 
Groups did not differ on mean age, F(2, 60) = 1.60, p > .10, or gender, χ2(2, N = 63) = 4.08, p 
>.10. Additionally, the State and Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait (STAI-T; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) served as a measure of trait anxiety. BDI-II scores 
were highly correlated with STAI-T scores, r = .878, p <.01. All participants gave informed 
consent, spoke English fluently and were tested in a single session. 
5.2.2 Apparatus and Stimuli 
The stimuli were presented centrally on a 17-in. CRT monitor controlled by an IBM-
compatible personal computer. Two response keypads were used with one keypad assigned to 
each participant. Each keypad had two response keys, mounted 15 cm apart in the horizontal 
plane of the participant. The classic Stroop task consisted of the words ‘B UE’ and ‘RED’ 
presented in either blue or red font. The emotional-face Stroop comprised 16 face stimuli (4 
male, 4 female, showing either happy or sad expressions; Ekman & Friessen, 1976). Images 
were masked to remove hair, body and background details. Either the word “HAPPY” or 
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“SAD” was printed beneath each face. All words were presented in capital letters, each letter 
measuring approximately 10 x 7 mm. The masked faces measured approximately 50 x 30 
mm. 
5.2.3 Procedure 
Task (classic or emotional) and SAT instruction (fast or accurate) was manipulated 
within-subjects and between blocks (4 block conditions). Each block condition contained 384 
trials (with rests after every 96 trials). Half of the participants first completed the classic 
Stroop task, the remainder began with the emotional-face Stroop. SAT instructions were 
balanced across participants within each task. In the classic Stroop task participants were 
instructed: “Please respond to the PRINTED colour of the words as ACCURATELY as 
possible”. For blocks in which speed was instructed, the word “ACCURATE Y” was 
replaced with “QUICK Y”. In the emotional-face Stroop task the instructions were: “Please 
respond to the EMOTION expressed by the face as… QUICKLY [or] ACCURATELY…as 
possible”. After being instructed participants completed 10 practice trials per condition and 
then completed the main experimental blocks. 
Participants were seated in a darkened testing booth approximately 80cm from the 
computer screen.   Responses were made with left and right key presses using the left and 
right index fingers, respectively. Responses were made to the font colour of the word (classic 
Stroop task) and to the emotional expression of the face (emotional-face Stroop task). 
Assignment of targets to response alternatives was balanced across participants. Stimuli were 
presented until response (max. 1500 ms), after which a fixation point appeared for 1650 ms 
between trials. Lastly, the BDI-II and STAI-T were administered. 
 
 
143 
 
5.3 Results 
 
Only RTs between 100 and 1500 ms in trials N-1, and N were considered correct. Trials 
with missing, too slow or too fast responses (< 1%) in trials N-1 and/or trial N were 
discarded. Error responses in trial N or N-1 were discarded from RT analyses. 
An initial omnibus ANOVA revealed an interaction between Task, Group, Previous 
Compatibility and Current Compatibility, F(2, 60) = 4.00, p = .023, ηp2 = .12, suggesting that 
performance in the two paradigms was not equal across groups. Thus, subsequent analyses 
were conducted for each task separately. Importantly, in order to report the critical speed-
accuracy manipulation the SAT factor was retained in the task-wise analyses. Consequently, 
RTs and choice-error rates were subjected to separate repeated measures ANOVAs for the 
emotional and classic Stroop tasks
13
. The within-subjects variables were SAT instructions 
(speed vs. accuracy); Previous Compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible); and Current 
Compatibility. The between-subjects factor was Group (Low, Medium, High BDI-II score). 
Bonferroni corrected p-values are presented for post-hoc tests. 
 
                                                 
13
 As depression has been associated with mood-congruent attentional biases, it may be suggested that elevated 
BDI-II groups would have higher interference effects than the lower BDI-II participants when the conflicting, 
irrelevant word in the emotional-face Stroop task is negative (e.g., positive face, negative word compared with 
positive face, positive word), but not when positive (negative face, positive word compared with negative face, 
negative word). However, no differences were found between groups on interference effects when distractor 
words were negative (ps > .10) or positive (ps > .10). Similarly, when previous target emotion and current target 
emotion were entered as factors in the analyses we found no emotion-specific influence on the CSEs (all ps > 
.10).  
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5.3.1 Classic Stroop task 
Reaction times. Responses were faster under speed (366 ms) than accuracy instructions 
(427 ms); F(1, 60) = 61.09, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .50.  Importantly, this difference was not 
modulated by group, F(2, 60) < .70, p > .50 (see Figure 14). 
RTs were higher for incompatible (405 ms) than compatible trials (388 ms) F(1, 60) = 
56.15, p< .001, ηp
2
 = .48 and this compatibility effect was larger under accuracy than speed 
instructions, F(1, 60) = 16.16, p< .001, ηp
2
 = .21. RTs also showed a main effect of previous 
compatibility, F(1, 60) = 5.57, p = .022, ηp
2
 = .09, due to slightly faster RTs after compatible 
than incompatible trials. The effect of current compatibility did not interact with group, F(2, 
60) < .03, p> .97, indicating that Stroop effects (incompatible minus compatible) did not 
differ as a function of group in the classic Stroop task. 
Importantly, previous and current trial compatibility interacted, F(1, 60) = 28.77, ps < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .34. That is, the Stroop effect was smaller following incompatible (11 ms) than 
compatible trials (25 ms). This congruency sequence effect (CSE) was further modulated by 
SAT, F(1, 60) = 10.96, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .15; the CSE was present only under accuracy, F(1, 60) 
= 30.26, p< .001, ηp
2
 = .34, but not speed instructions, F(1, 60) = 3.69, p = .12, ηp
2
 = .06. 
Importantly, the CSE did not interact with group, F(2, 60) = .16, p> .85
14 
(this was also the 
case when CSE analyses only included the accuracy condition: Group x CSE, F < 1, ns.). 
Therefore, groups did not differ in their ability to make these reactive cognitive control 
adjustments, see Figure 15 (gray bars), and Table 5. No other effects were significant. 
 
 
                                                 
14
 CSEs remained when repetitions were excluded, F = 6.74, p = .012, no interactions with group emerged 
during this analysis (ps > .10). 
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Choice error rates. Responses were more error prone under speed (6.2%) than 
accuracy instructions (2.6%); F(1, 60) = 40.65, p< .001, ηp
2
 = .40. Together with the RT 
findings, this result confirms that the manipulation of SAT was successful in the classic 
Stroop task. Importantly, this SAT effect was not modulated by group, F(2, 60) = .77, p > .47, 
suggesting the high BDI-II group had no detectable impairment in implementing these 
proactive adjustments (see Figure 14). 
 
 
Table 5 Summary of mean RTs [ms] and choice error rates [%] in the Classic Stroop task 
 
  
BDI-II GROUP 
LOW  MEDIUM  HIGH 
          
Instruction Seq. RT [ms] errors [%]   RT [ms] errors [%]   RT [ms] errors [%] 
          
Speed cC 349 6.5  348 4.9  381 6.3 
 cI 358 8.7  365 5.9  396 8.1 
 iC 349 7.6  353 5.0  381 6.5 
 iI 358 6.3  365 4.4  384 8.6 
          
Accuracy cC 405 2.3  392 1.5  439 1.5 
 cI 443 4.4  425 3.3  474 3.8 
 iC 408 2.7  398 1.8  448 2.4 
 iI 421 3.8  410 2.6  464 3.1 
                    
Note. 'Seq.' denotes trial compatibility sequence, lower 
case i/c and upper-case I/C indicate the compatibility level 
on trial N-1 and N, respectively.     
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Figure 15: Mean RT (top) and error rates (bottom) as a function of SAT instruction (Speed 
vs. Accuracy) and Group. Error bars depict S.E.M. As no group differences emerged in the 
SAT effect for either task, means were collapsed across tasks for purposes of these figures 
only. 
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Error rates were higher for incompatible (5.1%) than compatible trials (3.7%), F(1, 60) 
= 15.69, p< .001, ηp
2
 = .21. This Stroop effect did not interact with group, F(2, 60) = .71, p > 
.49. Importantly, previous and current trial compatibility interacted, F(1, 60) = 5.94, p = .018, 
ηp
2
 = .09; the Stroop effect was smaller following incompatible (0.9%) than compatible trials 
(2.0%). As with RTs, this CSE did not interact with group, all F(2, 60) = 1.23, p> .49 (see 
Table 5). No other effects reached significance. 
 
 
5.3.2 Emotional-face Stroop task 
Reaction times. Responses were faster under speed (469 ms) than accuracy instructions 
(556 ms), F(1, 60) = 71.85, p< .001, ηp
2
 = .55, however, this effect did not interact with 
group, (F < 1, p> .10; see Figure 14). RTs were higher for incompatible (523 ms) than 
compatible (502 ms) trials, indicating the presence of a Stroop effect (incompatible minus 
compatible), F(1, 60) = 60.10 , p < .001, ηp
2
 = .50, which was slightly larger under accuracy 
(24 ms) than speed instructions (17 ms), F(1, 60) = 5.64, p = .021, ηp
2
 = .09. This 
compatibility effect did not interact with group, F(2, 60) = 1.63, p> .20. Previous and current 
trial compatibility tended to interact, F(1, 60) > 2.87, p = .095, ηp
2
 = .05, indicating the 
presence of CSE effect. This CSE further interacted with SAT, F(1, 60) = 5.13, p = .027, ηp
2
 = 
0.08; due to control adjustments occurring only under accuracy, F(1, 60) = 6.68, p = .024, ηp
2
 
= .10, but not speed instructions, F< 1, p > .10. 
Importantly for the current hypotheses, BDI-II group interacted with the CSE, F(2, 60) 
= 6.26, p = .003, ηp
2
 = 0.17
15
, indicating that emotional conflict resolution differed between 
groups. Although the inclusion of SAT was not strictly justified by a 5 way interaction in the 
original omnibus ANOVA, it is clear from inspection of the means (see Table 6) that the 
                                                 
15
 This effect remained when repetitions were excluded from the analyses, F = 4.69, p = .013. 
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group difference was restricted to the accuracy instructions. This observation was qualified by 
a significant 4-way interaction between SAT, Group and the CSE, F (2, 60) = 4.12, p = .021, 
ηp
2
 = 0.12
16
. Further post-hoc tests confirmed that the interaction between CSEs and group 
was only present under accuracy, F(2, 60) = 8.32, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .22, but not speed 
instructions, F(2, 60) = 0.82, p = .45, ηp
2
 = .026. Specifically, CSEs ([Stroop effect after 
previous compatible trials] minus [Stroop effect after previous incompatible trials]) in the 
accuracy condition were reduced in the high (-13 ms) compared to both the low (15 ms), t(42)  
= 2.62, p = .036, d = 0.80, and medium BDI-II group (31 ms), t(36) = 4.24, p< .001, d = 1.44,  
no difference between the low and medium BDI-II group was found (p> .10), see Figure 15 
and Table 6. No other main effects or interactions were significant.   
Choice error rates. Responses were more error prone under speed (10.7%) than 
accuracy instructions (4.7%), F(1, 60) = 60.09, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .50, indicating that the SAT 
manipulation was also successful in the emotional-face Stroop task. Importantly, this SAT 
effect was not modulated by group, (F(2, 60) =.47, p> .62; see Figure 14). Error rates were 
higher for incompatible trials (9.6%) than compatible trials (5.9%), indicating the presence of 
a Stroop effect, F(1, 60) = 72.78, p< .001, ηp
2
 = .55, which was larger under speed than 
accuracy instructions, F(1, 60) = 21.38, p< .001, ηp
2
 = .26. Error rates also showed a main 
effect of previous compatibility, F(1, 65) = 5.25, p = .026, ηp
2
= .08 due to very slightly higher 
error rates after compatible (8.0%) than incompatible (7.4%) trials. Neither the Stroop nor the 
effect of previous compatibility interacted with group, both Fs(2, 60) < .43, ps> .64.  Previous 
and current trial compatibility interacted in error rates, F(1, 60) > 27.94, p< .001, ηp
2
 = .31, 
                                                 
16
 This four-way interaction persisted when the medium BDI-II group was removed from the analyses, F(1, 42) 
= 6.39, p = .015, and when the participants were split into minimal (BDI-II <13) and elevated scorers (BDI-II ≥ 
13), F(1, 61) = 4.17, p = .046,  as in Holmes & Pizzagalli (2007). 
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indicating the presence of a CSE, however, this did not interact with group, see Table 2. No 
other main effects or interactions were significant.   
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Figure 16: Mean RT CSEs in the accuracy condition of both the classic (gray bars) and the 
emotional-face Stroop (white bars) task. CSEs were calculated as (Stroop effect after 
previous compatible trials) minus (Stroop effect after previous incompatible trials), therefore, 
positive values indicate a reduction in the Stroop effect after conflict.  Error bars depict the 
standard error of the mean. 
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Table 6: Summary of mean RTs [ms] and choice error rates [%] in the Emotional-face Stroop 
task 
 
  
BDI-II GROUP 
LOW  MEDIUM  HIGH 
          
Instruction Seq. RT [ms] errors [%]   RT [ms] errors [%]   RT [ms] errors [%] 
          
Speed cC 448 7.9  450 6.8  488 9.3 
 cI 460 13.1  475 13.7  498 16.3 
 iC 444 9.1  452 7.0  482 10.2 
 iI 463 11.1  473 11.0  495 13.3 
          
Accuracy cC 513 3.5  532 3.5  572 3.7 
 cI 540 7.1  579 6.2  589 8.0 
 iC 526 4.3  551 3.6  567 4.2 
 iI 537 5.3  567 4.7  597 5.5 
                    
Note. 'Seq.' denotes trial compatibility sequence, lower-
case i/c and upper-case I/C indicate the compatibility 
level on trial N-1 and N, respectively.     
 
 
5.4. Discussion 
 
 
The study presented in the current chapter assessed the functioning of reactive and proactive 
cognitive control mechanisms, as well as the resolution of affective conflict in participant 
groups with varying levels of sub-clinical depressive symptoms. One novel result of the 
current investigation was that long-term SAT adjustments did not differ between groups, 
suggesting the spared implementation proactive control adjustments across the range of 
participants included in the current study. Secondly, since most metrics of reactive control 
(Stroop interference in both tasks and CSEs in the classic, colour-word Stroop paradigm) did 
not differ between groups, the current results do not support the idea of a general impairment 
in reactive control in individuals with elevated levels of depressive symptoms. Conversely, 
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the highest BDI-II group was associated with selectively impaired CSEs in the affective 
Stroop task. Specifically, while high BDI-II scorers did not differ from low and medium range 
participants on the overall Stroop effects in the emotional-face task, they demonstrated a 
highly selective impairment in the ability to resolve conflict arising in this affective paradigm. 
In light of existing proposals that negative affect might impair proactive cognitive 
control processes (Braver et al., 2007; West et al., 2010), SAT adjustments were predicted to 
be impaired in the high symptom group of the current study, however, this was not the case. 
These results challenge recent interpretations of psychophysiological data (West et al., 2010) 
where increased depressive symptoms were associated with the reducing amplitude of an ERP 
(pre-stimulus slow wave) related to proactive control. In contrast to this prior investigation, 
however, participants in the current study were given explicit, external performance goals to 
maintain over time (e.g., “respond as accurately as possible”), allowing preparatory control 
processes to be behaviourally quantified. On the other hand, West et al. (2010) interpreted the 
attenuation of the pre-stimulus slow wave as being diagnostic of impaired proactive control, 
however, they found no behavioural differences associated with increased depressive 
symptoms. Importantly, as pre-stimulus slow waves have been related to both motoric 
(preparatory activation preceding an imperative stimulus, Leuthold et al., 2004), and non-
motoric processes (general anticipatory processes preceding a stimulus, van Boxtel & Bocker, 
2004), reduced pre-stimulus slow wave activity alone does not unequivocally permit the 
conclusion that preparatory control processes are compromised in a specific group of 
individuals. 
Secondly, little evidence was found for generally impaired reactive cognitive control for 
participants with increased depressive symptoms. These results are in line with previous 
reports of unimpaired Stroop interference in a range of clinical and subclinical participant 
cohorts using non-emotional troop paradigms (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Meiran et al., 
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2011; West et al., 2010). Furthermore, CSE impairments were not associated with increasing 
BDI-II score in the classic Stroop task, this result is also consistent with similar findings 
reported in other investigations (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Ng et al., 2012; West et al., 
2010). Furthermore, when the current analyses controlled for potential mnemonic 
contributors to the CSE (c.f., Mayr et al., 2003) or restricted analyses to post-conflict 
performance benefits on incompatible trials alone (i.e., RT cI minus iI; c.f., Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2007), significant and BDI-II group independent, CSEs remained, indicating that 
conflict adaptation processes contributed to the observed effects (see also, Egner, 2007; 
Ullsperger et al., 2005). Finally, Schlaghecken and Martini (2012) recently proposed that 
CSEs are mainly driven by faster responses on cC compared to iC trials, indicating that CSEs 
may be driven mainly by speeding on sequences of conflict-free trials and not adaptation after 
conflict rich-trials. In the current study, however, no evidence for asymmetrical effects of 
previous conflict on subsequent compatible or incompatible trials was observed
17
. Therefore, 
despite finding robust Stroop interference effects and CSEs, significant depressive-symptom 
related impairments in reactive control were not apparent in the classic Stroop task.  
As prior investigations have reported  impaired CSEs in participant groups with 
increased depressive symptoms (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; 
Meiran et al., 2011), it is necessary to consider why discrepant results might occur between 
investigations. First, considering the current sample, a larger cohort of high symptom scorers 
was included in the current chapter than that of previous investigations which uncovered CSE 
impairments in depressed groups (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007: N = 13; Meiran et al., 2011: N 
= 9). Additionally, the High BDI-II sample in the current study reported numerically higher 
                                                 
17
 We re-analysed our data using the method of Schlaghecken and Martini (2012), focusing on the critical 
response alternation conditions. Importantly, we did not find any significant interactions between compatibility 
sequence and current compatibility for either task (all ps > .10). Therefore, significant support for context 
adaptation did not existwithin our current data. 
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depressive symptoms than the sample of Holmes and Pizzagalli (2007).  Consequently, basic 
variations in study sample size and depressive-symptom severity between cohorts do not 
provide compelling explanations for the divergence of results across studies. Furthermore, 
prior reports biased the proportion of conflict trials either towards compatible (Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2007) or incompatible stimuli (Meiran et al., 2011). Such frequency manipulations 
were avoided in the current investigation as they bias performance towards reactive and 
proactive control modes, respectively (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012; De Pisapia & 
Braver, 2006). It should be noted, however, that studies including such frequency 
manipulations also often fail to find general depression-related CSE impairments in the 
classic Stroop task (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008), the Simon task (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007) 
and in a counting Stroop task (West et al., 2010). Therefore, given the results from both the 
current study and that of prior investigations, depressive symptomatology does not appear to 
be associated with particularly robust or easily replicable impairments in reactive cognitive 
control. Additionally, these findings are also in line with the posterror adaptation results 
presented in Chapter 4 of the current thesis. More specifically, similar conflict monitoring 
processes (facilitated by fronto-cingulate brain areas) are proposed to underlie reactive 
cognitive control adjustments after conflict and errors (c.f., Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). Consequently, spared posterror (Chapter 4) and post-conflict 
(present chapter) adjustments converge to suggest the adequate functioning of these reactive 
control mechanisms in participants with elevated levels of depressive symptoms. 
 Most important for present purpose, CSEs were reduced in the highest depressive 
symptom group during the emotional-face Stroop task performance compared to participants 
with lower levels of depressive symptoms. Furthermore, as an affect-specific mechanism 
putatively underlies the regulation of interference caused by emotional distractors (Etkin et 
al., 2006; Egner et al., 2008; Maier & di Pellegrino, 2012; Soutscheck & Schubert, 2013). 
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Thus, a specific impairment in such affective-regulatory processes provides a plausible 
explanation for the observed differences between groups in the current study. In line with this 
hypothesis, Holmes and Pizzagalli (2007) reported CSE impairments for elevated BDI-II 
scorers when blocks of Stroop and Simon performance were preceded by negative emotional 
feedback. Therefore, converging evidence suggests that impaired reactive control adjustments 
may become more apparent for participants with increasing depressive symptomatology in 
tasks which require the concurrent processing (and regulation) of affective information. On a 
neuroanatomical level, () the functioning of the rostral ACC is central to the resolution of 
emotional conflict in the emotional-face Stroop task (Etkin et al., 2006; Egner et al., 2008; 
Maier & di Pellegrino, 2012). As previous studies have reported dysfunction of the rostral 
ACC in depressed groups for tasks which require the inhibition of emotional information 
processing (e.g., Eugène et al., 2010; Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008), it is plausible that the 
impairment observed in the high BDI-II group may result from the dysfunction of this neural 
structure.  Importantly, however, on-going functional neuroimaging research should aim to 
clarify this relationship. It should also be noted that despite frequently being associated with 
the dysfunction of the neural correlates of cognitive control (George et al., 1997; Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2008; Pizzagalli, 2011; West et al., 2010), studies often do not report behavioural 
differences between depressed and non-depressed groups during the performance of classic 
conflict paradigms. Consequently, it seems imperative that future research aims to account for 
which neural abnormalities correlated with depressive symptoms are predictive of measurable 
behavioural impairments. 
Some differences between the classic, colour-word and emotional-face Stroop should 
be discussed when evaluating the associations between depressive symptomatology and CSEs 
during each paradigm. First, as exact stimulus repetitions occurred in the classic Stroop task 
more frequently than in the emotional-face Stroop, the spared ability to make control 
155 
 
adjustments across BDI-II range in the classic Stroop may be in part explained by the higher 
number of exact stimulus repetitions occurring in this paradigm. Importantly, however, as 
group differences did not emerge on the classic Stroop even when such repetitions were 
excluded, stimulus-specific priming effects cannot explain the spared CSE observed in the 
high BDI-II group.  Furthermore, as RTs and error-rates were generally higher in the affective 
than the classic Stroop task, suggesting that emotional-face Stroop task performance was 
more difficult, group differences perhaps emerged on the more difficult task, irrespective of 
emotion. In an attempt to resolve this problem, a “matched” non-emotional face-Stroop task 
(i.e., naming the sex of a face with either compatible/incompatible irrelevant words) may be 
recommended instead of the classic Stroop paradigm. Existing research comparing such non-
emotional and emotional face-Stroop performance, however, has consistently found increased 
RT and error rates in the emotional compared to the non-emotional task (see Egner et al., 
2008; Maier & di Pellegrino, 2012; Monti et al., 2010; Soutschek & Schubert, 2013, see also 
similar differences occur in the non-emotional vs. emotional flanker task, Samanez-Larkin, 
Robertson, Mikels, Carstensen, & Gotlib, 2009). Therefore, regardless of their apparent 
similarities, affective interference tasks may be generally more difficult than their non-
emotional counterparts. Important for current concerns, while participants with elevated 
depressive symptoms demonstrated impaired CSEs in the emotional-face Stroop task, overall 
RTs, error rates, and Stroop effects did not differ between the High BDI-II group and other 
participant groups, proposing that the observed impairment  was highly specific to 
interference resolution and not to a general impairment in task performance. 
Finally, some characteristics of the current sample should be noted when relating the 
current results to the extant literature. Firstly, in the current sample BDI-II scores were highly 
correlated with trait anxiety (STAI-T), thus very strong distinctions between a depression-
specific result and one driven by general negative affect (common to both depression and 
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anxiety) are not possible with the current data. High correlations between depressive and 
anxious symptoms occur frequently, and clinical depression uncomplicated by such 
comorbidity is particularly rare (see Hirschfeld, 2001). Thus, the current high BDI-II group is 
not unrepresentative of typical cohorts with increased depressive symptoms. Furthermore, as 
the current study included a sub-clinical sample, differences not apparent in our experiment 
may only emerge in more severe clinically depressed samples. However, although sub-
clinical, the high BDI-II group in the current study reported moderate to severe levels of 
depressive symptoms (Beck et al., 1996). Therefore, as BDI-II scores correlate highly with 
other well-validated measures used to generate clinical diagnoses of depression (Beck et al., 
1996; Sprinkle et al., 2002), the present data proposes that impairments in reactive control 
may only occur in those reporting very severe symptoms. Secondly, antidepressant 
medication has been demonstrated to have a profound effect on emotional information 
processing (see Merens, Van der Does & Spinhoven, 2007). Importantly, as none of the 
participants in the current study reported taking anti-depressant medication at the time of 
testing, emotional processing was not confounded by current medication status. Interestingly, 
medication status may explain differences between the results of the current study and that of 
De Lissneyder et al., (2012) who reported general cognitive control impairments, with no 
emotion-specific impairment, during performance of the Internal Shift Task in a clinically 
depressed sample, however, their study included a majority medicated depressed group 
(85%), perhaps explaining the lack of emotion-specific effects. 
In conclusion, the current study provides important insights into the functioning of 
executive control processes in participant groups with increased depressive symptoms. First, 
to my knowledge the current study is the first to report that the maintenance of proactive 
speed-accuracy trade-offs are unimpaired across a range of depressive symptoms. Secondly, 
as most aspects of reactive control (e.g., Stroop interference effects and the CSEs in the 
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classic task) were unimpaired in all groups, the current findings do not support the idea of 
generally impaired reactive control in depression (see also Chapter 4 for a similar suggestion 
regarding reactive posterror adjustments). In contrast, high BDI-II scorers in the current study 
demonstrated a selective impairment in the ability to resolve emotional conflict. Together 
with a prior report of reduced post-conflict adjustments in depression when the task 
performance was paired with negative emotional feedback (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007), 
converging evidence suggests that reactive, trial-to-trial control impairments occur in 
depression particularly when task demands require the concurrent regulation of emotional 
information processing. Future work should investigate the nature of such emotion-cognition 
interactions in relation to vulnerability to the onset and subsequent duration of depressive 
episodes. 
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6 
Depressive symptoms and task preparation in the face of emotional distraction: 
An ERP study.  
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6.1 Introduction 
Effective performance of everyday tasks requires the ability to direct attention towards goal-
relevant information in the environment, whilst ignoring task-irrelevant and potentially 
distracting environmental noise. Highly affective signals, such as emotional facial 
expressions, appear to be particularly salient distractors with several authors suggesting such 
emotional information gains privileged access to information processing (see Hodsoll et al., 
2011; Reeck & Egner, 2011). Importantly, while initial orienting towards aversive stimuli 
may motivate adaptive responses in certain circumstances (cf. Gray, 2004; Pourtois, Schettino 
&Vuilleumier, 2013), the involuntary allocation of attention towards affective distractions 
might confer significant costs on non-emotional aspects of task performance (Dolcos & 
Mcarthy, 2006; Hodsoll et al., 2011; Reeck & Egner, 2011; Siegle et al., 2002). Furthermore, 
disruptive interactions between cognition and emotion may be particularly debilitating for 
individuals with emotional disorders (cf. Banich, Mackiewicz, Depue, Whitmer, Miller & 
Heller, 2009; Mayberg, 1997; Roiser & Sahakian, 2013), who are characterised by the 
inability to disengage from, or inhibit the processing of, concern-related material (Joorman, 
2004; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Koster et al., 2011). Consequently, the purpose of the 
current investigation was to explore the potentially disruptive interaction between increased 
engagement with task-irrelevant affective material and non-emotional task-relevant material 
in participants with elevated levels of depressive symptoms.  
Recently, Banich et al. (2009) noted that few studies have investigated executive 
processes in depression when task-relevant information must be utilized across a delay period 
despite the presence of emotional distractors. Interestingly, emerging consensus suggests 
negative material is preferentially processed in depression when such concern-related 
information is presented for longer stimulus durations (Bradley et al., 1997; Gotlib et al., 
2004; Koster et al., 2005), perhaps because affective biases in depression involve elaborative, 
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self-referential processing of concern-related material, as opposed to the rapid, pre-attentive 
bias towards negative or threat-related stimuli which might characterise anxiety (cf. Bradley 
et al., 1997; De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Consequently, it is predicted 
that affective distractors will interfere with goal-directed, preparatory attentional processes in 
depression when task-irrelevant emotional stimuli are presented for long stimulus durations in 
advance of non-emotional target stimuli. A novel cued RT procedure was designed in the 
current study to test this hypothesis. In this protocol an initial cue (the frame surrounding an 
affective portrait) indicated the response set required (easy or difficult stimulus 
categorization) to targets presented after a delay period. An affective distraction dimension 
was added to the task by pairing task-irrelevant emotionally expressive faces with the onset of 
the task cue. Importantly, in the current task participants with elevated depressive symptoms 
are predicted to experience difficulty disengaging from negative emotional stimuli (cf. Koster 
et al., 2005; Koster et al., 2011), impairing responses to subsequent targets. Furthermore, 
independent of affective distraction, depression has previously been associated with impaired 
performance as a function of increasingly effortful tasks (Hartlage et al., 1993; Schroder et 
al., 2013). Thus, the difficulty manipulation was motivated as a further assessment of effortful 
cognitive performance as a function of increasing depressive symptoms. 
In addition to behavioural performance measures, ERPs relating to both perceptual and 
central stages of information processing were compared across participant groups. ERPs are 
particularly beneficial to the study of biased attentional processing as the first point of 
differentiation between waveforms elicited by two conditions (i.e., positive vs. negative 
distractors) provides the “upper bound” time at which attentional processes vary as a function 
of a given variable (Luck et al., 2000). Thus, a primary aim of the current study was to utilize 
the high temporal resolution of ERPs to assess the time-course of differential processing of 
affective distractors as a function of increasing depressive symptoms. Two early (P1 and 
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N170) ERPs will serve as indices of initial cue-related processing of the task-irrelevant 
emotional face to assess depression-specific early attentional biases.  The possibility of 
impaired disengagement (cf. Koster et al., 2005; Koster et al., 2011) from negative 
information in the elevated depression groups could also impair preparatory processes in 
anticipation of upcoming targets, attenuating an ERP (i.e., the Contingent Negative Variation; 
CNV) which develops during the cue-target interval before the upcoming target. Finally, 
target-related ERPs (P1, N1, P300) will serve as a neurophysiological measure of the 
efficiency of target processing as a function of cue condition and group.  
 
6.1.1. Cue-related early attentional ERP components. 
Although not face-specific (cf. Rossion & Jacques, 2008), the P1 maximal over 
posterior occipital electrode sites appears to reflect face-sensitive modulation of early 
perceptual processes (Batty & Taylor, 2003; Kolassa et al., 2007; Jaworska et al., 2012). On 
an individual difference level, generally increased P1 amplitudes have been reported in 
socially phobic participants during serial viewing of emotional faces, suggesting that these 
groups are characterised by hyper-vigilant attentional monitoring when up-coming stimuli are 
potentially concern-related (Kolassa & Miltner, 2006; Kolassa, Kolassa, Musial, & Miltner, 
2007). Important for current purposes, interpersonal signals conveyed by emotional 
expressions are purportedly concerning for individuals with increased depressive symptoms 
(Gotlib et al., 2004). Therefore, depression could be associated with hyperactive monitoring 
(P1 potentiation) in the context of emotional face processing. 
The N170 is a face-specific negative deflection in the ERP occurring between 130-190 
ms after stimulus onset at bilateral temporo-occipital electrode sites (Bentin, Allison, Puce, 
Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Botzel, Schulze, & Stodieck, 1995; Schweinberger, Pickering, 
Jentzsch, Burton & Kaufmann, 2002). Important for current concerns, several authors have 
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suggested that the N170 is modulated by emotional facial expressions, often demonstrating 
larger amplitudes for negative expressions (e.g., Batty & Taylor, 2003; Blau, Maurer, 
Tottenham & McCandliss, 2007; Kolassa, Kolassa, Musial & Miltner, 2007; Kolassa et al., 
2009; Martens, Leuthold & Schweinberger, 2010; but see Eimer & Holmes, 2002; Eimer, 
Holmes & McGlone, 2003). Additionally, the N170 is affected by the increasing emotional 
intensity of facial expressions, indicating that saliency of expression might be coded at early 
processing stages (Sprengelmeyer & Jentzsch, 2006). Supporting this suggestion, the N170 is 
larger to fearful (i.e., concern-related) faces in social phobia (Kolassa & Miltner, 2006) and in 
participants who anticipate imminently giving a public speech (Wieser, Pauli, Reicherts, & 
Muhlberger, 2010). I am aware of only two studies that report the N170 in depressed 
participants (Foti, Olvet, Klein, & Hajcak, 2010
1
; Jaworska, Blier, Fusee, & Knott, 2012). 
Importantly, neither study reported increased N170 amplitudes to negative emotional 
expressions in depressed compared to control participants.  
In summary, although these early ERP components seem sensitive to emotional 
information and concern-related affective signals, there are a number of studies suggesting 
that depression-specific attentional biases do not affect early attentional processes (Bradley et 
al., 1997; Koster et al., 2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2005) and should, therefore, not affect these 
early ERP components in the current study. 
6.1.1 Cue-related ERP correlates of preparatory processes in task anticipation 
Some researchers have suggested that participants with elevated depressive symptoms 
experience difficulties disengaging from negative material (cf. Koster et al., 2005; Koster et 
al., 2011). Such difficulty might potentially attenuate adaptive processes which develop in 
anticipation of an up-coming target during the cue-target interval. The contingent-negative 
variation (CNV; Walter et al., 1964) reflects a sustained negativity observed in cued-RT tasks 
in which a cue or warning stimulus is followed by a target or imperative stimulus. The CNV 
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reaches maximal negativity immediately prior to target onset, and has been related to both 
preparatory-motoric (see Leuthold et al., 2004; Mackay & Bonnet, 1990) and anticipatory-
attentional (see van Boxtel & Bocker, 2004; Falkenstein et al., 2003) processes developing 
during the cue-target interval. Consequently, impaired disengagement from affective 
distractors in elevated depression (cf. Koster et al., 2011) is predicted to reduce task-relevant 
anticipatory/preparatory processes during the cue-target interval, resulting in attenuated CNV 
amplitudes.  As a secondary goal, the current study assessed the influence of cued task 
difficulty on CNV amplitude. The CNV has previously been related to cognitive-resource 
mobilization (cf. Falkenstein et al., 2003), thus, in the current experiment the CNV was 
predicted to be largest when cues indicate upcoming difficult (resource demanding) rather 
than easy targets.  
6.1.3 Target-related ERP components 
Impaired preparatory processes during the cue-target interval are expected to have 
harmful effects on target processing. Consequently, the target N1, P1 and P300 were analysed 
as ERP measures of target processing. The P1 and N1 components have previously been 
associated with early attentional processes during choice RT performance (cf. Handy & 
Mangun, 2000; Vogel & Luck, 2000), thus the amplitude of these components might be 
attenuated if target based attention is impaired by emotional distraction. The latency of the 
P300 is sensitive to the duration of stimulus categorization or evaluation processes (Kutas, 
McCarthy & Donchin, 1977; Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Polich, 2007) and 
also to the efficiency of cognitive performance (Polich & Kok, 1995; Polich, 1991). In the 
current context peak latency of the P300 should be delayed for difficult compared to easy 
stimulus categorizations, and also when attention is distracted from the target by irrelevant 
emotional stimuli, particularly in participants with elevated depression levels. 
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6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
48 participants contributed data to the experiment. Data from 8 participants were 
excluded either due to the individual currently taking anti-depressant medication (6 
participants) or committing too many errors during the experiment (>40%, 2 participants). 
Subsequently, two groups were formed using a median split on the sample’s range on the 
Major Depression Inventory (see Chapter 3: General Methods) forming Low (MDI ≤ 17; 
mean MDI = 9.0, range = 2-17) and High (MDI > 17; mean MDI = 27.1, range = 18-40) 
depressive symptom groups. According to a previous validation of the MDI, mean depressive 
symptom levels in the high MDI group in the current study might be described as “moderate” 
to “marked” (Bech et al., 2001). All participants gave informed consent, received course 
credit or £10 reimbursement and were tested in a single 2hr session (including EEG 
application, experiment and questionnaires). Participant groups did not differ on age or 
gender distribution, see Table 7. However, participant groups did differ on levels of trait 
anxiety (STAI-T score, see Chapter 2: General Methods). Additionally, the STAI-T was 
strongly correlated with MDI score, r (38) = .706, p < .001 
 
Table 7: Sample characteristics for the Low and High MDI groups. 
  Group   
Characteristic Low MDI                           High MDI                           Group Difference 
Age 22.8 20.7 p > .10 
MDI 9.4 27.0 p < .001 
STAIT-T 39.3 52.4 p < .001 
%Female 65% 65%  
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6.2.2 Apparatus and Stimuli 
Information regarding EEG apparatus, stimulus presentation software and the testing 
environments is presented in the General Methods (see Chapter 2).  
The face stimuli consisted of 32 greyscale faces (equal numbers of males and females 
with 2 expressions (happy, sad) per identity) taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional 
Faces set (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). A black frame (119 x 155 pixels), either solid 
or dashed, surrounded each face (see Figure 16). Target stimuli (M, T, 4 or 8) were 
surrounded by frames identical to the preceding cue frames. Both emotional faces (cue 
period) and target stimuli (target period) were presented in the centre of the frame. All stimuli 
were presented on a constant light grey background.  
6.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were first prepared for EEG recording outside the recording booth. Two 
types of cue frames provided advance information about an upcoming A) easy task 
(categorizable mapping; numbers (4, 8)  left hand, letters (M, T)  right hand) or B) 
difficult task (non-categorizable mapping; 4 and T  left hand, 8 and M  right hand). 
Before the experiment participants were instructed on the stimulus-response mapping 
associated with each cue type (i.e., solid or dashed frame), but were not informed that these 
task types would be ‘easy’ or ‘difficult’. A task-irrelevant emotional face was presented 
together with the cue frame for a total of 2000 ms, and subsequently replaced by the target. At 
target onset the frame remained on the screen, however, the irrelevant face was replaced by 
the target letters/numbers, see also Figure 16. All stimulus types (frame type, face gender, 
emotional expression and targets) were displayed randomly and with equal probability.  
Targets were displayed until response or a maximum of 1500 ms. After the response 
both target and frame were replaced by a blank screen for 1000 ms followed by a fixation 
cross for 500 ms before the presentation of the next cue.  
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Figure 17: Schematic depiction of the emotional cueing task used in the current experiment. 
 
Participants were instructed to respond quickly to the target stimuli using the advance 
information provided by the cue to further speed responses. Target assignment to response 
alternatives was balanced across participants. Additionally, frame assignment (solid vs. 
dashed) to task-set (easy vs. difficult categorization) was balanced across participants. The 
experiment started with two practice blocks (32 trials), however, participants were allowed to 
repeat these practice blocks once if they had difficulty learning the frame and stimulus-
response mappings required of the task. The experiment included 768 trials (12 blocks of 64 
trials), separated by breaks in which mean reaction time (RT) and error rates were displayed.  
6.2.4  Data Analysis 
Behavioural data. 
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Only correct trials with RTs between 150 and 1500 ms contributed to the RT analysis. 
RTs and error rates were subjected to repeated measures ANOVAs with within-subject 
variables trial-type (easy vs. difficult categorization) and irrelevant facial emotion (negative 
vs. positive), and the between subjects factor of group (low MDI vs. high MDI). 
 
ERP data 
The EEG data processing (trial-inclusion criteria, referencing, and filtering) were 
identical to that reported in Chapter 2: General Methods. 
 
Cue-locked ERPs. The posterior P1 was operationalized as the maximal peak at 
electrodes PO7 and PO8 in the peak search windows 85- 135 ms after cue onset. The face-
specific N170 was measured at electrodes P9 and P10 as the most negative peak within 140-
190 ms following cue onset.  The CNV can be divided into early and late subcomponents (see 
van Boxtel & Böcker, 2004), thus the early CNV was operationalized as the mean amplitude 
1000-1300 ms after cue onset, and the late CNV as the mean amplitude 1900-2000 ms after 
cue onset (corresponding to –100 to 0 ms relative to target onset), both at midline electrode 
sites (Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz). Cue-locked components were measured using a 200 ms baseline 
commencing 200 ms before cue onset. 
 
Target-locked ERPs. P1 and N1 amplitudes were quantified using automatic peak 
detection software using a search window for the most positive amplitude 105-145 ms (P1) 
and the most negative deflection 160-220 ms (N1) relative to target onset. Finally, the target-
related P300 response was measured at Pz as the most positive potential 350-500 ms after 
target onset. Target-locked ERPs were measured against a 200 ms baseline commencing 200 
ms before target onset. 
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Statistical analysis. The resulting cue- and target-locked ERPs amplitudes or peak 
latency (P300) were subjected to repeated measures ANOVAs including the within-subject 
variables Task Difficulty (easy vs. difficult) and Irrelevant Cue Emotion (negative vs. 
positive facial expression), and the between subjects factor of Group (low MDI vs. high 
MDI). P1 and N1/N170 ANOVAs included the additional variable of Hemisphere (left or 
right) whilst CNV analyses included the additional factor of Electrode (Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz).  
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Behavioural data 
Reaction Times. Mean RTs were faster in easy (511 ms) than difficult (538 ms) trials, 
F(1, 38) =20.18, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .347, suggesting that the manipulation of task difficulty was 
successful. Despite the High MDI group displaying numerically slower overall RT than low 
MDI scorers, the overall group difference was not significant, F(1, 38) = 1.65, p = .207, ηp
2
 = 
.042. No other effects or interactions were significant, see also Figure 17, upper panel.  
Choice error rates. Participants made more errors on difficult (13.5%) than easy (9.4%) 
tasks, F(1, 38) = 12.763, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .251. Together with the RT data, this finding suggests 
that the manipulation of task difficulty was successful. Error rates were also higher when 
positive (12.0%) rather than negative (10.9%) task-irrelevant emotional faces were presented 
with the task-cue, F(1, 38) = 6.877, p = .012, ηp
2
 = .153. This effect was further modulated by 
task difficulty, F(1, 38) = 6.284, p = .017, ηp
2
 = .142. Post-hoc tests revealed that participants 
were less accurate after positive (14.5 %) than negative (12.4 %) emotions only for the 
difficult task, F(1, 38) = 12.41, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .246, but not the easy task, F < 1, n.s., see also 
Figure 17, lower panel. No other effects were statistically significant, all ps > .10.  
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Figure 18: Behavioural data from the cueing task as a function of Group, Task Difficulty 
(Easy, Difficult) and Irrelevant Cue Emotion (positive, negative). Mean RTs and choice error 
rates are depicted in the top and bottom panels, respectively. Error bars depict S.E.M.  
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6.3.2 ERP data 
Cue-Related ERPs 
P1. Peak P1 amplitudes were larger over the right (6.26 V) than the left (4.91 V) 
hemisphere, F(1, 38) = 7.32, p = .010, ηp
2
 = .162. There was also a main effect of irrelevant 
cue emotion, F(1, 38) = 5.26, p = .026, ηp
2
 = .124, which further interacted with Task 
Difficulty, F(1, 38) =5.362, p = .026, ηp
2
 = .124. Post-hoc tests revealed that the P1 was larger 
to negative (5.83 V) than positive (5.38 V) faces only for easy, F(1, 38) =11.66, p = .004, 
ηp
2
 = .235, but not for difficult task cues, F< 1, ns, see Figure 18. Important for current 
concerns, there was no main effect of Group nor interaction between Group and Irrelevant 
Emotion, Fs < 1, ns. No other effects reached significant levels, all ps> .10. 
 
N170. The peak amplitude of the N170 was significantly larger for negative (-5.06 V) 
than positive (-4.48 V) irrelevant emotional face cues, F(1, 38) = 18.22, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.324
2
., see also Figure 19. The interaction between Group and Irrelevant Emotion was not 
significant, F < 1, ns. No other effects were significant, all ps> .10.  
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Figure 19: waveforms depicting the P1 at electrodes PO8 and PO7 as a function of MDI 
group, emotional expression and task difficulty. 
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Figure 20: waveforms depicting the N170 at electrodes P9 and P10 as a function of MDI 
group, emotional expression and task difficulty. 
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Early CNV. There was a significant main effect of electrode, F(4, 152) = 14.051, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .227, due to mean early CNV amplitudes being most negative at fronto-central 
electrodes. Additionally, the early CNV was larger (more negative) for positive (-1.05 V) 
than negative (-.84 V) cue emotions, F(1, 38) = 4.26, p = .046, ηp
2
 = .10. No other main 
effects or interactions were significant, all ps >.10, see Figure 20. 
Late CNV. The main effect of Electrode was significant, F(3, 152) = 16.05, p< .001, ηp
2
 
= .297, due to late CNV amplitudes being largest at fronto-central electrode sites. 
Additionally, late CNV amplitudes were more negative for cues indicating an upcoming easy 
(-3.18 V) than difficult task (-2.86 V), F(1, 38) = 4.52, p = .040, ηp
2
 = .106, see Figure 22 
Important for the current hypotheses, there was a significant main effect of emotional 
expression, F(1, 38) = 6.55, p = .015, ηp
2
 = .147, which further interacted with Group, F(1, 
38) = 4.13, p = .049, ηp
2
 = .10. Post-hoc ANOVAs revealed that this interaction was due to 
late CNV amplitudes being attenuated after negative (-2.57 V) rather than positive face cues 
(-3.21 V) for the high, F(1, 19) = 9.94, p = .01, ηp
2
 = .343, but not for low MDI participants, 
F < 1, ns, see Figure 20. There was a further interaction between group, emotion and 
electrode, F(4, 152) = 2.96, p = .022, ηp
2
 = .07, due to the group difference being largest at 
fronto-central electrode sites. 
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Figure 21: cue-locked waveforms depicting the effect of Emotional face on the CNV at 
midline electrode sites separately for the Low (Left panels) and High (right panels) MDI 
groups. 
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Target-related ERPs 
P1 and N1. No effects reached significant levels in the P1 amplitude, all Fs < 2.70, all 
ps > .11. The N1 was larger of the left (-5.23 V) than the right (-4.20 V) hemisphere, F(1, 
38) = 4.53, p = .040, ηp
2
 = .107, see Figure 21. The N1 amplitudes were larger for targets 
preceded by negative (-4.86 V) than positive irrelevant face cues (-4.52 V), F(1, 38) = 
7.17, p = .011, ηp
2
 = .159. Furthermore, amplitudes were more negative for easy than difficult 
targets, F(1, 38) = 8.80, p = .005, ηp
2
 = .188, however, this main effect further interacted with 
Hemisphere, F(1, 38) = 5.38, p = .026, ηp
2
 = .124; N1 amplitudes were modulated by task 
difficulty at PO7 (easy: -5.51 V vs. difficult: -4.95 V), F(1, 38) = 11.46, p = .004, ηp
2
 = .23, 
but not PO8, p > .10, see Figure 22. No other effects were significant, all ps > .10.  
P300. The P300 peaked later for difficult (496 ms) than easy target tasks (480 ms), F(1, 
38) = 9.91, p = .003, ηp
2
 = .207, see Figure 21 and Figure 22. Additionally, the P300 peaked 
later for high MDI (509 ms) than low MDI participants (467 ms), F(1, 38) = 5.84, p = .021, 
ηp
2
 = .133, see Figure 21. No other effects on the latency of the P300 were significant  
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Figure 22: Waveforms depicting the target-locked ERPs presented as a function of group, 
task difficulty and facial expression. Left panels: Target P1 and N1 components at electrodes 
PO7 and PO8. Right panels: P300 at electrode Pz. 
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Figure 23: Stimulus-locked waveforms depicting the difficulty effects. Waveforms are 
collapsed across the emotion of the irrelevant face and across participant groups.  
 
6.4 Discussion 
The current study investigated the ability of individuals with elevated depressive 
symptoms to engage with task-relevant cue-information over a delay period whilst ignoring 
task-irrelevant emotional information. Behaviourally, while both RT and error-rates 
demonstrated robust effects of task difficulty, no differential effects of emotional distractors 
were found between participant groups. Conversely, the ERP results were largely in line with 
the experimental predictions.  First, while early perceptual ERPs (the P1 and N170) were 
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modulated by emotional expressions, this effect did not differ between participant groups. 
Therefore, while task-irrelevant emotional expressions of the faces were clearly processed, 
increased early perceptual engagement with concern-related material (sad faces) was not 
evident in the elevated depressive symptom group. In contrast, the late CNV, measured 
immediately before target onset, was reduced after negative rather than positive affective 
distractors for the High but not the Low MDI participant group. Importantly, this differential 
modulation by affective distractors between groups of late, but not early, information 
processing stages is in line with recent suggestions that depression-related mood-congruent 
processing biases selectively affect later stages of cognitive processing (e.g., Bradley et al., 
1997; Gotlib et al., 2004; Koster et al., 2005).  
Interestingly, the apparent distracting effect of mood-congruent information on the 
CNV in the elevated MDI group was not associated with co-occurring behavioural 
impairment. Importantly, previous authors have suggested that strong distraction effects on 
CNV amplitude should only be inferred when attenuated ERPs are associated with poorer 
behavioural performance (cf. Tecce & Hamilton, 1973; Wagner et al., 1996). In fact, 
participants in general appeared to make overall less mistakes after negative rather than 
positive distractors, however, this effect did not interact with group. Consequently, it appears 
that the reduced CNV observed here after negative emotion in the elevated MDI group results 
from an affective process that occurs in parallel to, but does not interfere with, preparatory 
processes facilitating behavioural responses to the target. Alternatively, it might be suggested 
that participants did not engage adaptive preparatory or anticipatory processes during the cue-
target interval, and instead relied entirely on information provided after target onset. While 
further experimentation including uninformative cues would be required to unambiguously 
assess the influence of informative cues on task performance, the modulation of CNV 
amplitude by cued task difficulty suggests that participants indeed engaged with task-relevant 
179 
 
cue information during the cue-target interval. Importantly, several authors have suggested 
that ERP activity measured during the time-window of the CNV might comprise several sub-
components relating to both response preparation or other attentional processes (cf. Leuthold 
et al., 2004; van Boxtel & Böcker, 2004). Consequently, it is possible that variation in the 
CNV related to task difficulty (independent of MDI group) and irrelevant affective material 
(specific to high MDI scorers) reflects the operation of parallel, distinct psychological 
processes. 
The modulation of the CNV by cued task difficulty, with larger CNVs for easy than 
difficult upcoming tasks, is interesting despite this effect not differing between participant 
groups. More specifically, this finding seems inconsistent with the idea that CNV amplitude 
is positively associated with resource-demand of the upcoming target response (cf. 
Falkenstein et al., 2003). Consequently, it is of interest to understand why larger CNVs were 
observed before easy than difficult tasks in the current study. First, as cues did not inform 
about any specific motor operations required for the target response, the observed modulation 
of CNV amplitude by task difficulty cannot be attributed to advanced and hand-specific 
motor preparation during the cue-target interval (van Boxtel & Böcker, 2004). Interestingly, 
previous studies of interference tasks have also suggested that non-motoric changes in CNV 
amplitude might be larger for apparently easy rather than difficult trials. For example, Gratton 
et al. (1992) noted that the CNV was larger when cues indicated an up-coming compatible 
(~easy) than incompatible (~difficult) flanker array. Furthermore, Alpay et al., (2009) 
reported that the CNV was more negative following compatible than incompatible trials in the 
Simon task. Alpay et al. (2009) suggested that such CNV modulation might reflect an overall 
increased “response readiness” after compatible compared to incompatible trials. Thus, in the 
current context it is possible that participants demonstrated increased readiness when the 
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upcoming trial involved an easy categorization, whilst participants adopted a less ready (more 
cautious) state in anticipation of difficult categorizations.  
The current results do not support previous suggestions that depressive symptoms might 
be associated with impaired performance on increasingly effortful tasks (e.g., Hartlage et al., 
1993); in the current study participant groups demonstrated equivalent abilities to make both 
easy and difficult categorizations. It should be noted, however, that a sub-clinical participant 
group was used in the current study, therefore, the possibility remains that general attentional 
control impairments might occur when more severe or clinically depressed participants are 
tested (see also De Lissnyder, Koster, Derakshan & De Raedt, 2010; De Raedt & Koster, 
2010; Joorman et al., 2007). Furthermore, the overall CNV did not differ between the 
elevated and low symptom group, questioning previous suggestions that preparatory or 
proactive control processes are generally diminished in sub-clinical depression (see West et 
al., 2010). Interestingly, however, target P300 latency was significantly longer in the elevated 
compared to the low symptom group. This finding is in line with some prior reports of 
increased P300 latency in depressed groups (Karaaslan, Gonul, Oguz, Erdinc & Esel, 2003; 
Nandrino, Massiou & Evrett, 1996). As the latency of the P300 has been linked to general 
cognitive efficiency (Polich & Kok, 1995; Polich, 1991), increased P300 latency might be 
interpreted as a general slowing of cognitive operations in depression. Importantly, given the 
lack of behavioural impairment in the high MDI group, however, these results must be 
interpreted with caution. More specifically, while elevated depression was associated with 
numerically slower and less accurate overall performance, these differences were not 
statistically significant.  
Independent of MDI group, task difficulty modulated the amplitude of the N1 and the 
latency of the P300. The target N1 was larger for easy than difficult targets, specifically over 
the left hemisphere. As identical stimuli were used for easy and difficult targets, these N1 
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modulations cannot be explained by differences in physical stimulus properties between 
conditions. Instead it appears that easy trials were associated with the attentional 
amplification of early sensory processing of targets, which might have in part facilitated easy 
categorizations. These findings are in line with previous suggestions that the posterior N1 
might reflect a discriminative processes in early selective attention (cf. Vogel & Luck, 2001), 
whilst the left lateralization of this N1 effect is in line with previous reports of left 
hemisphere specialisation in perceptual aspects of letter processing (e.g., Polk et al., 2002). 
Finally, longer peak latencies in the P300 component to difficult rather than easy task 
categorizations is consistent with previous suggestions that this ERP component is sensitive 
to the duration of stimulus categorization processes (Kutas et al., 1977; Polich et al., 2007).  
Independent of the hypothesised relationships between affect and executive function, 
the current results further inform theories of emotional information processing associated 
with elevated depressive symptoms. First, in line with many previous suggestions, the cue-
related N170 was larger in response to negative facial expressions (see also Batty & Taylor, 
2003; Blau et al., 2007; Kolassa et al., 2007; Kolassa et al., 2009; Martens et al., 2010). These 
findings support previous suggestions that early face perception is sensitive to the initial 
saliency (cf. Sprengelmeyer & Jentzsch, 2006) or early selective attentional processing (cf. 
Martens et al., 2010; Mohamed, Neuman & Schweinberger, 2009) of negative emotional 
expressions. Furthermore, this emotional modulation of the N170 occurred when affect was 
not task relevant; questioning previous suggestions that this N170 is only sensitive to 
emotional expressions when participants are explicitly instructed to attend to affective aspects 
of the face (Kolassa et al., 2007). Most importantly, affective modulations of the N170 were 
independent of MDI group (see Jaworska et al., 2012 for a similar suggestion). This finding is 
in line with previous suggestions that depression is not necessarily associated with mood-
congruent biases in early perceptual processing of concern-related material (cf. Bradley et al., 
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1997; Mogg et al., 2000; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Gotlib et al., 2004). In contrast, the CNV as 
an index of sustained anticipatory/preparatory activity was differentially modulated by 
emotion as a function of group, providing novel psychophysiological support for suggestions 
that mood-congruent processing biases selectively affect later stages of information 
processing in those with elevated depressive symptoms (c.f., Bradley et al., 1997; Koster et 
al., 2005).  
In addition, the cue-related P1 component was influenced by emotional expression. The 
P1 was more positive for negative expressions; however, this effect was restricted to 
conditions in which faces were paired with an easy cue. While attentional effects on the P1 
amplitude must be interpreted with caution since low-level stimulus features are known to 
strongly effect these components (see Rossion & Jacques, 2008), the interaction between 
categorization difficulty and emotion cannot be explained by solely by low-level stimulus 
features. More specifically, the aspect of the cue which conveyed task-set information (frame 
texture) was balanced between conditions across participants meaning effects of cue-
difficulty cannot be easily attributed purely to physical aspects of the stimulus. More 
important for current concerns, however, the P1 amplitude did not vary by group. In contrast, 
several studies have reported generally increased P1 amplitudes during emotional face 
processing in social phobia (e.g., Kolassa & Miltner, 2006; Kolassa et al., 2007; Kolassa et 
al., 2009), putatively because these groups engage a hyper-vigilant style of processing when 
the upcoming trial might include concern-related material. However, despite previous 
suggestions that negative interpersonal signals may be of particular concern in depression 
(Gotlib et al., 2004), the P1 did not reveal such hyper-vigilant monitoring in the elevated 
symptom group.  
Finally, some important characteristics the current sample are worthy of discussion 
when comparing the current results to existing studies. First, self-report MDI scores 
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correlated highly with levels of trait anxiety, thus it is currently difficult to differentiate 
between depression-specific effects and those related to general negative affect (shared by 
both depression and anxiety). It should be noted that such associations between depressive 
and anxious symptoms are common in clinical and sub-clinical samples (see Fountoulakis, et 
al., 2007; Hirschfield, 2001), thus the high comorbidity present in the current sample is 
relatively typical of existing investigations. One obvious concern stemming from this 
comorbidity rate is, if anxiety is associated to hypersensitive early monitoring for concern-
related material, why does a sample with both high anxiety and depression not show 
increased early processing of negative material. Importantly, one potentially distinguishing 
factor between depression and anxiety is the reduced levels of positive affect present in 
depressed samples (Watson et al., 1988). It has previously been suggested that this anhedonic 
aspect of depressive symptomatology might reduce the motivation to engage hypersensitive 
monitoring for negative information in the environment (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). 
Consequently, it is possible that the elevated depressive symptom group were not 
characterised by hyperactive monitoring for concern-related material (e.g., increased P1 or 
N170 amplitude), but instead with increased engagement with negative material once it has 
already become the subject of attention (see also Joormann et al., 2007; Koster et al., 2005).  
In conclusion, the current results provide novel neurophysiological support for previous 
suggestions that mood-congruent attentional biases occur selectively at late stages of affective 
information processing in participants with elevated depressive symptoms (e.g., Bradley et 
al., 1997; Gotlib et al., 2004; Koster et al., 2005). Importantly, these differences were 
observed in a group reporting sub-clinical depressive symptoms, and, therefore, motivate 
future research investigating the effects of emotional distraction on the CNV in pre-selected 
clinical cohorts. Furthermore, as previous research has suggested that difficulty disengaging 
from mood-congruent material might be particularly problematic for depressed individuals 
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with increased ruminative thinking styles (De Lissnyder, Koster, Goubert, Onraedt, 
Vanderhasselt& De Raedt, 2012; Koster et al., 2011), future work investigating emotional 
modulation of the CNV might benefit from the measurement of ruminative aspects of 
depressive cognition. Nevertheless, given that clear differences of emotion on CNV between 
groups observed in the current study suggests that slow cortical potentials such as the CNV 
might provide a fruitful avenue for on-going research into the interaction between emotional 
and non-emotional cognitive processing as a function of depressive psychopathology. 
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7  
General Discussion 
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The aim of the current thesis was to investigate the potential influence of elevated levels 
of depressive symptoms on a range of cognitive control abilities, using experimental 
paradigms containing either neutral or affective stimuli. As cognitive control typically refers 
to a broad range of psychological functions, the empirical work employed a range of 
measures, assessing diverse aspects of executive control such as error processing, conflict 
adaptation, and advanced preparation. Additionally, Chapters 3, 4 and 6 employed ERP 
analyses to investigate psychophysiological aspects of task performance between groups. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 addressed the central aim of the current thesis, investigating mood-
dependent changes in cognitive control, while the initial study reported in Chapter 3 aimed to 
differentiate between competing accounts of posterror slowing.  
In the following general discussion I will first overview the main findings from the 
empirical chapters of the current thesis project. Secondly, I will discuss the results pertaining 
to “general” (i.e., those associated with non–valenced tasks) attentional and cognitive control 
functions associated with depression. Third, the role of affect in attentional processes will be 
discussed in relation to depressive symptoms. Finally, the results of Chapters 3 and 4 will be 
discussed in the context of recent debates regarding posterror adjustments.  
 
7.1 Summary of the Empirical Results 
Study 1. The first chapter aimed to differentiate between competing adaptive and non-
adaptive accounts of posterror adjustment using a false-feedback manipulation. Critically, 
while f-P300 modulation indicated that false-feedback in general violated participants’ 
feedback-expectations, subsequent trial RT performance was slowed and speeded for false 
feedback (vs. accurate) following correct and error performance, respectively. These 
divergent behavioural responses after expectancy violation are clearly inconsistent with the 
orienting account of posterror slowing, which predicts that surprise should inevitably be 
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followed by increased RT slowing. In the context of the current thesis, this study served to 
validate the use of posterror slowing as a measure of adaptive error processing in participant 
groups with elevated depressive symptoms (see Study 2).  
  
Study 2. This study systematically investigated the relationship between depressive 
symptoms and experiential, psychophysiological and behavioural aspects of error processing 
at various RSIs. In general, posterror adaptations on E+1 trials followed the expected pattern 
across levels of the RSI manipulation (i.e., posterror slowing effects increased with 
decreasing RSI and posterror accuracy improvements occurred specifically at the longer RSI). 
Additionally, significant posterror slowing and increased posterror accuracy was observed on 
E+2 trials at short RSIs. These accuracy results suggest that the long-term consequences of 
error-monitoring are adaptive, even when less time is available between events. Interestingly, 
however, none of these behavioural effects were associated with increasing depressive 
symptom levels. Furthermore, elevated depression was not associated with increasingly 
negative error appraisals (contextualized questionnaires) or significantly altered error-related 
brain potentials (Ne/ERN or early/late Pe). These findings do not support the idea that 
depression is associated with hypersensitive error monitoring or increased affective reactions 
to mistakes. 
 
Study 3. This study investigated the ability of participants with elevated depressive 
symptoms to exert attentional control over conflict arising from explicitly emotional 
(Emotional-face Stroop task) and non-emotional (Classic Stroop task) representations. 
Additionally, the ability to maintain proactive SAT adjustments was compared across groups 
as a measure of more sustained, strategic control processes. Interestingly, participants in the 
high depressive symptom group demonstrated a selective impairment in the trial-to-trial 
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resolution of emotional conflict. In contrast, reactive (Stroop interference, classic Stroop task 
CSEs) and sustained, proactive (SAT adjustment), processes were relatively spared across a 
range of depressive symptom levels during performance of the non-emotional task. 
Importantly, these findings suggest that depressive symptoms might be associated with 
control impairments specifically when control over emotional sources of distraction is 
required.  
 
Study 4.  The final study in the current thesis investigated the ability of participants 
with elevated depressive symptoms to utilize task-relevant information (cues indicating up-
coming task difficulty) across a delay period despite the presence of task-irrelevant emotional 
distractors. In addition to behavioural performance, the CNV was measured as a 
psychophysiological correlate of advanced preparation. Behaviourally, groups did not differ 
in their general ability to perform easy and difficult categorization tasks, suggesting that 
depressive symptoms were not associated with general impairments during increasingly 
difficult tasks. In contrast, the ERP results indicated that elevated depression levels were 
associated with a mood-congruent attenuation of a brain potential related to advanced 
preparation (CNV), but not components related to early perceptual/selective attention 
processes (P1, N170). Importantly, this pattern of results provides novel neurophysiological 
support for a late locus of mood congruent attentional processing bias in depression.  
 
7.2. Depressive Symptoms and Cognitive Control Processes in Non-Valenced Tasks. 
The empirical work presented in the current thesis tested many facets of cognitive 
control in participants with elevated levels of depressive symptoms.  Importantly, the detailed 
study of cognitive control functions associated with elevated levels of depression is motivated 
by subjective reports of difficulty concentrating representing a diagnostic symptom for MDD 
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(DSM-IV, 1994). More specifically, a more comprehensive understanding of such cognitive 
features of depression can be provided by understanding more precisely the cognitive 
operations affected in currently symptomatic individuals. Furthermore, as several authors 
have suggested that executive and cognitive control processes might relate to daily life 
functions, such as work-place, social and academic functioning, in addition to the “cognitive” 
regulation of emotion (e.g., Bock, Rimm-Kaufman, Nathanson & Grimm, 2009; De Raedt & 
Koster, 2010; Elliott, 1998; Phillips et al., 2002; Rosier & Sahakian, 2013; Snyder, 2013) 
cognitive control processes affected by depression potentially link cognitive symptoms of 
depression to the disabling effects of the disorder on daily life functioning (De Raedt & 
Koster, 2010; Snyder, 2013). Interestingly, in contrast to previous suggestions, the overall 
picture advocated by the empirical work presented in the current thesis did not support the 
idea that depression is associated with generally impaired cognitive control processes, 
particularly in the context of non-emotional tasks. These findings contrast the conclusions of  
some previous investigations reporting cognitive control impairments in similarly depressed 
groups (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008a; Meiran et al., 2011; Snyder, 2013; West et al., 
2010). Consequently, in the following section I will compare the results of the current 
empirical work with that of previous investigations in an attempt to review of the nature of 
cognitive control processes associated with depressive symptoms. 
 
7.2.1 Depressive Symptoms and the Online Modulation of Cognitive Control. 
Many authors consider both posterror and post-conflict (CSE) adjustments to reflect 
classic measures of the online upregulation of cognitive control processes, initiated after 
internal performance monitoring processes signal the need for increased control (e.g., 
Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004; Egner, 2007; Gratton et al., 1992; Kerns et al., 2004; Laming, 
1979; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; St rmer et al., 2002; but see 
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Hommel et al., 2004; Mayr et al., 2003). Importantly, despite observing robust CSEs (classic 
Stroop task, Chapter 5) and posterror adjustments (Chapter 4) in the empirical work presented 
in the current thesis, these effects were not associated with elevated levels of depressive 
symptoms. Together, these findings do not support the idea that depression is associated with 
impairments in the transient upregulation of executive control, triggered by evaluative signals 
from internal performance monitoring processes (Botvinick et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof et al., 
2004; Yeung et al., 2004). 
 In specific regard to the CSE effect, only two studies to my knowledge have reported 
generally impaired CSE adjustments (i.e., failure to reduce interference effects after conflict) 
during classic colour-word Stroop performance in depressed samples (c.f., Holmes & 
Pizzagalli, 2007; Meiran et al., 2011). In contrast, and in line with the current results, several 
other investigations have not reported depression-related CSE impairment in Stroop tasks 
(e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008a; West et al., 2010), the flanker task (Clawson, Clayson & 
Larson, 2013) or the Simon task (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Ng et al., 2012). As the 
empirical work presented in Chapter 5 included a sub-clinical sample, it may be suggested 
that that impaired CSEs are only observed in participants with more severe or clinical levels 
of depressive symptoms. Existing research, however, does not appear to support this idea. For 
example, while CSE impairments in the classic Stroop were previously reported in both a 
sub-clinical (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007) and clinical sample (Meiran et al., 2011), further 
investigations including clinically defined samples have reported no CSE impairment (see 
Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008a; Clawson et al., 2013). Finally, studies that have reported no 
CSE difference between groups have tended to include larger depressed samples (e.g., 
Clawson et al., 2013, N (depression group) = 55; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008a, N = 20; Ng et 
al., 2012 = 35; Pizzagalli et al., 2006, N = 17), than the two studies that reported reduced 
CSEs in depressed samples during classic colour-word Stroop performance (Holmes & 
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Pizzagalli, 2007, N = 13; Meiran et al., 2011, N = 9). Consequently, previous suggestions that 
depression is associated with impairments in the on-line control of response conflict (Holmes 
& Pizzagalli, 2007; Meiran et al., 2011) are not met with strong and reliable support either 
from the empirical work presented in the current thesis (Chapter 5), or that in the existing 
literature.  
In relation to posterror adjustments, while depression-related posterror impairments 
(reduced posterror accuracy) have been reported by a number authors (e.g., Beats et al., 1996; 
Elliott et al., 1997; Pizzagalli et al., 2006; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008b; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 
2010; Jones et al., 2010; Schroder et al., 2013), impaired error adaptation was not apparent in 
the elevated depression group in the current thesis (Chapter 4). In line with the current results, 
several other investigations have also not differences in error adaptation processes between 
depressed and control groups (e.g., Ruchsow et al., 2006; Schrijvers et al., 2008, Schrijvers et 
al., 2009; Olvet et al., 2010; Weinberg et al., 2012a). It has recently been suggested that 
variation in task-difficulty might explain some of this variation in results between 
investigations (Olvet et al., 2010; Schroder et al., 2013). More specifically, it has been 
suggested that participants with elevated depressive symptoms lack the ability to “bounce 
back” from errors during the performance of more difficult tasks (Schroder et al., 2013). In 
line with this suggestion, in easier tasks, such as the choice RT paradigm employed in the 
current thesis (see Chapter 4), it might be expected that posterror performance would not 
differ between groups with elevated and low levels of depressive symptoms. Therefore, it 
appears that depressive symptoms might not be associated with impaired error adaptation in 
general (i.e., regardless of the context in which the error occurs), but instead with 
impairments in particular task settings (e.g., more difficult tasks), which appear to provoke 
error-related impairments in depressed groups. Finally, it should also be noted that during the 
performance of such effortful tasks, depressed groups were not typically associated with 
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general impairments in cognitive control. For example, Schroder et al. (2013) switched S-R 
mappings between blocks of flanker performance to increase task difficulty, and, while 
participants with elevated depression scores demonstrated reduced posterror accuracy for 
these switch blocks (vs. blocks in which S-R mappings were maintained from block N-1), 
depression was not associated with other impairments during task performance (e.g., flanker 
effects, overall error rates), suggesting that task difficulty perhaps sensitized depressed 
individuals specifically to the occurrence of their mistakes. More specifically, during the 
performance of tasks perceived as being more difficult, negative expectations about personal 
performance associated with depression (c.f., Rosier & Sahakian, 2013) might increase the 
severity of error appraisals, leading to “catastrophic” emotional reactions to errors 
specifically in the context of more difficult tasks for depressed participants. 
7.2.2 Depression and Sustained or Proactive Cognitive Control Processes 
Recently, it has been suggested that depression might be associated with the impaired 
ability to make proactive control adjustments, as evidenced by the attenuation of a pre-
stimulus slow wave (~CNV, c.f., West et al., 2010). In contrast to this result, however, none 
of the empirical work presented in the current thesis supported the general idea that elevated 
levels of depressive symptoms are associated with a reduction in the engagement of such 
proactive control processes. First, unlike the study of West et al. (2010), in the current 
research the overall amplitude of the CNV did not differ between low and elevated depressive 
symptom groups during the performance of a cued-RT task (see Chapter 6). Moreover, both 
the study of West et al. (2010) and the current investigation measured slow-wave activity in 
sub-clinical samples, suggesting that differences in depressive symptom severity between 
cohorts provides an unlikely account for the divergent results between studies. Finally, 
experiments using clinically depressed samples often do not show general attenuations of the 
CNV component in MDD groups (see Heimberg et al., 1999; Hansenne & Ansseau, 2001), 
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further questioning the reliability of the relationship between this ERP and depression. 
Finally, the behavioural results presented in Chapter 5 were also inconsistent with the idea 
that depressive symptoms are associated with impaired sustained or proactive cognitive 
control processes. More specifically, participant groups with varying levels of depressive 
symptoms did not differ in their ability to maintain long-term speed-accuracy trade-offs 
throughout the duration of experimental blocks, suggesting the sparing of these proactive 
control processes in depression.  
7.2.3 Is Depression Associated with Increased Susceptibility to Response Conflict? 
The size of the general Stroop interference effect did not differ across a range of 
depressive symptom scores in the experiment presented in Chapter 5. Contradicting these 
results, a recently published meta-analysis of 20 studies reporting the Stroop effect in 
depressed samples suggested that depression is associated with increased susceptibility to 
Stroop interference (Snyder, 2013). As meta-analytical approaches generally have higher 
statistical power than any single experiment to estimate reliable impairments associated with 
a given population, this recent report strongly challenges the validity of the conclusions 
presented in Chapter 5. It should be noted, however, that while the quantitative nature of 
meta-analyses provides a strong method to synthesise the results from multiple investigations, 
the interpretation of such an analysis may be hindered by the procedures insensitivity to 
methodological differences between studies (see Maier & M ller, 2010). In the following 
section I will outline some methodological issues that potentially account for the apparent 
discrepancy between the current data (i.e., unimpaired Stroop effects in Chapter 5) and the 
conclusions drawn by Snyder (2013).    
First, Snyder (2013) only included studies employing the classic Stroop paradigm in her 
meta-analysis. While the precise nature of attentional control operations might vary slightly 
between different common interference tasks, such as the Flanker task, the Simon task,  and 
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Stroop task (cf. Cohen et al., 1990; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Gratton et al., 1992; Kornblum et 
al., 1990; Liu, Banich, Jacobson & Tanabe, 2004; Stürmer et al., 2002), successful 
performance on each of these protocols has been attributed to a core feature of executive 
function, which serves on-going behaviour by avoiding interference from task-irrelevant 
environmental noise (cf. Banich, 2009; Botvinick et al., 2001; Miyake et al., 2000;Verhaegen, 
2011). Consequently, if depression is associated with generally increased susceptibility to 
processing interference, one might also predict that many conflict paradigms, in addition to 
the classic colour-word Stroop effect, should also be associated with increased interference 
effects in depressed samples. In contrast, despite the Flanker task being used in numerous 
studies of cognitive control processes in depressed groups (Clawson et al., 2013; Chiu & 
Deldin, 2007; Olvet et al., 2010; Pizzagalli et al., 2006; Ruchsow et al., 2004; Schrijvers et 
al., 2008; Schrijvers et al., 2009; Schroder et al., 2013), I am aware of no single report of 
generally increased flanker interference in a depressed sample. Similarly, response conflict 
arising in the Simon task has also, albeit less frequently, been reported in groups with 
elevated depressive symptoms, again often without differences emerging between groups 
(Kanske & Kotz, 2012 (3 experiments); Halari et al., 2009; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; but 
see Ng et al., 2012). Thus, the idea that depression is generally associated with generally (i.e., 
across multiple interference protocols) increased susceptibility to response conflict does not 
appear to be met with strong support from the existing literature. 
Importantly, despite poor support for a general increased susceptibility to processing 
interference in depression, given that previous investigators propose that the mechanisms 
underlying cognitive control might differ lightly between protocols (e.g., Cohen et al., 1990; 
Gratton et al., 1992; Konblum et al., 1990; Liu et al., 2004; Stürmer et al., 2002), it remains 
possible that depression-related impairments are specific to the Stroop paradigm. Importantly, 
however, one further confound impedes the conclusions drawn by Snyder (2013) regarding 
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susceptibility to Stroop interference in depressed samples.  Specifically, while MDD groups 
(vs. controls) were associated with increased Stroop interference effects (Cohen’s d = 0.39), 
the same samples were additionally associated with an even larger general RT slowing effect 
(Cohen’s d = 0.61, neutral condition). Importantly, because general RT differences between 
groups can largely confound between-group differences in interference scores (c.f., 
Verhaegen, 2011), the increased interference effect reported by Snyder (2013) cannot be 
unambiguously attributed to cognitive control impairment in depression.  
Finally, it might be asked why previous investigations of the Stroop effect often 
reported generally increased RT effects in depressed samples, while the elevated depressive 
symptom group in Chapter 5 did not show overall RT slowing. One methodological 
difference between investigations which appears to account for this discrepancy is the use of 
blocked vs. randomized presentation of Stroop compatibility. More specifically, the majority 
of studies reporting general RT slowing during Stroop performance in depressed samples 
used blocked designs in which sequences of compatible, neutral and incompatible trials are 
presented in independent blocks (e.g., Constant et al., 2005; Kertzman et al., 2010; Lampe, 
Sitskoorn & Heeren, 2004; Lemelin et al., 1997; Lyche et al., 2011). In contrast, experiments 
using the randomised presentation of compatibility levels have often found no difference 
between controls and depressed samples (cf. Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Krompinger & 
Simons, 2011; Markela-Lerenc et al., 2006; Meiran et al., 2011; Wagner, 2006; West et al., 
2010; Chapter 5 of the current thesis). As proactive control processes can dominate 
performance when up-coming conflict levels are highly predictable (cf. Braver, 2012; De 
Pisapia & Braver, 2006; MacLeod, 1991), depression-related impairment on blocked designs 
has been interpreted as a potential failure to engage in a sustained, strategic response style 
(Markela-Lerenc et al., 2006). Disagreeing with this proposal, however, higher levels of 
proactive control should be required on sequences of incompatible trials (i.e., prioritise 
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colour-naming), compared sequences of compatible trials (Braver et al., 2007; De Pisapia & 
Braver, 2006). Therefore, impaired proactive control would also predict a selective 
impairment on incompatible trials. In contrast, Snyder (2013) noted that depressed groups 
were associated with increased RTs even on neutral trials, arguing against the idea that 
participants with depression are associated with impaired proactive control processes. Thus, it 
appears that the nature of blocked designs might encourage some general task disengagement 
and/or reduced motivation to perform at speed in depressed participants relative to controls 
(see Engeland et al., 2003 for a similar suggestion).  
 
7.3 Attentional Control over Explicitly Affective Information Processing in Depression 
Interestingly, while the empirical results presented in the current thesis do not support 
the idea that depressive symptoms are associated with cognitive control impairments during 
the performance of non-emotional tasks, differences between low and elevated depressive 
symptom groups were observed during the performance of affective paradigms. First, 
elevated depressive symptom levels were associated with the impaired ability to resolve 
emotional conflict on a trial-to-trial basis (Chapter 5), and, secondly, an elevated depressive 
symptom group was associated with the selective, mood-congruent attenuation of an ERP 
related to late (CNV), but not early (P1, N170), aspects of attentional processing (Chapter 6). 
Importantly, both of these effects occurred selectively in the presence of emotional material, 
suggesting that attentional processes in depression might be selectively affected during the 
performance of emotional tasks. It should be noted, however, that it appears unlikely that the 
emotion-specific effects observed in Chapters 5 and 6 reflect the impairment of the same 
underlying psychological processes. Specifically, while the mood-congruent attenuation of 
the CNV appeared to be valence-specific (i.e., a selective amplitude attenuation for negative, 
but not positive, emotional distractors in the elevated depressive symptom group), 
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incompatible trials in the emotional-face Stroop task required the regulation of emotional 
processes in general (i.e., control over both positive and negative representations, see also 
Monti et al., 2010), implicating an emotion-specific, but not valence specific mechanism (see 
also Egner et al., 2008). In the following sections I will relate both of these findings to current 
theories of biased attentional processing and the regulation of emotional information 
processing in depression. 
7.3.1 Mood-Congruent Attentional Bias Associated with Depressive Symptoms 
Since their inception, cognitive theories of the emotional disorders have suggested that 
depression is associated with a mood-congruent processing bias towards concern-related, 
negative material (Beck, 1979; Beck, 2008; Bower, 1981; Disner et al., 2011; Gotlib et al., 
2004; Koster et al., 2005; Bradley et al., 1997). Recently, it has also been suggested that such 
biases occur specifically when negative affective material is presented for longer periods of 
time (e.g., Bradley et al., 1997; Gotlib et al., 2004; Koster et al., 2005; Koster et al., 2011; 
Mogg & Bradley, 2005), putatively due to mood-congruent processing biases in depression 
resulting from deep or elaborative processing of self-referent material (Gotlib & Joormann, 
2010; Leyman et al., 2011). Overall, the results of Chapters 5 and 6 of the current thesis are 
partially in line with such a late locus of valence-specific processing biases in depression. As 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, the mood-congruent modulation of the CNV, but not 
earlier aspects of attentional processing (e.g., P1, N170), by sad material is in line with 
suggestions that enhanced engagement with self-referent material associated with depression 
selectively occurs at late, post-perceptual stages of information processing (e.g., Bradley et 
al., 1997; Gotlib et al., 2004; Koster et al., 2005). In the emotional-face Stroop paradigm, 
however, a mood-congruent attentional bias might be predicted to produce larger interference 
effects when negative (i.e., the word ‘SAD’) rather than positive distractors (i.e., the word 
‘HAPPY’) are presented to low-mood participants. In contrast to this suggestion, additional 
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analyses revealed no increased Stroop effect for negative (sad) compared to positive (happy) 
distractor words for the elevated depressive symptom group. This finding is inconsistent with 
the idea that depression is associated with valence-specific attentional bias. Importantly, 
however, during task performance, emotional-face Stroop stimuli were presented only until a 
response was committed (typically < 550 ms). As recent research proposes that mood-
congruent biases in depression are most commonly observed at longer stimulus durations 
(typically ≥ 1000 ms) (e.g., Bradley et al., 1997;  otlib et al., 2004; Koster et al., 2005; 
Leyman et al., 2011), concern-related information may not have been presented for a 
sufficient duration to provoke valence-specific biases in high symptom scorers during 
emotional-face Stroop performance. Therefore, differences in the length of mood-congruent 
stimulus presentation time might explain the apparently inconsistent valence-specific effects 
between Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
7.3.2 Emotional-face Stroop Performance and the Implicit Regulation of Emotion 
It is clear that a valence-unspecific, but emotion-specific mechanism provides the most 
likely explanation for the impaired ability to resolve emotional conflict observed in the 
emotional-face Stroop task. More specifically, successful resolution of emotional conflict 
requires being able to exert similar levels of control over both positive and negative distractor 
words (see also Monti et al., 2010), as conflict trials include both positive and negative 
emotional material. Therefore, the impairment observed in the elevated symptom group in 
Chapter 5 appears to reflect an inability to resolve emotional conflict in general. This finding 
is particularly interesting when contrasted with the spared control over conflict observed 
during classic colour-word Stroop performance in the same elevated symptom group. 
Together, these results propose that the depression-related impairment does not stem from a 
general impairment in conflict resolution processes per se, but to an attentional control 
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process specific to explicitly emotional conflict. In potential explanation for this dissociation, 
several previous authors have proposed that affect-specific mechanisms underlie the 
resolution of emotional conflict, in contrast to those involved in the resolution of conflicts 
arising from non-emotional representations (e.g., classic Stroop interference) (Egner et al., 
2008; Maier & di Pellegrino, 2012; Monti et al., 2010; Soutschek & Schubert, 2013). For 
example, Monti et al. (2010) reported that healthy ageing was associated with the impaired 
resolution of conflict arising from non-emotional, but not from emotional distractors. 
Interestingly, the converse appears to have occurred for the elevated depression sample in the 
Chapter 5: conflict resolution was impaired on the emotional-face but not the classic Stroop 
paradigm. Together, these results suggest that processes of emotional and non-emotional 
conflict resolution can be selectively dissociated on an individual difference level.  
Finally, on a psychological level, Gyurak et al. (2011) recently suggested that emotional 
conflict resolution reflects a form of implicit (i.e., un-instructed) emotion regulation, as this 
sequential adjustment involves exercising attentional control over competing affective 
representations (see also Etkin et al., 2011). Consequently, it might be suggested that 
depression is associated with the selectively impaired regulation of emotional information 
processing. This suggestion appears to accord with the mood-disturbance which characterises 
depression, and implies a fundamental inability to regulate emotional processing. 
Furthermore, on a neuroanatomical level, emotional conflict has been associated with 
increased activation in the amygdalae, which is in turn suppressed in post-conflict trials by 
increased control from the rACC (c.f., Egner et al., 2008; Etkin et al., 2006; Etkin et al., 2011; 
Maier & di Pellegrino, 2012). The reduced ability to resolve emotional conflict associated 
with depressive symptoms might involve the specific dysfunction of this rACC-amygdala 
interaction. In line with this suggestion, converging evidence from several neuroimaging 
studies has suggested that depression is associated with the hyperactive and more sustained 
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response of the amygdala both at resting state and during the processing of affective stimuli 
(see Beck, 2008; Disner et al., 2011; Drevets, 1998; Liotti & Mayberg, 2001; Mayberg, 1997; 
Siegle et al., 2002), as well as the dysfunction of the rACC (Eugene et al., 2010; 
Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008; van Tol et al., 2010).  Therefore, the current behavioural 
results are in line with previous proposals that depression is associated with reduced top-
down control over hyperactive ventral emotional processing (e.g., Beck, 2008; Liotti & 
Mayberg, 2001; Mayberg et al., 1997; Rosier & Sahakian, 2013).  It should be noted, 
however, that this line of reasoning is speculative, and future neuroimaging work might aim 
to clarify the neuroanatomical nature of such implicit emotion regulation in depressed 
samples.  
7.3.4 Depressive Symptoms and the Distinction Between “Hot” and “Cold” Cognition. 
Rosier and Sahakian (2013) recently suggested that depression might be associated with 
particular control impairments over “hot” rather than “cold” cognitive processes. In their 
review the authors defined “hot” cognitive processes as those including emotionally valenced 
stimuli or negative feedback, whereas “cold” cognitive processes are those facilitating non-
emotional aspects of performance, such as those measured by classic, affectively neutral 
neuropsychological tests of executive function. Importantly, however, the authors suggested 
that “cold” cognitive processes might be “turned hot” in depressed individuals, particularly 
when performance feedback indicates a negative event such as an error (see also, Beats et al., 
199 ; Elliott et al., 1997; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007). Recently, however, seemingly “cold” 
cognitive processes, such as conflict monitoring (c.f., Botvinick et al., 2001), have been 
suggested to involve affective processes (Botvinick, 2007), challenging a clear dichotomy 
between “hot” and “cold” cognitive processes. More specifically, Botvinick and colleagues 
(e.g., Botvinick, 2007; Kool et al., 2010), recently suggested that both response conflict and 
errors are perceived as aversive events, which motivate subsequent avoidant regulatory 
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processes (i.e., conflict adaptation; posterror adjustments) in the avoidance of these 
affectively negative outcomes (see also van Steenbergen et al., 2009). Consequently, if 
evaluative aspects of control monitor on-going performance for aversive events, all remedial 
executive adjustments might be considered a form of implicit emotion regulation (see Gyurak 
et al., 2011 for a similar suggestion). In the context of error processing, these suggestions are 
additionally supported by previous reports that errors are associated with increased autonomic 
arousal (Hajack et al., 2003a; O’Connell et al., 2007), startle response (Hajcak & Foti, 2008) 
and amygdala activity (Pourtois et al., 2010). Most important for current concerns, if elevated 
depressive symptomatology is associated with a general failure to regulate aversive/affective 
events, it might be expected that all sequential effects in cognitive control would be impaired 
in symptomatic individuals: This was, however, not the case in the current thesis.  
One key concept which might help to resolve this apparent inconsistency in the current 
results is the idea of “cognitive reactivity” in depressed participants. More specifically, 
cognitive theories of emotional disorders suggest that individuals vulnerable to depression are 
characterised by increased reactivity to concern-related stressors in the environment (c.f., 
Beck, 1967, 2008; De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Disner et al., 2011). It should also be noted, 
however, that the effects of a stressor may be influenced either by the relevance of the event 
to depressive symptomatology (e.g., specific to sad rather than threatening stimuli, see Gotlib 
et al., 2004), and also to the salience/magnitude of the stressor itself (c.f., De Raedt & Koster, 
2010; Monroe & Harkness, 2005). Consequently, conflicts between unambiguously affective 
representations in a task in which performance requires the identification of emotional 
expression (i.e., Emotional Stroop task), might prompt a stronger emotional reaction than 
general response conflict or errors. In other words, instead of viewing “hot” and “cold” 
cognitive processes as being strictly dichotomous, the degree of emotionality evoked by two 
paradigms might differ on continuum. Furthermore, depression-related impairments might 
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occur especially for the most unambiguously affective paradigms. More specifically, 
depressive symptom-related impairment might be more prevalent when affective signals from 
evaluative processes exceed a certain threshold that determines whether affective signals are 
met with adaptive, resolution-related behaviours (e.g., conflict adaptation; posterror accuracy 
improvements; c.f., Botvinick, 2007), rather than “catastrophic” (cf. Beats et al., 199 ) or 
“exaggerated” (Beck, 2008) reactions to negative events which are ultimately detrimental for 
on-going performance (see also Inzlicht & Legault, in press). 
In light of these suggestions, the current and existing results regarding conflict 
adaptation appear to fit with the idea of ‘cognitive reactivity”, as impaired CSEs in non-
valenced conflict tasks appear to be particularly rare in depression (see Clawson et al., 2013; 
Ng et al., 2012). Additionally, the more mixed results regarding posterror performance in 
depressed samples may also be accounted for by a similar concept. More specifically, several 
authors have recently suggested that depressive-symptom specific posterror performance 
impairments (i.e., decreased posterror accuracy) occur selectively on highly difficult/effortful 
tasks (cf. Olvet et al., 2010; Schroder et al., 2013). For example, Schroder et al. (2013) 
suggested that those with elevated depressive symptoms lack the cognitive resources to 
“bounce back” from their errors during effortful task performance.  hile the Schroder et al. 
did not explicitly state whether or not this failed error-recovery was due to an exaggerated 
emotional response to the error or not, it might be suggested that effortful task-contexts 
modulate affective responses to errors. More specifically, dysfunctional attitudes (Beck, 
1979; Beck, 2008) and negative expectations about self-performance (c.f., Roiser & 
Sahakian, 2013) associated with depression are perhaps amplified during the performance of 
increasingly difficult tasks. In turn, such negative expectations regarding performance might 
increase the saliency of errors, leading to a depression-specific ‘catastrophic’ (Beats et al., 
1996) response to mistakes during more difficult rather than easy tasks. Further supporting 
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this affective-motivational idea, Holmes and Pizzagalli (2007) reported that sub-clinically 
depressed participants showed decreased posterror accuracy in the Simon task when blocks 
were preceded by negative emotional feedback, as compared to positive feedback, suggesting 
that feelings of personal failure or inadequacy might lead to depression-related impairments 
in posterror performance (see also Compton et al., 2008). Therefore, in the experimental work 
presented in the current thesis (Chapter 4), participants with elevated levels of depression 
perhaps did not show posterror performance impairments because the choice RT task 
employed was relatively simple. In line with this suggestion, in Chapter 4 participants with 
elevated depressive symptoms did not report increased negative appraisals of errors on an 
error-contextualised questionnaire, suggesting that errors were not experienced as being 
subjectively more aversive for participants with elevated rather than low levels of depressive 
symptoms during task performance in Chapter 4.  
 
7.4 The Generalizability of the Current Results to Clinical Depression 
All of the empirical studies included in the current thesis which assessed cognitive 
control processes associated with elevated depressive symptoms included sub-clinical 
samples, identified by raw scores on self-report inventories. While this method is commonly 
used to identify participant groups in experimental research (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; 
Joormann, 2004; Koster et al., 2005; Krompinger & Simons, 2011; Leyman et al., 2011; 
Schroder et al., 2013;  est et al., 2010), it may be suggested the lack of ‘general’ cognitive 
control impairments observed in the current samples can be attributed to less severe 
impairments occurring in the current groups than in cohorts selected due to clinical diagnostic 
criteria. Importantly, as no clinical groups were assessed during the current empirical work, 
meaning that this issue cannot be entirely circumvented using the present data, in the 
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following section I will discuss the potential strengths and weaknesses of the employed 
approach to participant selection in the current thesis. 
 First, an obvious concern is that elevated depressive symptom groups identified by 
self-report measures are characterised by generally lower levels of overall symptom severity 
than clinical groups. Consequently, general cognitive control impairments not observed in the 
current work may be observed more reliably in clinically depressed participants.  Importantly, 
despite selecting participants by clinical interview, many studies also utilize self-report 
inventories (particularly the BDI-II) to quantify depressive symptom severity, making it 
possible to compare overall levels of symptoms between sub-clinical and clinical groups. 
These comparisons reveal that the high symptom groups in Chapters 4 and 5 displayed 
similar mean BDI-II scores as several cohorts selected according to clinical diagnostic criteria 
in other investigations (e.g., Clasen et al., 2013; Clawson et al., 2013; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 
2008a).  Therefore, in terms of overall symptom severity at least, the current groups appear to 
be comparable with many groups defined by clinical diagnoses. Further suggesting that self-
report methods relate to clinical diagnoses, both BDI-II and MDI scores correlate strongly 
with outcome measures from clinician-administered interviews (e.g., Bech et al., 2001; Beck 
et al., 1996; Cuijpers et al., 2007; Fountoulakis, et al., 2007; Sprinkle et al., 2002). Such 
correlations are perhaps unsurprising as both the MDI and BDI-II were intentionally designed 
to closely mirror the criteria used to generate MDD diagnoses by the DSM-IV (see Bech et 
al., 2001; Beck et al., 1996). Despite these arguments supporting use of self-report 
inventories, several authors have suggested that clinically defined samples might be 
qualitatively different from those reporting “analogue” or sub-clinical depression (c.f., Coyne, 
1994; Gotlib, 1984). Essentially, an individual who seeks clinical treatments for his/her 
depression might be suffering from more intense, protracted and/or debilitating 
symptomatology than predominantly university undergraduate samples self-reporting 
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increased “distress” (c.f., Coyne, 1994). Although some authors who have directly compared 
the symptom profile of clinical and sub-clinical samples have provided some argument 
against this qualitative distinction (e.g., Cox, Enns, Borger & Parker, 1999), as no clinical 
cohorts were studied in the current thesis, this argument cannot be circumvented using the 
present data. Consequently, further research using clinically defined samples would be 
required to unambiguously address this issue in future research. 
Secondly, several theories of depression suggest that cognitive processes might change 
not only as a consequence of depressive symptom severity, but also in relation to the number 
of previous depressive episodes experienced by the individual. For example, the kindling 
hypothesis (Post, 1992; as cited in Monroe & Harkness, 2005; see also Beck, 2008) suggests 
that while initial episodes of depression tend to occur in response to particularly distressing 
life events (e.g., bereavement, personal failure, or relationship breakdown), future recurrences 
of acute depressive episodes can often be triggered by relatively minor stressors. Crucially, 
these theories suggest that previous instances of depression might sensitize the individual to 
milder negative stimulation, in turn increasing vulnerability to relapse (see Beck, 2008; 
Monroe & Harkness, 2005). Similarly, it has been proposed that the recurrence of depressive 
episodes can leave a “scar” on attentional control mechanisms (c.f., De Raedt & Koster, 
2010; Vanderhasselt & De Raedt, 2009), due to both prolonged periods of chronic stress, and 
the reinforcement of negative interpretational biases that occur during acute phases of 
depression (De Raedt & Koster, 2010). Importantly, participants included in the current thesis 
were typically young adults in their early to middle twenties. As the median age of onset for 
first episode mood disorders has previously been estimated to fall within this age-range 
(Kessler et al., 2005), it might be suggested that the long-term effects of depression were 
likely minimal in the current samples. Thus, future work should aim to more closely assess 
the influence of past history of depression in relation to cognitive control. For example, it 
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might be predicted that the ability to regulate the influence of sources emotional distraction 
might be increased as a result of the previous number of depressive episodes (c.f., De Raedt 
& Koster, 2010).   
Third, no participants included in the current analyses reported currently taking 
antidepressant medication, meaning that the current empirical results were not confounded by 
medication status. Importantly, while some authors have suggested that the acute 
administration of antidepressant medication has little effect on psychophysiological aspects of 
performance monitoring (e.g., de Bruijn et al., 2006), the long-term effects of psychotropic 
medication on cognitive control in clinically depressed participants is relatively unknown 
(c.f., Ullsperger, 2011). In contrast, serotonin manipulations (i.e., SSRI administration) have 
been related to fast-occurring alterations in emotional information processing, such as 
attention bias and the identification of facial expressions (see Merens et al., 2007). 
Consequently, it seems important that attentional biases are studied in depression without the 
potentially confounding effects of antidepressant medication. While some studies do report 
results from unmediated groups with MDD (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008a), the majority 
of clinical studies (potentially 80%; Snyder, 2013) fail to control for medication status in 
participants currently seeking treatment (e.g., Clawson et al., 2013; Georgiadi et al., 2011; 
Meiran et al., 2011; Schrijver et al., 2009). Thus, the fact that medication status is more easily 
controlled for reflects a strong benefit of the use of sub-clinical participants (see also West et 
al., 2010). 
Fourth, self-report measures of depression and trait anxiety were strongly correlated 
throughout the empirical work presented in the current thesis.  Previous studies have 
attempted to isolate experimental effects related to depressive symptoms by using ANCOVA 
models to “control” for the presence of comorbid levels of anxiety (e.g., Holmes & Pizzagalli, 
2007). This approach was not pursued in the current thesis for two reasons. Most importantly, 
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if anxiety and depression are strongly related, it is unlikely that one symptom score (e.g., 
depression severity) can explain meaningful, unique variance that is not explained by the 
other symptom score (e.g., anxiety). Thus, despite anxiety frequently being “controlled for” 
using such procedures in the literature, this almost always reflects a misapplication of 
ANCOVA (see Field, 2009; Miller & Chapman, 2001 for further discussion). One further 
method employed to distinguish between experimental effects related to anxiety and 
depression has been to use structured clinical interviews to partition groups into cohorts 
meeting thresholds for a diagnosis of MDD but not GAD, and vice versa if anxiety is the 
psychopathology of interest for the current investigation (e.g., Gotlib et al., 2004; Weinberg 
et al., 2012a). This method ensures that anxiety levels in a “pure” MDD sample are below 
threshold for a comorbid diagnosis of GAD, however, it should also be noted that such “pure” 
MDD samples still report higher anxiety levels than control groups (e.g., Leyman et al., 
2007). Most interestingly, authors do find reliable differences between ‘anxious’ and 
‘depressed’ cohorts on certain psychological measures. For example, anxiety is commonly 
associated with higher Ne/ERN amplitudes whereas depression is not (c.f., Weinberg et al., 
2012b for review). Furthermore, anxious groups are associated with a preattentive bias 
towards concern-related material, whereas mood-congruent processing biases in depression 
appear to occur at a later stage of processing (Bradley et al., 1997; Koster et al., 2005; Mogg 
& Bradley, 2005). Thus, in psychopathological research the terms “depression” and “anxiety” 
do appear to be associated with differences in certain psychological processes. One factor that 
potentially distinguishes depression from anxiety is that depression is associated with 
diminished positive affect (c.f., Watson, Clark & Carey, 1988). Therefore, a number of 
authors have suggested that this an-hedonic aspect might distinguish anxiety from depression, 
with anxiety retaining the motivation to monitor highly for concern-related events (see Mogg 
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& Bradley, 2005; Weinberg et al., 2012a). Future work should aim to carefully address this 
hypothesis.  
7.5 Implications for general theories of Posterror adjustment, independent of depressive 
symptoms 
 
The results presented in the current thesis do have important general implications for 
recent debates regarding the nature of posterror slowing. More specifically, the evidence 
reported in Chapters 3 and 4 converge to support cognitive control accounts in which 
posterror slowing is assumed to reflect adaptive shifts in response criteria after errors (cf. 
Botvinick et al., 2001; Laming, 1979; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). In the following section I 
will outline specifically why the posterror results obtained within the current thesis do not fit 
well with the core predictions of the major non-adaptive theory of posterror adaptation, the 
orienting account (c.f., Notebaert et al., 2009). 
 First, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 (RSI 1000 only), participants made significant 
accuracy improvements in posterror, compared to postcorrect trials. Notably, such accuracy 
improvements clearly contradict the non-adaptive orienting account of posterror adaptation. 
More specifically, a key motivation of the orienting account was that “increased accuracy 
after errors is usually not observed” in studies of posterror slowing (Notebaert et al., 2009, p. 
275). While it is undoubtedly the case that many studies do not report statistically significant 
posterror accuracy increases (e.g., Compton et al., 2008; Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011; 
Hajcak & Simons, 2008; Hajcak et al., 2004), significant posterror accuracy improvements do 
appear to be more prevalent in the literature than Notebaert et al. (2009) suggested in the 
original formulation of the orienting account (e.g., Brewer & Smith, 1984; Brewer & Smith, 
1989; Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer & Ullsperger, 
2011; Jentzsch & Leuthold, 2006; Laming, 1968; Strozyk & Jentzsch, 2012; Schroder et al., 
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2013; Chapters 3 and 4 of the current thesis). Furthermore, while a number of studies do not 
report statistically significant levels of posterror slowing, many studies report that accuracy is 
numerically improved after errors (e.g., Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009; Hajcak et al., 2004; 
Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; Weinberg et al., 2012a). Importantly, as the choice RT tasks 
commonly employed in cognitive control studies typically yield high overall accuracy rates, it 
is plausible that many such studies fail to report improved posterror accuracy due to prevalent 
ceiling effects, despite posterror slowing being generally being motivated by a desire to move 
to a more conservative response threshold. In contrast, it appears that only relatively few 
experiments using longer RSIs (> 500 ms) in choice RT tasks have reported reduced posterror 
accuracy(e.g., Fiehler et al., 2005; Notebaert et al., 2009; Notebaert & Verguts, 2011), as 
predicted by the orienting account. 
In contrast to findings at long RSIs, posterror accuracy decreases are more commonly 
found at short RSIs (e.g., Burns, 1971; Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; Dudschig & Jentzsch, 
2009; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). As discussed previously, in line with earlier suggestion (c.f., 
Gehring & Fencsik, 2001; Welford, 1979), Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009) recently proposed 
that a more protracted bottleneck occurs at central processing stages for error rather than 
correct trials, interfering with subsequent trial processing at short RSIs. Importantly, 
according to this account, error-monitoring is assumed to reflect an adaptive process involved 
in determining the nature of the mistake (see also Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977; Welford, 1979), 
which nevertheless has deleterious consequences for on-going behaviour in the context of 
short RSIs. In contrast to this initial conceptualisation of the bottleneck account, Houtman 
and Notebaert (2013) recently suggested that the bottleneck hypothesis, akin to the orienting 
account, is a “non-functional” theory of posterror behaviour due to its apparently negative 
consequences for on-going behaviour. The E+2 findings of Chapter 4 in the current thesis, 
however, disagree with this proposal. More specifically, while posterror (E+1) accuracy 
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improvements were not observed at short RSIs, E+2 trials were associated with significant 
accuracy improvements. These findings strongly suggest that, even at short RSIs, error 
monitoring signals to motivate future improvements in performance, which appear to be 
delayed at shorter RSIs until E+2 trials, when error-monitoring has had sufficient time to 
complete before the onset of the subsequent event.  
Finally, as the orienting account is primarily a theory seeking to explain RT effects after 
surprising events, it is also important to assess the ability of the account to predict RT effects 
after expectancy violation. Questioning the RT predictions of the orienting account, and in 
line with the findings from our previous study (Picton et al., 2012), the results presented in 
Chapter 3 disagree with the suggestion that surprising events are inevitably followed by 
increased RT slowing relative to non-surprising events (c.f., Notebaert et al., 2009; Núñez 
Castellar et al., 2010). More specifically, in Chapter 3 the f-P300 was generally increased in 
response to false feedback, while subsequent RTs were either larger or smaller for false 
“ERROR” and false “CORRECT” feedback, respectively. This finding is clearly inconsistent 
with the previous proposal by Núñez Castellar et al. (2010) that ERPs relating to outcome-
expectancy (P300s) and not response-accuracy (e.g., Ne/ERN) on trial N dictates the extent of 
RT slowing by trial N+1 (see also Picton et al., 2012). Moreover, these ERP results also 
appear inconsistent with suggestions that error-related positives determine the extent of 
posterror slowing (cf. Falkenstein et al., 2000; Hajcak et al., 2003). In contrast, it may be the 
case that increased P300 amplitude does not determine the precise extent of subsequent 
slowing, but still necessarily precedes behavioural change. More specifically, as P300s have 
often been related to the updating of context (Polich, 2007), accuracy-related P300 effects 
might lead to altered behaviour (mediated by some additional process) depending on whether 
new contextual information indicates that an unexpected outcome is better or worse than 
expected (Holroyd & Coles, 2002).  These findings appear to be generally in line with 
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theories of cognitive control which suggest that control adjustments occur after out-come 
evaluation processes register a ‘cost’ to on-going performance (c.f., Botvinick, 2007; Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002; Schackman et al., 2011). 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
First, the empirical results regarding error processing presented in current thesis broadly 
support cognitive control accounts of posterror slowing (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Laming, 
1979; Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977), and generally contradict the 
predictions of the orienting account of posterror slowing (Notebaert et al., 2009). Importantly, 
these findings validate the continued use of posterror slowing as a measure of cognitive 
control processes in both basic cognitive neuroscience research, as well as in cross-sectional 
studies investigating developmental and clinical influences on cognitive control. 
In specific regard to the hypotheses relating to depressive symptoms, throughout both 
the empirical evidence gathered during the course of the current thesis project, in addition to 
the presented review and analysis of extant literature, there appears to be little strong support 
to suggest that depression is associated with reliable impairments in a number of classic 
cognitive control measures including: susceptibility to response conflict, post-conflict 
adaptation (CSE), error processing, advanced preparation and sustained response threshold 
adjustments (SAT). This evidence suggests that previous associations between general 
attentional and cognitive control processes in depression might be partially overstated. In 
contrast, novel evidence presented in the current thesis proposes that depression-related 
impairments in attentional processing occur during tasks that require the regulation of 
emotional information processing (CSE in the Emotional-face Stroop paradigm, mood-
congruent attenuation of the CNV). Therefore, together, the current results and presented 
analyses propose that depression might not be associated with impairment in “general” 
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cognitive control processes, but instead that depression is accompanied by subtle impairments 
in attentional control which occur more prevalently in the presence explicitly emotional, 
concern-related information.  
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